The Roots and Rationalizations of U.S. Torture in Vietnam

2021 ◽  
pp. 89-124
Author(s):  
William L. d'Ambruoso

This chapter traces the twin tales of the CIA’s and the U.S. military’s use of torture during the Vietnam War. The CIA’s interrogation program was rooted in the early days of the Cold War, when the agency was founded. U.S. foreign policy elites like Dwight Eisenhower and Allen Dulles were convinced that the Soviet Union’s freedom from norms and laws gave it an edge. As a result, the CIA began researching and practicing behavioral control techniques, using drugs and sensory deprivation to compete with Soviet programs. The agency’s KUBARK interrogation manual (1963) considered physical torture off-limits and ineffective, but recommended “maxim[izing] mental discomfort.” Likewise, CIA interrogators in Vietnam such as Frank Snepp believed isolation and sensory deprivation were both ethically and efficaciously superior to harsher alternatives. While racism and exasperation explain much of the U.S. military’s use of torture, soldiers also used water and electricity because the techniques were “unpleasant” but not “injurious.”

Author(s):  
James Paasche

The Department of Army Special Photographic Office (DASPO) was created to document U.S. Army activities during the Cold War, with much of the work centered on the Vietnam War. This chapter, by James Paasche, demonstrates that the production of state and military propaganda required constant negotiations of control between military commanders and the soldiers and media makers on the ground. Further, this chapter attends to the labor practices of an institutional filmmaking unit in the hopes of delineating how the processes of media production must adapt to the fraught contexts of war. In addition, the chapter considers how image making was considered a key component of the U.S. military’s supposed technological superiority during the Vietnam War.


Author(s):  
Michael David Martignago

The Vietnam War was the quintessential Cold War conflict between the United States and the Sino-Soviet supplied, nationalistic North Vietnamese. This war saw the world’s most wealthiest and dominant military force suffer a long, drawn out defeat to a poverty-stricken society of farmers, armed with nothing but an unyielding nationalism and outdated weaponry. This paper examines the United States’ involvement in Vietnam throughout the Vietnam War and also explores the ways in which the Vietnam War affected the Cold War. Beginning with President Harry S. Truman in 1945 and ending with President Gerald Ford in 1975, this paper examines the motivations behind each of the six United States Presidential Administrations during the Vietnam War and gives an in-depth explanation for the crucial decisions that were made by the United States Government over the course of the war. The effect that these foreign policy decisions and directives had on the Cold War atmosphere is also heavily analyzed. The faults and failures of the United States that led to their humiliating defeat in Vietnam consequently altered the Cold War atmosphere. In order to fully understand the Cold War, it is necessary to understand the Vietnam War and its impact on United States foreign policy.


2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen M Walt

This article uses realism to explain past US grand strategy and prescribe what it should be today. Throughout its history, the United States has generally acted as realism depicts. The end of the Cold War reduced the structural constraints that states normally face in anarchy, and a bipartisan coalition of foreign policy elites attempted to use this favorable position to expand the US-led ‘liberal world order’. Their efforts mostly failed, however, and the United States should now return to a more realistic strategy – offshore balancing – that served it well in the past. Washington should rely on local allies to uphold the balance of power in Europe and the Middle East and focus on leading a balancing coalition in Asia. Unfortunately, President Donald Trump lacks the knowledge, competence, and character to pursue this sensible course, and his cavalier approach to foreign policy is likely to damage America’s international position significantly.


2014 ◽  
Vol 47 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 269-279 ◽  
Author(s):  
Deborah Welch Larson ◽  
Alexei Shevchenko

Since 2003, Russian foreign behavior has become much more assertive and volatile toward the West, often rejecting U.S. diplomatic initiatives and overreacting to perceived slights. This essay explains Russia’s new assertiveness using social psychological hypotheses on the relationship between power, status, and emotions. Denial of respect to a state is humiliating. When a state loses status, the emotions experienced depend on the perceived cause of this loss. When a state perceives that others are responsible for its loss, it shows anger. The belief that others have unjustly used their power to deny the state its appropriate position arouses vengefulness. If a state believes that its loss of status is due to its own failure to live up to expectations, the elites will express shame. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has displayed anger at the U.S. unwillingness to grant it the status to which it believes it is entitled, especially during the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, and most recently Russia’s takeover of Crimea and the 2014 Ukrainian Crisis. We can also see elements of vengefulness in Russia’s reaction to recognition of Kosovo, U.S. missile defense plans, the Magnitsky act, and the Snowden affair.


