The Problem in Detail

Author(s):  
Thomas Kalinowski

This chapter sets the stage for the empirical investigation of the domestic political economic sources of international conflicts and cooperation. It consists of four parts. First, it gives a general brief historical overview over the problems of the international regulation of finance since nineteenth-century imperialism until the global financial crisis that started in 2008. Second, it introduces the G20 as the main forum for global economic cooperation. Third, it offers an overview of the different reactions to the global economic crisis since 2008. Fourth, it introduces the major conflicts in the G20 about the international regulation of finance in the three crucial areas identified in Chapter 1: global imbalances and macroeconomic coordination, financial globalization and financial regulation, as well as currency competition and management.

2011 ◽  
Vol 216 ◽  
pp. R1-R15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erland W. Nier

There is increasing recognition that prior to the global financial crisis financial regulation had lacked a macroprudential perspective. There has since been a strong effort to make a new macroprudential orientation operational, including through the establishment of new macroprudential authorities or ‘committees’ in a number of jurisdictions. These developments raise — and this paper explores — the following three questions. First, what distinguishes macroprudential policy from microprudential policy and what are its key tasks? Second, what powers should be given to macroprudential authorities and what should be their mandate? Third, how can governance arrangements ensure that macroprudential policies are pursued effectively? While arrangements for macroprudential policy will to some extent be country-specific, we identify three basic challenges in setting up an effective macroprudential policy framework and discuss options to address them.


2011 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 305-321
Author(s):  
Iris H-Y Chiu

In the wake of the global financial crisis, the trajectory of legal reforms is likely to turn towards more transparency regulation. This article argues that transparency regulation will take on a new role of surveillance as intelligence and data mining expand in the wholesale financial sector, supporting the creation of designated systemic risk oversight regulators.The role of market discipline, which has been acknowledged to be weak leading up to the financial crisis, is likely to be eclipsed by a more technocratic governance in the financial sector. In this article, however, concerns are raised about the expansion of technocratic surveillance and whether financial sector participants would internalise the discipline of regulatory control. Certain endemic features of the financial sector will pose challenges for financial regulation even in the surveillance age.


Author(s):  
Richard Roberts

At the onset of the Global Financial Crisis in 2007 London was one of the two foremost global financial centres, along with New York. London experienced a 12 per cent fall in wholesale financial services jobs in 2008–9, but a recovery got underway in 2010 and London’s wholesale financial services sector staged a wavering advance. But now there were new challenges, in particular the avalanche of financial regulation coming from the UK, the EU, the US and the G20. Fintech engendered new uncertainties. The impact of Brexit was uncertain, but mostly expected to be negative, at least in the short-term. Furthermore, there was growing competition from Asian and other financial centres. Nevertheless, London remained pre-eminent as one of the two largest global concentrations of wholesale financial services activity and at the top of the Global Financial Centres Index.


2021 ◽  
pp. 47-70
Author(s):  
Jonathan S. Davies

Theodore (2020: 2) argues that since the global financial crisis, “austerity has become the primary means for the further neoliberalisation of inherited arrangements”: neoliberalisation upon earlier waves of neoliberalism. Chapter 2 delves into this proposition. It begins by exploring the impact of the GFC, and its aftermath, in the eight countries and cities studied. It proceeds to examine the interplay of key terms introduced in chapter 1: crisis, austerity and neoliberalisation. The chapter allocates the cities to three groups: those in which austerity is recognized as a central concept or challenge and a warrant for neoliberalisation (Athens, Dublin and Leicester), those in which it is concealed or re-signified within an otherwise vigorous neoliberalisation agenda (Baltimore and Montréal), and those positioning themselves critically or outside it (Barcelona, Dandenong and Nantes). The chapter concludes by discussing theoretical implications of convergence and divergence in the cross-cutting relationships between crisis, austerity and neoliberalisation.


2020 ◽  
pp. 203-222
Author(s):  
Thomas Rixen ◽  
Lora Anne Viola

The global financial crisis led G20 states to conclude that stronger regulatory standards and improved compliance were needed to ensure global financial stability. To this end, the G20, as collective governor, granted an institutional intermediary, the Financial Stability Board (FSB), authority to develop and supervise financial market regulations. However, the G20 designed the FSB in ways that stymied its regulatory competence. Why did the G20 design the FSB in ways that were inadequate to meeting its own governance goal? Competence–control theory provides a compelling answer. The G20 faces a tradeoff between a competent intermediary and control over the intermediary; this tradeoff is exacerbated by the G20’s collective nature. While the G20 has a collective long-term interest in an intermediary with the expertise and capacity to promote stability-enhancing regulations, intense short-term distributive conflicts among member states yield strong incentives to control the intermediary. These internal distributive conflicts are more easily overcome during systemic economic crisis, when a competent intermediary is urgently needed. Once the crisis has passed, however, the governor reasserts control, again compromising the intermediary’s competence. The chapter illustrates this argument with an account of reforming the Financial Stability Forum into the FSB, and three case studies of policy reforms after the financial crisis.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (10) ◽  
pp. 5
Author(s):  
Nicolas D. Albertoni

The main goal of this paper is to situate current trade policy debates in a proper historical context by analyzing the main trade policy milestones of the 21st-century. It does not attempt to offer an extensive historical overview of trade policy, which has been done masterfully by other scholars, but to analyze the events that have led to a stagnation of the multilateral trade system and rising protectionism. This paper begins with the winding road of trade liberalization since World War II, briefly tracing how we arrived from the early stages of the Bretton Wood System to the current moment of stagnation of the multilateral system and rising protectionism. It then turns to four key events to understand the current new reality: China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008 to 2009, the trade war between the United States and China, and the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic in trade policy dynamics. It concludes with some final comments on the relevance of understanding current trade debates from a historical perspective.


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