Introduction

Hegel's Value ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-36
Author(s):  
Dean Moyar

The Introduction situates Hegel’s theory of justice in relation to the political moralism of ideal theory and the critical realism of those who hold that theories of morality and politics should be sharply separated. The Introduction argues that the unification of morality and right in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right depends on an overlooked theory of value. The various forms of value in Hegel are listed and it is shown that they can be conceived as unified through his conception of purposiveness. Spelling out the rationality in the account as a version of inferentialism, the Introduction distinguishes Hegel’s teleological inferentialism from pragmatist inferentialism. It is shown how inferential rationality in the practical domain can underwrite a theory of justice through Hegel’s conception of the rationality of life. Finally, a Basic Argument is given as the template for the development of the content of right.

2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
David Bromell

In the context of the 2013 retirement income review (CFLRI, 2013), Kathryn Maloney and Malcolm Menzies from the Commission for Financial Literacy and Retirement Income put the question to me: what does ‘a fair go’ mean in public policy? I mentioned this in a chance conversation with Colin James, who suggested tackling the question in an active, verbal sense (‘a fair go’), rather than attempting to elaborate on ‘fairness’ as an abstract noun. Consequently, this paper does not propose ‘a theory of fairness’ as a proxy for, say, a theory of distributive justice, or a theory of social justice, even a non-ideal theory of justice (cf. Arvan, 2014; Simmons, 2010). My aim is more modest: to provide a framework for public reasoning in contexts where there is argument across the political spectrum about whether a public policy gives people who are affected by it ‘a fair go’.  


Author(s):  
David Estlund

Throughout the history of political philosophy and politics, there has been continual debate about the roles of idealism versus realism. For contemporary political philosophy, this debate manifests in notions of ideal theory versus nonideal theory. Nonideal thinkers shift their focus from theorizing about full social justice, asking instead which feasible institutional and political changes would make a society more just. Ideal thinkers, on the other hand, question whether full justice is a standard that any society is likely ever to satisfy. And, if social justice is unrealistic, are attempts to understand it without value or importance, and merely utopian? This book argues against thinking that justice must be realistic, or that understanding justice is only valuable if it can be realized. The book does not offer a particular theory of justice, nor does it assert that justice is indeed unrealizable—only that it could be, and this possibility upsets common ways of proceeding in political thought. The book's author engages critically with important strands in traditional and contemporary political philosophy that assume a sound theory of justice has the overriding, defining task of contributing practical guidance toward greater social justice. Along the way, it counters several tempting perspectives, including the view that inquiry in political philosophy could have significant value only as a guide to practical political action, and that understanding true justice would necessarily have practical value, at least as an ideal arrangement to be approximated. Demonstrating that unrealistic standards of justice can be both sound and valuable to understand, the book stands as a trenchant defense of ideal theory in political philosophy.


Author(s):  
Fernando Aranda Fraga ◽  

In 1993 John Rawls published his main and longest work since 1971, where he had published his reknowned A Theory of Justice, book that made him famous as the greatest political philosopher of the century. We are referring to Political Liberalism, a summary of his writings of the 80’s and the first half of the 90’s, where he attempts to answer the critics of his intellectual partners, communitarian philosophers. One of the key topics in this book is the issue of “public reason”, whose object is nothing else than public good, and on which the principles and proceedings of justice are to be applied. The book was so important for the political philosophy of the time that in 1997 Rawls had to go through the 1993 edition, becoming this new one the last relevant writing published before the death of the Harvard philosopher in November 2002.


2013 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 151-173
Author(s):  
Milica Trifunovic

The article gives conceptual clarification on a distinction between ideal and nonideal theory by analyzing John Rawls? theory as presented in his books ?A Theory of Justice? and ?The Law of Peoples.? The article tries to show the importance of ideal theory, while at the same time pointing out that the distinction, ideal and nonideal, needs further qualification. Further, the article also introduces the distinction of normative and descriptive into ideal and consequently nonideal theory. Through this four-fold distinction it is easier to establish the function of each theory and the separation of work-fields between philosophers, politicians and lawyers.


