scholarly journals Bureaucratic Representation and the Rejection Hypothesis: A Longitudinal Study of the European Commission’s Staff Composition (1980–2013)

2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 4-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Magali Gravier ◽  
Camille Roth

Abstract This article analyzes the evolution of the staff composition of the European Commission from 1980 to 2013 using the theory of representative bureaucracy. The article first demonstrates how the Commission formulates guidelines which aim at offering fair levels of representation to each member state. However, comparing recruitment targets and actual staffing figures reveals very heterogeneous staff levels. Some member states enjoy unexpectedly high levels of representation whereas others present very low levels. The latter are particularly intriguing and open the door to the formulation of a “rejection hypothesis.” This hypothesis challenges one of the foundations of the theory of representative bureaucracy and leads us to suggest that the theory be enhanced in order to take into account its context of implementation in terms of consolidated or contested statehood, which in turn may explain the phenomena of rejected offers of bureaucratic representation.

2019 ◽  
pp. 208-248
Author(s):  
Nigel Foster

This chapter considers the actions commenced before the Court of Justice. These include actions by the European Commission and other member states against a member state (Articles 258–60 TFEU); judicial review of acts of the institutions (Article 263 TFEU); the action against the institutions for a failure to act (Article 265 TFEU); actions for damages (Articles 268 and 340 TFEU); and the right to plead the illegality of an EU regulation (Article 277 TFEU). The chapter also considers interim measures under Articles 278 and 279 TFEU and enforcement actions arising from the Commission enforcement of EU competition law against individuals.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 101-125
Author(s):  
Ágoston Korom

The scope of action of EU Member States’ land policies lies at the intersection of positive and negative integration. Therefore, if a Member State restricts the ownership and use of agricultural land, it implies both the legitimate restriction of fundamental freedoms and that it achieves the targets listed under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) on improving the quality of living for farmers in keeping with the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). Despite this, it is worrisome that the EU’s control over negative integration does not allow Member States to create sustainable regulations. In contrast, the EU law leaves it entirely to the Member States to introduce restitution measures vis-à-vis the properties that were confiscated before their accession. The EU’s control prohibits direct discrimination against the citizens of other Member States. Under certain circumstances, according to the European Commission, the general principles of EU law and the provisions of the Charter can help individuals enforce restitution provisions. Bearing this in mind, we analysed the practice of the European Commission, its statements, and procedures against Member States, given that these are based on professional and/or political considerations. We examine the practice of the Commission and the CJEU vis-à-vis a Hungarian legislation on the so-called ‘zsebszerződések’. We also propose recommendations.


2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jarle Trondal ◽  
Zuzana Murdoch ◽  
Benny Geys

The vast majority of existing studies on bureaucratic representation focus on bureaucracies’ permanent and internal staff. Yet, the rising sophistication of modern democracies and the technocratization of political life are gradually inducing an increased reliance on external experts to assist in the development and implementation of policy decisions. This trend, we argue, raises the need to extend studies of bureaucratic representation to such external and non-permanent experts in governmental affairs. In this article, we take a first step in this direction using seconded national experts (SNEs) in the European Commission as our empirical laboratory. Our results highlight that Commission SNEs do not appear representative of their constituent population (i.e., the EU-27 population) along a number of socio-demographic dimensions. Moreover, we find that the role perception of “experts” is primarily explained by organizational affiliation, and only secondarily by demographic characteristics (except, of course, education).


Subject Proposed reform of the EU comitology procedure. Significance The little-known ‘comitology’ procedure plays a key role in EU regulation. In recent years, this process has been breaking down as member-state expert representatives in comitology committees often abstain from voting, forcing the European Commission to take controversial decisions on its own (and accept any blame for them). In response, the Commission has proposed reforms that would pressure member states to take a position on (and hence political ownership of) controversial regulatory decisions. Impacts Government representatives, interest-group representatives and corporate lobbyists will be most affected by comitology reform. Despite adding transparency and avoiding blame-shifting to Brussels, the reforms would probably not help the EU’s image with citizens. The European Parliament might demand -- as part of any final reform package -- an increase in its involvement in the comitology process.


Author(s):  
Dimitry Kochenov

On a reasoned proposal by one third of the Member States, by the European Parliament or by the European Commission, the Council, acting by a majority of four fifths of its members after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, may determine that there is a clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State of the values referred to in Article 2. Before making such a determination, the Council shall hear the Member State in question and may address recommendations to it, acting in accordance with the same procedure.


2020 ◽  
pp. 65-89
Author(s):  
Matthew J. Homewood

This chapter discusses articles in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) that provide for actions that are brought directly before the Court. Under Articles 258 and 259 TFEU (ex Articles 226 and 227 EC), respectively, the European Commission and Member States may bring enforcement proceedings against a Member State in breach of Treaty obligations. Article 260 TFEU (ex Article 228 EC) requires compliance with the Court’s judgment. Article 263 TFEU (ex Article 230 EC) concerns judicial review of EU acts. The outcome of a successful action is annulment. Article 265 TFEU (ex Article 232 EC) provides for actions against the EU institutions for failure to act.


Author(s):  
Matthew J. Homewood

This chapter discusses articles in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) that provide for actions that are brought directly before the Court. Under Articles 258 and 259 TFEU (ex Articles 226 and 227 EC), respectively, the European Commission and Member States may bring enforcement proceedings against a Member State in breach of Treaty obligations. Article 260 TFEU (ex Article 228 EC) requires compliance with the Court’s judgment. Article 263 TFEU (ex Article 230 EC) concerns judicial review of EU acts. The outcome of a successful action is annulment. Article 265 TFEU (ex Article 232 EC) provides for actions against the EU institutions for failure to act.


2010 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 307-309
Author(s):  
Sonya Walkila

Case C-392/08 European Commission v. Kingdom of Spain nyrFailing to draw up external emergency plans for all relevant establishments in accordance with Directive 96/82/EC on the control of major accident hazards involving dangerous substances may result in a Member State being deemed to have failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 11(1)(c) thereof (author's headnote).


2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 32
Author(s):  
Jozsef Toth

The new directive of the European Parliament and the European Council issued in 2014 define unified expectations regarding banking resolution mechanism to be applied in territory of each EU member state. The non-euro zone member states must create national resolution funds while the euro zone member states have to upload the so called Single Resolution Fund. These funds are implemented in order to finance the banking resolution processes. This article introduces the main rules of the unified resolution system as well as deals with its financial background. The European Commission declared in its statement that the target level of the Single Resolution Fund is 55 billion euros. However, this paper provides evidence that this target level is underestimated.


2021 ◽  
pp. 208-248
Author(s):  
Nigel Foster

This chapter considers the actions commenced before the Court of Justice. These include actions by the European Commission and other member states against a member state (Arts 258–60 TFEU); judicial review of acts of the institutions (Art 263 TFEU); the action against the institutions for a failure to act (Art 265 TFEU); actions for damages (Arts 268 and 340 TFEU); and also the right to plead the illegality of an EU regulation (Art 277 TFEU). The chapter also considers interim measures under Arts 278 and 279 TFEU and enforcement actions arising from the Commission enforcement of EU competition law against individuals.


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