Augustine’s Use of Rhetorical Economy in his Theodicy

Author(s):  
Brian Gronewoller

Chapter 5 demonstrates that Augustine utilizes rhetorical economy to explain God’s providence over that which does not come from God—evil. The first section provides a reading of On Genesis against the Manichaeans 1.3.5 which indicates that part of Augustine’s solution—the separation between the acts of creating and arranging—is a logical separation based upon the first two principal parts of rhetoric, invention (inuentio) and arrangement (dispositio). The second section then argues, by means of a close reading of On Free Choice 3.9.27, that Augustine utilizes rhetorical economy as the logic by which he explains how God’s providence harmonizes with the source of sin, free will, by defining God’s providence according to the divine activity of arrangement rather than production.

2020 ◽  
Vol IV (4) ◽  
pp. 15-34
Author(s):  
Igor Gasparov

The article considers contemporary free will defences, proposed by A. Plantinga, R. Swinburne, according to which the existence of a world in which there is free will is something more valuable than the existence of a world in which there is no free will. It is shown that contemporary forms of free will defences share with atheistic arguments from evil an anthropomorphic model of God, in which God is thought as an individual among other individuals, although endowed with attributes such as omniscience and omnipotence to an excellent degree. It has also been shown that another important point of similarity between contemporary free will defences and atheistic arguments from evil is that both attempt to assess what our world would be like if created by such an individual. In contrast to atheistic arguments from evil, contemporary free will defences argue that divine omnipotence and omniscience are subject to some greater restrictions, as usually assumed, especially due to God's desire to give some of his creations the ability of free choice, which logically implies the possibility and even necessity of the existence of evil. It is demonstrated that classical theism does not share the anthropomorphic model of deity typical for many contemporary philosophers of religion. Classical theism rejects both the anthropomorphic model of deity and the unaccountability of free will to God as the supreme good. On the contrary, it assumes that free decision was initially an opportunity for the voluntary consent of man which had an innate aspiration towards God as his supreme good. Nevertheless, due to the creation of man out of nothing, this consent could not be automatic but implied forming a virtuous character, and man's transition from a state in which he was able not to sin, to a state in which he would be not able to sin.


Author(s):  
Shira Weiss

Albo focuses his exegetical interpretation on his conception of free choice in a unique reading of the Exodus narrative. In the biblical description of the plagues that God brought upon the Egyptians, it is written that God “hardened Pharaoh’s heart” so that he would not agree to allow the Israelites to leave his land. The literal meaning of the narrative implies that God restrained Pharaoh’s free will. Such an interpretation calls God’s justice into question, since Pharaoh is held morally responsible for his refusal to liberate the Israelites. In an effort to reconcile the seeming conflict, Albo creatively interprets this enigmatic narrative, concluding that God did not deprive Pharaoh of his free choice, but rather preserved his volitional will, thereby maintaining divine justice. By hardening Pharaoh’s heart, God gave Pharaoh the fortitude to withstand the pressures of the plagues and exercise free choice whether or not to liberate the Israelites.


2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea C. Levi

A model of free will is proposed, appealing to the similarity with simple, two-body chemical reactions where the energy curves for the reagents and for the products cross. The system at the crossing point has a freedom of choice to perform the reaction or not. The Landau-Zener formula, corresponding to the opportunity of meeting twice the crossing point, is interpreted as free will with an afterthought and generalized to the cases when a subject thinks about a choice n times. If the probability distribution pn of afterthoughts is known, the probability of a final yes decision is given. The results are generalized to situations where a preference for or against a change exists or where the freedom is only partial, has to fight with conditioning factors, and possibly decreases with increasing instances of free choice.


2004 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 83
Author(s):  
Federica BERGAMINO

The paper aims to show how the act of free will in Thomas Aquinas is not exercised merely in the choice between good an evil, but consists more essentially in the free choice ofthe better. What plays the key role in the analysis is Thomas's metaphysical conception of the good and its relationship to the free subject. The special causality of the good -and more concretely, of the particular good- is noted, and then choice is examined in light of the analogical nature of the «better».


2020 ◽  
Vol 100 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 219-233
Author(s):  
Michael Jaworzyn

Abstract This article provides an account of how Caspar Langenhert (1661–c. 1730) attempted to reconcile teaching a controversial “egoist” metaphysics in Paris with his reasons for rejecting Calvinism, leaving the Netherlands, and joining the Catholic Church. Langenhert had renounced Calvinism especially because he took the Calvinist account of free will to be philosophically, morally, and scripturally dubious. He preferred the notion of indifference in explaining freedom. That did not seem to accord well with his later work, the Novus Philosophus (1701–1702), whose supposedly “egoist” metaphysics appears to deny such freedom to creatures. Langenhert’s own defence would have been that there was no conflict here, because of the unusually strong distinction he drew between the domains of metaphysics and theology, but his attempts to sidestep his apparent unorthodoxy seem to have been unconvincing to the Parisian authorities, and Langenhert was required to cease teaching.