Author(s):  
Robert Pippin

In a famous passage in his Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel claimed that ‘philosophy is its own time comprehended in thought’. But our time is very different from Hegel’s, so two approaches have developed to understanding the relevance of his work for the contemporary world. One looks to remaining points of contact, such as his criticism of a contractualist view of the state. Another tries to apply his general approach to contemporary issues. Both are valuable, but in this article, the latter is taken up, and one issue is the focus. The question is, assuming there can be collective intentionality and collective agency (what Hegel calls Geist (spirit)), how should we understand Hegel’s claim that such group agents can be collectively self-deceived? And how would that claim bear on the contemporary political world?


Author(s):  
Naomi Zack

Ideals of justice may do little toward the correction of injustice in real life. The influence of John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice has led some philosophers of race to focus on “nonideal theory” as a way to bring conditions in unjust societies closer to conditions of justice described by ideal theory. However, a more direct approach to injustice may be needed to address unfair public policy and existing conditions for minorities in racist societies. Applicative justice describes the applications of principles of justice that are now “good enough” for whites to nonwhites (based on prior comparisons of how whites and nonwhites are treated).


Author(s):  
Christopher Thompson

The distinction between ideal and nonideal theory is an important methodological concern in contemporary political theory. At issue is the extent to which political theorizing is a practical endeavor and, consequently, the extent to which real-world facts should either be factored into political theorizing or else be assumed away. The distinction between ideal theory and nonideal theory was first introduced by John Rawls in his classic A Theory of Justice. Rawls’s ideal theory is an account of the society we should aim for, given certain facts about human nature and possible social institutions, and involves two central assumptions. First, it assumes full compliance of relevant agents with the demands of justice. Second, it assumes that historical and natural conditions of society are reasonably favorable. These two assumptions are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for his ideal theory. For Rawls, nonideal theory primarily addresses the question of how the ideal might be achieved in practical, permissible steps, from the actual, partially just society we occupy. The account of ideal and nonideal theory advanced by Rawls has been subject to criticism from different directions. Amartya Sen accepts Rawls’s distinction between ideal and nonideal theory but argues that Rawlsian-style nonideal theory is too ideal. Given the many and severe injustices we face we do not need to know what ideal (or “transcendental”) justice looks like; our focus should not be on how to transition toward this ideal. Instead, the advancement of justice requires a comparative judgment which ranks possible policies in terms of being more or less just than the status quo. G. A. Cohen, by contrast, argues that Rawlsian-style ideal theory is not really ideal theory as such, but instead principles for regulating society. Our beliefs about normative principles should, ultimately, be insensitive to matters of empirical fact; genuine ideal theory is a form of moral epistemology (an exercise of identifying normative truths).


Reviews: The Study of Government: Political Science and Public Administration, The Psychology of Politics, The Politics of Communication: A Study in the Political Sociology of Language, Socialization and Legitimation, The Structure of Social Science: A Philosophical Introduction, Political Learning, Political Choice and Democratic Citizenship, The Political Character of Adolescence: The Influence of Families and Schools, Mathematical Approaches to Politics, Funktionsanalyse Und Politische Theorie, The Collected Works of Walter Bagehot. Vols. V–VIII the Political Essays, The Conservative Nation, The House of Commons: Services and Facilities, Marketing Boards and Ministers: A Study of Agricultural Marketing Boards as Political and Administrative Instruments, Studies in Social Science and Planning, Politics by Pressure, The Problem of Party Government, Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden: From Relief to Income Maintenance, Comparative Revolutionary Movements, Mass Political Violence: A Cross-National Causal Analysis, The Communists in Spain, Amicable Agreement versus Majority Rule, Uncertain Passage—China's Transition to the Post-Mao Era, Soviet Politics and Political Science, Malaysia—New States in a New Nation, General Elections in South Africa 1943–1970, Fascism in Italy: Society and Culture 1922–1945, The History of the Nazi Party: Volume II, 1933–1945, The Aryan Myth: A History of Racist and Nationalist Ideas in Europe, Europe in Question, The Defence of Western Europe, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, The Foreign Policies of the Powers, Survey of Commonwealth Affairs. Problems of Expansion and Attrition 1953–1969, Testing Theories of Economic Imperialism, Daughter of a Revolutionary: Natalie Herzen and the Bakunin-Nechayev Circle, Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution. A Political Biography, 1888–1938, The Liberal Theory of Justice: A Critical Examination of the Principal Doctrines in A Theory of Justice, Contemporary Thought and Politics, The Essex Reference Index: British Journals on Politics and Sociology. 1950–1973

1975 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 514-571
Author(s):  
R. G. S. Brown ◽  
H. J. Eysenck ◽  
B. G. Stacey ◽  
Alan Ryan ◽  
Shawn W. Rosenberg ◽  
...  

