Perception in Aristotle’s Ethics

2021 ◽  
pp. 196-229
Author(s):  
Marc Gasser-Wingate
Keyword(s):  
Personal Experience ◽  
Practical Wisdom ◽  
Theoretical Treatment ◽  
Role Perception ◽  
General Rules ◽  
Virtuous Behavior ◽  
Aristotle's Ethics ◽  
Modes Of Thought ◽  
Ethical Significance ◽  
Do So

How do Aristotle’s empiricist views bear on the role perception plays for the virtuous? Do they point towards a certain kind of ethical particularism, according to which universal rules could never adequately codify virtuous behavior? I argue they do not. Virtuous agents always need perception to determine what to do, and it is inexpedient for them to articulate general rules of conduct, but this is not because it is in principle impossible to do so, or because virtuous conduct does not admit of theoretical treatment. Still, perception and experience do play an indispensable role in the development and deployment of practical wisdom. For our learning to be virtuous depends on first-hand, personal experience that theoretical modes of thought could not provide. I end by considering what a practically-oriented treatment of virtuous conduct would look like, and how we might conceive of its ethical significance.

scholarly journals The Problem of Universal Judgments in Aristotle’s Ethics

2018 ◽  
pp. 81-96
Author(s):  
R. S. Platonov
Keyword(s):  
Personal Experience ◽  
Practical Wisdom ◽  
Practical Knowledge ◽  
Moral Norms ◽  
Unsolvable Problem ◽  
The Past ◽  
Practical Syllogism ◽  
Aristotle's Ethics ◽  
The Right ◽  
Rational Mechanism

The author sets a goal to show the specificity of the formulation of universal prescriptive judgments about a virtuous act (moral norms) in the framework of Aristotelian ethical doctrine. To achieve this goal, Aristotle’s philosophy concept of practical wisdom (phronesis) is analyzed. It shows a necessity to distinguish the use of practical wisdom in a personal experience of the act and for forming the inter-subjective practical knowledge (episteme) about making of a virtuous act. The specificity of ethics as practical knowledge and its difference from individual moral experience are defined by means of the distinction of the use of practical wisdom. It also shows the limitations of practical syllogism as the main rational mechanism for the formation of inter-subjective practical knowledge. Additionally, the universal prescriptive judgments are divided into informative and functional: the former reveals the content of the action, the latter – its structure, that is, the former defines what a person must do, the latter defines what an action should be to comply with the right purpose, consequently, the right content. At the same time, the right content is recognized only in individual experience and can not be expressed universally, without losing its practical value. The author concludes that the formulation of informative universal prescriptive judgments is impossible within the framework of Aristotelian ethical doctrine. It is impeded by the unsolvable problem of the correlation between the general and the particular, the transition from descriptive judgments to prescriptive judgments. However, it is possible to formulate functional universal prescriptive judgments. They also constitute the methodological basis for criticism of the accepted in society moral norms, which are based on the past positive experience of actions. 

Rule Fitness and Pathology in Learning Classifier Systems

2004 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-135 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim Kovacs
Keyword(s):  
Value Functions ◽  
Classifier Systems ◽  
Reward Function ◽  
Learning Classifier ◽  
Learning Tasks ◽  
General Rules ◽  
Strength Based ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Value Function ◽  
Do So

It has long been known that in some relatively simple reinforcement learning tasks traditional strength-based classifier systems will adapt poorly and show poor generalisation. In contrast, the more recent accuracy-based XCS, appears both to adapt and generalise well. In this work, we attribute the difference to what we call strong over general and fit over general rules. We begin by developing a taxonomy of rule types and considering the conditions under which they may occur. In order to do so an extreme simplification of the classifier system is made, which forces us toward qualitative rather than quantitative analysis. We begin with the basics, considering definitions for correct and incorrect actions, and then correct, incorrect, and overgeneral rules for both strength and accuracy-based fitness. The concept of strong overgeneral rules, which we claim are the Achilles' heel of strength-based classifier systems, are then analysed. It is shown that strong overgenerals depend on what we call biases in the reward function (or, in sequential tasks, the value function). We distinguish between strong and fit overgeneral rules, and show that although strong overgenerals are fit in a strength-based system called SB-XCS, they are not in XCS. Next we show how to design fit overgeneral rules for XCS (but not SB-XCS), by introducing biases in the variance of the reward function, and thus that each system has its own weakness. Finally, we give some consideration to the prevalence of reward and variance function bias, and note that non-trivial sequential tasks have highly biased value functions.

scholarly journals Collingwood’s philosophy of art as a basis for virtue aesthetics.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Collins
Keyword(s):  
Practical Wisdom ◽  
Artistic Expression ◽  
Philosophy Of Art ◽  
Artistic Creation ◽  
Contemporary Work ◽  
Aristotle's Ethics ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Work Done

In this thesis I show how Aristotle’s approach to ethics can be applied to aesthetics in order to address normative concerns relating to practices of artistic creation and spectatorship, and how R. G. Collingwood’s philosophy of art provides an understanding of these practices that works as a basis for such an approach. I begin by discussing the connection between aesthetic and ethical normativity as found in the thought of various prominent philosophers, and review the contemporary work done in the name of ‘virtue aesthetics’. I then explicate Aristotle’s ethics, with a particular focus on his definition of virtue and his discussion of practical wisdom, and give an overview of Collingwood’s understanding of art and the role of imagination in artistic expression and understanding, before synthesizing the structure of Aristotle’s ethics with the content of Collingwood’s philosophy of art in order to arrive at an outline of a Collingwoodian virtue aesthetics.

