Hegel’s Shepherd’s Way Out of the Thicket

Author(s):  
Terry Pinkard
Keyword(s):  

Our modern conditions require a reflective stance on our lives. Yet it is also clear that some forms of domination have continued to be practiced long after their insufficiencies have been exposed. What is actual and what lies behind the various appearances of our social and political world has never been fully actualized. This chapter examines this sense of being ready to unsettle our settled convictions through experiences that push us to think of what we have been doing up until now as something illusory and not as merely not living up to an explicit ideal. Part of the unsettling feature of modernity is that we can think that we have at least settled what we take to be at stake even while admitting that we have not lived up to such ideals, only to find that we turn out not to have settled what really was at stake.

Author(s):  
David Randall

The changed conception of conversation that emerged by c.1700 was about to expand its scope enormously – to the broad culture of Enlightenment Europe, to the fine arts, to philosophy and into the broad political world, both via the conception of public opinion and via the constitutional thought of James Madison (1751–1836). In the Enlightenment, the early modern conception of conversation would expand into a whole wing of Enlightenment thought. The intellectual history of the heirs of Cicero and Petrarch would become the practice of millions and the constitutional architecture of a great republic....


Author(s):  
Kristi A. Olson

What is a fair income distribution? The empirical literature seems to assume that equal income would be fair, but the equal income answer faces two objections. First, equal income is likely to be inefficient. This book sets aside efficiency concerns as a downstream consideration; it seeks to identify a fair distribution. The second objection—pointed out by both leftist political philosopher G. A. Cohen and conservative economist Milton Friedman—is that equal income is unfair to the hardworking. Measuring labor burdens in order to adjust income shares, however, is no easy task. Some philosophers and economists attempt to sidestep the measurement problem by invoking the envy test. Yet a distribution in which no one prefers someone else’s circumstances to her own, as the envy test requires, is unlikely to exist—and, even if it does exist, the normative connection between the envy test and fairness has not been established. The Solidarity Solution provides a novel answer: when someone claims that her situation should be improved at someone else’s expense, she must be able to give a reason that cannot be rejected by a free and equal individual who regards everyone else as the same. Part I develops the solidarity solution and shows that rigorous distributive implications can be derived from a relational ideal. Part II uses the solidarity solution to critique the competing theories of Ronald Dworkin, Philippe Van Parijs, and Marc Fleurbaey. Finally, part III identifies insights for the gender wage gap and taxation.


Author(s):  
Martin Loughlin

This chapter examines the history of political-legal reasoning. It suggests that this history begins in the Renaissance with the emergence of a doctrine of ‘reason of state’, a doctrine which was widely debated between the late-sixteenth and early-eighteenth centuries but remained contentious throughout. It argues that reason of state continued to exert an influence in the modern political world, but that that influence is complicated by changes in the nature and forms of government. Most importantly, the modern state presents itself as a constitutional state and once the constitution is established as ‘fundamental law’, whatever remains of reason of state discourse is subsumed under the idea of ‘constitutional legality’. Consequently, those elements of the doctrine that live on in contemporary practice no longer fall into a distinct category of reason of state; they have become a facet of the emergence of the modern ‘state of reason’.


2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 54-80
Author(s):  
Corey Barwick ◽  
Ryan Dawkins

Why do some people evaluate state supreme courts as more legitimate than others? Conventional academic wisdom suggests that people evaluate courts in nonpartisan ways, and that people make a distinction between how they evaluate individual court decisions and how they evaluate the court’s legitimacy more broadly. We challenge this idea by arguing that people’s partisan identities have a strong influence on how people evaluate the impartiality of courts, just as they do other aspects of the political world. Using original survey experiments, validated by existing observational survey data, we show that people perceive state supreme courts as being more impartial when courts issue decisions that match the ideological preferences of their preferred political party, while court decisions at odds with their party’s policy goals diminish people’s belief that courts are impartial arbiters of the law. We also show that the effects of citizen perceptions of impartiality erode evaluations of state court legitimacy, which makes them want to limit the independence of judicial institutions.


Res Publica ◽  
1993 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-38
Author(s):  
Pierre Blaise ◽  
Vincent De Coorebyter

In the countries with a strong muslim immigration, the practice and the organization of Islam  represent a national and international politica! stake. The Belgian state, which recognizes and supports the most important cults financially, recognized Islam in 1974. But this cult doesn't still obtain this state support and the questions concerning its organization are more complex than ever. Thelegislation is insufficient and its application almost non-existent. The debates on 'integrism' and hijab have confronted us with the problem of the integrating role of Islam. The Belgian political world seems today to fear the influence of foreign countries on immigrants. All these factors throw light on the history and the present state of the Belgian legislation on the organization of the islamic cult, which this article analyses.


1981 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 471-497 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard M. Merelman

I first encountered the work of Harold Lasswell in the late 1950s, when I was a barely awake undergraduate at a university whose reputation for mediocrity was richly deserved. I opened Politics: Who Gets What, When, How to the first paragraph: ‘The study of politics is the study of influence and the influential. The science of politics states conditions; the philosophy of politics justifies preferences. This book, restricted to political analysis, declares no preferences. It states conditions.’ I had never heard of Lasswell, for my political science courses limited themselves to subjects like Congressional seniority and Cabinet responsibility in Britain. One course discussed the law of piracy, a subject I had trouble linking to international politics in the 1950s. Some enterprising instructors occasionally discussed the balance of power, and one even assigned David Truman. But Lasswell was terra incognita to me, as he no doubt was to most undergraduates in those years.


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