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 24-51
Author(s):  
Aneta Květinová

Studie se zabývá analýzou politické teorie modu vivendi britského politického filosofa Johna Graye, přičemž za její hlavní cíl lze považovat především určení autorovy ideologické pozice v kontextu liberálního myšlení, jakož i posouzení koherence Grayovy teorie s koncepcí liberalismu strachu. Na základě kritické reflexe převažujícího univerzalistického pojetí liberalismu článek identifikuje a analyzuje stěžejní atributy Grayova specifického uchopení liberální teorie v podobě ideálu modu vivendi, etické teorie hodnotového pluralismu, univerzálního minima a hodnoty tolerance. V návaznosti na tuto identifikaci je následně zkoumán i etický rozměr Grayovy politické teorie, jehož charakteristika umožňuje zhodnotit, do jaké míry lze autorovu teorii interpretovat v kontextu liberálního myšlení. V této souvislosti se studie rovněž snaží ukotvit Grayovu tvorbu v širším rámci alternativních projektů liberální teorie, když usiluje o prokázání principiálních paralel mezi Grayovým politickým modelem a politickým myšlením Bernarda Williamse jakožto stěžejním představitelem tzv. liberalismu strachu. Výzkum těchto paralel pak přispívá především k nastolení otázek souvisejících s možností důsledného odlišování politické a morální teorie a chápání konfliktu jakožto neodmyslitelné součásti politické reality v rámci současného liberalismu. The paper aims to analyse the political theory of modus vivendi by political philosopher John Gray and to determine the ideological standpoints of Gray's theory within the context of liberal thought as well as to assess its coherence with the concept of liberalism of fear. On the basis of a critical reflection of the prevailing universalistic conception of liberalism, the study identifies and analyses essential attributes of Gray's specific but controversial political theory: the ideal of modus vivendi; ethical theory of value pluralism; universal minimum and the value of toleration. Having interpreted all those main parts of the concept, the study is supposed to clarify also the ethical dimension of Gray's theory which makes it possible to decide to what extent the author might be identified as a liberal thinker. In this regard, the study endeavours to embed Gray's thought in a broader framework of alternative projects of liberal theory by demonstrating fundamental parallels between Gray's model and political thought of Bernard Williams as the main theoretician of liberalism of fear. Investigations of those parallels thus contributes towards articulating questions concerning the possibility of consistently distinguishing between the political and the moral theory as well as perception of a conflict as an ineradicable part of political reality in the framework of contemporary liberalism.


AmeriQuests ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mary Lynn De Silva

In Australia, practices of preemptive deterrence construct the political identity of asylum seekers as the ‘illegal other’, and as a threat to national security and to national identity. At the core of the state's illegality regimes lies the endorsement of exclusionary norms through the grammar of security. Who is responsible for the endorsement of these norms and how do they (re)produce illegality regimes? How are securitization moves legitimized and sustained through illegality regimes? How may they be resisted? A case study of Sweden illustrates how the securitization discourses mobilizing illegality regimes may be resisted through norm circles in the political sphere that endorse norms of egalitarianism, justice and equality. This paper focuses on the ‘critical realism’ associated with the works of Dave Elder-Vass and Roy Bhaskar. Elder-Vass draws on the philosophy of Roy Bhaskar to examine the ontology of language, discourse, culture and knowledge and their contribute to the construction of social reality, thus synthesizing aspects of realism and constructionism. Roy Bhaskar’s philosophy of the social sciences has aimed to crystallize a transcendental realist framework incorporating a form of critical naturalism and also critical hermeneutics.


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