Author(s):  
К.В. Алексеев

В статье анализируется отношение к крепостному праву как социально-политической проблеме в произведениях Я. П. Полонского «Свежее преданье» (включая план ненаписанных глав), «Признания Сергея Чалыгина» и «Дешевый город». Рассматриваются герои трех романов, с помощью которых писатель рисует правдивую картину жизни русского общества в 1820-е, 1840-е и 1850-е годы, а также показывает существовавшие в обществе позиции по отношению к крепостному праву. Через некоторых героев автор транслирует свое собственное мнение по поводу крепостной зависимости крестьян: рассказчик, Камков, Лора, Ульяна Ивановна, князь Таптыгин, баронесса («Свежее преданье»); Сергей Чалыгин, его мать, Кремнев («Признания Сергея Чалыгина»); Елатомский, Эвина, Бавин («Дешевый город»). Выделяются следующие аспекты трактовки Полонским проблемы крепостного права: протест против крепостного права неразрывно связан с идеями свободы и равноправия, при этом свобода понимается писателем не как проявление абсолютной воли человека, а как ответственное отношение к интересам общества и других людей; в среде либерально настроенной интеллигенции (особенно в 1850-е годы), как показывает писатель, существовало противоречие, заключающееся в расхождении слов и жизни за счет труда крепостных крестьян; неоднозначное отношение самих крестьян к возможному освобождению от крепостной зависимости ставит вопрос о готовности землепашцев принять свободу. Отмечается, что наиболее либеральные и демократические установки персонажей произведений совпадают с авторским мировоззрением. Делается вывод о том, что в исследуемых романах Я. П. Полонский пропагандирует идеи свободы, выступает против крепостного права, а также правдиво передает распространенные в русском обществе в 1820–1850-х годах настроения в контексте данной проблемы. Рассмотрение Полонским социально-политических проблем при этом отличается оригинальностью: писатель вкрапляет в ткань произведений диалоги, небольшие лаконичные зарисовки, краткие рассуждения, касающиеся вопросов политики, в частности крепостного права, и только целостный анализ текста позволяет понять позицию автора. The article analyzes J. P. Polonsky’s attitude to serfdom as a social and political problem through the prism of Polonsky’s novels “A Lovely Promise” (including the unwritten chapters), “Sergey Chalygin’s Confessions” and “A Cheap City”. The article focuses on the characters of the three novels whose images help the writer to depict the life of Russian society in the 1820s, the 1840s, and the 1850s, as well as to render social attitudes to serfdom. Some of the characters function as the author’s mouthpiece, showing Polonsky’s attitude to serfdom. These characters are the narrator, Kamkov, Lora, Ulyana Ivanovna, count Taptygin, the baroness (“A Lovely Promise”), Sergey Chalygin, his mother, Kremnev (“Sergey Chalygin’s Confessions”), Elatomsky, Evina, Bavin (“A Cheap City”). The article highlights the following aspects of Polonsky’s attitude to serfdom: serfdom is a monstrous practice which robs a person of their innate right to freedom and equality. The writer doesn’t treat freedom as manifestation of free will, but as recognition and respect for others. Polonsky underlines the discrepancy between liberal ideas expressed by representatives of intelligentsia and their acceptance of serfdom, he highlightes that peasants treated emancipation differently and sometimes they were not willing to accept freedom. The article maintains that Polonsky’s characters’ liberal and democratic ideas reflect the writers’ worldview. The author of the article concludes that in the aforementioned novels, J. P. Polonsky propagates freedom, censures serfdom, describes social attitudes to serfdom prevalent in Russian society in the 1820s–1850s. Polonsky’s treatment of social and political problems is strikingly unique. The writer’s ideas and attitudes can only be uncovered through close reading, through comprehensive analysis of the characters’ dialogues and short sketches on political issues.


PEDIATRICS ◽  
1975 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 186-186
Author(s):  
R. J. H.

In a recent volume1 Arrow takes the libertarian view that individuals can and should make a free choice of whether and when they want to get medical care, when given all the information. Pellegrino comments on the limitations of this libertarian view: (1) We are not isolated individuals but social beings whose actions effect others as well as ourselves. (2) Society has now said that it will care for people when sick. But if they are sick because of what they willfully did then should society not provide care? For children it is difficult to argue that they should be punished for their parents' failings. (3) The sick person's ability to deal with "all" the facts is limited, especially so for children. Pellegrino advocates an ethical view of the right to medical care as well as a legal one. " . . . law is the coarse adjustment that guards against the grosser violations of human rights; ethics is the fine adjustment that sets a higher ideal than law can guarantee." It would seem that children should have the right to medical care.


1974 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 313-318
Author(s):  
Douglas P. Lackey

Old philosophical problems never die, but they can be reinterpreted. In this paper, I offer a reinterpretation of the problem of reconciling divine omniscience and human free will. Classical discussions of this problem concentrate on the nature of God and the concept of free will. The present discussion will focus attention on the concept of knowledge, drawing on developments in epistemology that resulted from the posing of a certain problem by Edmund Gettier in 1963.


Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (10) ◽  
pp. 832
Author(s):  
David Torrijos-Castrillejo

The results from contemporary science, especially the theory of evolution and quantum physics, seem to favor process theology. Moreover, the evil committed by free will leads some theologians to reduce divine action in order to prevent God from being responsible for evil. Thus, among those who defend a particular providence, Molinism finds many followers. This article first argues that contemporary science does not constrain us to deny particular providence. Second, it criticizes the implicitly deterministic character of Molinism. Thirdly, a Thomistic solution is proposed as an alternative which, by means of a different metaphysical approach to cosmic contingency and freedom of will, defends particular providence without reducing divine activity except in personal sins.


Author(s):  
Susanne Bobzien

This chapter shows, through painstaking analysis of the extant texts (Epicurus, Lucretius, Diogenes Laertius, et al.), that there is no evidence that Epicurus dealt with the kind of free-will problem with which he is traditionally associated, i.e. that he discussed free choice or moral responsibility grounded on free choice, or that the ‘swerve’ was involved in decision processes. Rather, for Epicurus, actions are fully determined by the agent’s mental disposition at the outset of the action. Moral responsibility presupposes not free choice but that the person is unforced and causally responsible for the action. This requires the agent’s ability to influence causally, more specifically on the basis of their beliefs, the development of their behavioural dispositions. The ‘swerve’ was intended to explain the non-necessity of agency without undermining Epicurus’ atomistic explanation of the order in the universe, viz. by making the mental dispositions of adults non-necessary.


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