scholarly journals Collingwood’s philosophy of art as a basis for virtue aesthetics.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Collins
Keyword(s):  
Practical Wisdom ◽  
Artistic Expression ◽  
Philosophy Of Art ◽  
Artistic Creation ◽  
Contemporary Work ◽  
Aristotle's Ethics ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Work Done

In this thesis I show how Aristotle’s approach to ethics can be applied to aesthetics in order to address normative concerns relating to practices of artistic creation and spectatorship, and how R. G. Collingwood’s philosophy of art provides an understanding of these practices that works as a basis for such an approach. I begin by discussing the connection between aesthetic and ethical normativity as found in the thought of various prominent philosophers, and review the contemporary work done in the name of ‘virtue aesthetics’. I then explicate Aristotle’s ethics, with a particular focus on his definition of virtue and his discussion of practical wisdom, and give an overview of Collingwood’s understanding of art and the role of imagination in artistic expression and understanding, before synthesizing the structure of Aristotle’s ethics with the content of Collingwood’s philosophy of art in order to arrive at an outline of a Collingwoodian virtue aesthetics.

Anxiety, Intelligence, and Access to Primitive Modes of Thought in High and Low Scorers on Remote Associates Test

1972 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 375-381 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin Martindale
Keyword(s):  
Valid Measure ◽  
Total Range ◽  
Remote Associates Test ◽  
Modes Of Thought ◽  
Range Study ◽  
Do So

Three studies concerning the validity of the Remote Associates Test (RAT) are described. All are based on the serendipitous finding that, when is are dichotomized at their median RAT score, within the high RAT group the RAT correlates with other tests in a manner which would be expected for a test of creativity whereas it generally does not do so across its total range. Study I reports this finding for several measures of access to primitive modes of thought. An analogous finding concerning anxiety emerged from Study II. In Study III it was found that the RAT does not correlate with intelligence in the upper half of its distribution. It is concluded that the RAT may be a valid measure of creativity only in its upper ranges.

scholarly journals Common origins and the ethics of planetary seeding

2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 301-306 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tony Milligan
Keyword(s):  
Solar System ◽  
Practical Wisdom ◽  
Thought Experiment ◽  
Ethical Reason ◽  
Microbial Life ◽  
Historical Justice ◽  
Do So

AbstractFaced with a choice between attempting to seed another world with terrestrially-sourced microbes (with which we would have a shared origin) and microbes sourced from elsewhere within the solar system (whose origins might therefore differ), would we have any non-instrumental ethical reason to favour the terrestrial microbes? What follows will argue that in relation to the goals of promoting life similar to our own, or even simply microbial life, we might conceivably make such an appeal and do so in a defensible manner. However, in no case would such a consideration operate as a silencer for rival considerations (such as likelihood of success, enhancing diversity or historical justice). The thought experiment serves to highlight the diversity of considerations which are in play in ethical deliberation about matters of astrobiology and the role of practical wisdom rather than trumping considerations.

scholarly journals Particularism for Generalists: A Rossian Business Ethic

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
J. Drake
Keyword(s):  
Business Ethics ◽  
Business Ethic ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Practical Wisdom ◽  
Standard Approach ◽  
Recent History ◽  
Ethical Theories ◽  
Standard Framework ◽  
Do So

A standard framework for business ethics views the inquiry as an application of major ethical theories to specific issues in business. As these theories are largely presented as being principled, the exercise therefore becomes one of applying general principles to business situations. Many adopting this standard approach have thus resisted the implementation of the most prominent development in ethical theory in recent history: that of particularism. In this article, I argue that particularist thinking has much to offer to business ethics and that standard resistance to particularist business ethics is based largely on misunderstandings. I do so by illustrating how the harbinger of particularism, W. D. Ross, countenances the practical wisdom of particularist ethics while being 1) invulnerable to standard objections to particularist business ethics and 2) compatible with the generalism of the standard approach. The Rossian business ethic is therefore one that the standard approach should be eager to include.

scholarly journals Bringing (inter)national history into ‘Introduction to International Relations’

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 91-104
Author(s):  
Andrew A. Szarejko
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
International Relations ◽  
Personal Experience ◽  
Great Power ◽  
Introductory Courses ◽  
National History ◽  
Power Politics ◽  
International History ◽  
Great Power Politics ◽  
Do So

Many introductory courses in International Relations (IR) dedicate some portion of the class to international history. Such class segments often focus on great-power politics of the twentieth century and related academic debates. In this essay, I argue that these international history segments can better engage students by broadening the histories instructors present and by drawing on especially salient histories such as those of the country in which the course is being taught. To elaborate on how one might do this, I discuss how US-based courses could productively examine the country’s rise to great-power status. I outline three reasons to bring this topic into US-based introductory IR courses, and I draw on personal experience to provide a detailed description of the ways one can do so.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document