2004 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-121
Author(s):  
Hasan Kösebalaban

Philip Robins contends that Turkish foreign policy has faced four challengesin four distinct periods of its history: (1) consolidating the emergentTurkish Republic through external recognition (1930s), (2) remainingneutral during the Second World War (1940s), (3) confronting thechallenge of Soviet expansionism (the cold war era), and (4) respondingto the end of bipolarity (post-cold war era). Robins examines these foreignpolicy issues in the last period.The main thesis of this work is threefold: First, Turkey is a status quopower in the way that its foreign policy elites have fastened their thinkingand practice to the framework of “the sanctity of borders, of states, ofmultilateral institutions and of norms of conduct, even when it becameclear that systemic changes had rendered some of these continuities nolonger tenable” (p. 6). Second, Turkey continues to be firmly orientedwestwards in terms of its foreign relations, which are characterized by itsstrong commitment to NATO as well as its desire to join the EuropeanUnion (EU). Finally, Turkish foreign policy has been characterized moreby “caution than daring,” quoting Malik Mufti. Despite the increase in itspower relative to its neighbors, Turkey has avoided an interventionist foreignpolicy by emphasizing the formation of multilateral frameworks forconflict resolution.Robins defends these arguments by analyzing the international systemicand domestic politics context in which Turkish foreign policy is ...


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 19-37
Author(s):  
O. I. Rebro ◽  
M. A. Suchkov

This article seeks to fi ll the gap between well theorized upon constants of the U.S. strategic thinking and the divergent approaches of various administrations to practical actions on the international arena. Grounded in the concept developed by Christopher Hammer, the analysis presents the U.S. foreign policy as the product of a never-ending internal debate about the most optimal ways of promoting values, dealing with international institutions and prioritizing threats within a security perimeter. Taking stock of the choices made by consecutive presidents in each of the three areas the authors study the roots of foreign policy inertia of the sole superpower that resulted in unforced mistakes undermining its own political cohesion as well as hindering the emergence of lasting international architecture to replace the cold-war order. Thus, the article argues that the key feature of the last thirty years – the absence of an enemy as an organizing principle for the U.S. foreign policy – prompted the American public to pay less attention to global events which became the area of opportunistic decisions. Overall, the authors conclude that the mistakes were made precisely when the domestic debates in the U.S. about international relations were absent and note that the current divisions in the American society as an impetus for self-scrutiny and the emergence of China as a focal point for the American elites may result in a more coherent foreign policy and make the U.S. a more responsible international actor.


PMLA ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 128 (2) ◽  
pp. 322-336
Author(s):  
Michael Collins

Norman Mailer was haunted by the specter of social death—a specter created for him by living as a Jew between the parentheses created by the Holocaust and the prospect of nuclear Armageddon. As an antidote to social death, Mailer sought its opposite—sovereignty within and beyond his writer's sphere. In the boxer Muhammad Ali, Mailer found an exemplar of the seizure of sovereignty within and beyond a sphere. The Fight chronicles the heavyweight championship battle between Ali and George Foreman in Zaire, a country treated like a private bank account by its dictator, Mobutu Sese Seko. I argue that Mailer regrettably failed to emphasize fully the fact that Zaire was exhibit B (the Vietnam War being the writer's inevitable exhibit A) in the case Mailer passionately made that the Cold War brutalized the American psyche.


1992 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 357-375
Author(s):  
Marcia Pointon

In October 1968 the American Embassy in Grosvenor Square, London was under siege from students protesing against the continued American presence in Vietnam. In France the universities were in turmoil. The Washington Post for 6 October covered the Apollo Flight – the first step to the moon–, uprisings in Columbia university, Twiggy in person and a debate about when the Bikinians might return to their island. Nixon was edging his way towards the presidency in a year that had seen the assassinations of Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King, a year in which Johnson decided not to stand for another term in order (allegedly) to devote himself to ending the Vietnam war, in which the Democratic convention took place in Chicago in the midst of violent clashes between police and demonstrators.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document