On the Status of the EU’s Democratic Legitimacy after Lisbon

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dieter Grimm
Keyword(s):  
German Law ◽  
Public Authority ◽  
Democratic Legitimacy ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
European Democracy ◽  
European Public ◽  
The Status ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
The Eu

This chapter examines the status of the EU’s democratic legitimacy after Lisbon: the treaty, which forms the legal foundation of the EU, and the 2009 judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court, which declared that the German law ratifying the treaty was compatible with the Basic Law, Germany’s constitution. One of the Lisbon Treaty’s declared goals is to strengthen European democracy. This chapter first considers the levels of creating and organizing European public authority and the exercise of European public authority before discussing the European Parliament’s limited role in terms of approving decisions. It then asks whether the notion that EU is democratically deficient is accurate, suggesting that the necessary degree of democratization in the EU depends on the scope of its powers and on the extent of its autonomy from the Member States. Finally, it explores the question of de-legitimation through Europe’s democratic deficit.

International Treaties and The German Constitution

2019 ◽  
pp. 171-190
Author(s):  
Stefan Kadelbach
Keyword(s):  
German Law ◽  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
International Treaties ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
The Status ◽  
German Constitution ◽  
Federal Constitutional

This chapter deals with the making, status, and interpretation of international treaties under the German Constitution. It describes the interrelationship of the different institutions in treaty-making and shows how a comparatively old provision of the German Basic Law has been adapted slowly to new circumstances over the past decades. Thus, even though foreign affairs has remained a domain of the executive, several developments have contributed to an enhanced role of Parliament over time. These developments are partly due to the role of special sectors of law such as EU law and the law governing the use of force and partly due to changes in constitutional practice. As for the status of treaties in German law, the Federal Constitutional Court has developed a stance according to which treaties generally share the rank of the legal act that implements them into domestic law. A notable exception is the European Convention of Human Rights, which has assumed a quasi-constitutional rank by means of consistent interpretation. Some reference is made to other continental systems to assess how far different constitutions bring about certain features; various systems appear similar in many respects at first sight, whereas features in which they differ may be a source of inspiration for future constitutional practice.

Celebrating the Milk Maid: What Federal Constitutional Court President Limbach Doesn't Tell Us About the Court Says It All

2001 ◽  
Vol 2 (9) ◽  
Author(s):  
Viktor Winkler
Keyword(s):  
German Law ◽  
The Other ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Limited Size ◽  
Small Stature ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Law Student

It's a small book. Actually, it is a very small book. Only one hundred and twenty-eight pages, it's a format so thin it could fit into a pocket. As a matter of fact, it is smaller than a copy of the Grundgesetz (German Basic Law) that a German law student would carry along to class. The book's title, however, is considerably more intrepid than the book's small stature. At the same time breathtakingly pithy and slightly immodest, the book is simply called Das Bundesverfassungsgericht (The Federal Constitutional Court). And at the top of the cover, just to make sure, the word “WISSEN” (KNOWLEDGE) appears in big letters. While one wonders how a publication of such limited size could deign to comprehensively present the important “knowledge” of the Federal Constitutional Court, the other words on the cover provide some assurance. Those words are the name of the book's author who obviously could not be more adequate for the task. The author, Jutta Limbach, is the current President of the Federal Constitutional Court presiding in her seventh year.

Corona-Bonds und EU-Verschuldung: Zukunftsvision oder Europäische Naivität?

2020 ◽  
Vol 69 (2) ◽  
pp. 148-165
Author(s):  
Bodo Herzog
Keyword(s):  
Current Debate ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Political Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
European Public ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Lively Debate ◽  
And Control ◽  
Principle Of Liability ◽  
The Eu

AbstractThis article studies the current debate on Coronabonds and the idea of European public debt in the aftermath of the Corona pandemic. According to the EU-Treaty economic and fiscal policy remains in the sovereignty of Member States. Therefore, joint European debt instruments are risky and trigger moral hazard and free-riding in the Eurozone. We exhibit that a mixture of the principle of liability and control impairs the present fiscal architecture and destabilizes the Eurozone. We recommend that Member States ought to utilize either the existing fiscal architecture available or establish a political union with full sovereignty in Europe. This policy conclusion is supported by the PSPP-judgement of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany on 5 May 2020. This ruling initiated a lively debate about the future of the Eurozone and Europe in general.

Äußerung von Beamten im Konflikt mit Dienstpflichten

2018 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 265-300
Author(s):  
Klaus Herrmann
Keyword(s):  
Civil Servants ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Present Contribution ◽  
General Duty ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
The Status ◽  
German Constitution ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Administrative Courts ◽  
Historical Developments

Summary Over the past decades, the adjudication handed down by the German administrative courts has consistently derived from the principles of the professional civil service (Grundsätze des Berufsbeamtentums) enshrined in Article 33 paragraph 5 of the Grundgesetz (GG, Basic Law) and in the blanket clauses of the Beamtenstatusgesetz (BeamtStG, Act on the Status of Civil Servants) as well as the Civil Servants Acts applicable at the Federal and the Land levels the duties of civil servants, judges, and soldiers to adhere to the German Constitution and to be loyal to it, to maintain their impartiality, and to protect the respect in which their employer is held, as well as the trust that their employer and the general public place in them, in any statements they may make as part of their service, but also outside of an official context. The present contribution sets out the historical developments and milestone decisions in this regard, such as the judgment handed down by the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) of May 22nd, 1975, which refused to grant employment as civil servants to applicants seeking such employment who were involved with the Deutsche Kommunistische Partei (DKP, German Communist Party). Furthermore, the contribution addresses the various consequences, based on their severity, which violations against the duty to adhere to the German Constitution, to remain neutral, and to exercise restraint will have, along with the consequences of violations of the duty to observe secrecy in all matters pertaining to the service. Based on the circumstances of the cases adjudicated by the courts, the requirements made on civil servants’ conduct and the „red lines“ constituting a dereliction of official duties when crossed are discussed. Where the punishment under disciplinary law of violations of said duties is concerned, the administrative courts premise their decisions on the assumption that civil servants, judges, and soldiers are aware of what is expected of them. However, the articles’ main focus is on how the duty of neutrality was derived, in terms of jurisprudence, in the court rulings most recently handed down on the „Lights out!“ call by the mayor of a city in North Rhine-Westphalia. The municipal leader had instructed all city-owned buildings to turn their lights off, on the evening of an assembly that had been previously registered with the city administration, in the interests of damaging the attractiveness of the demonstration and its overall impact. While the administrative courts have relied, in dealing with that particular call to action and with other statements made in the battle of public opinion, on the general duty of the state to remain objective and to adhere to the principle of neutrality where party politics are concerned, the present contribution highlights the fact that the duty of neutrality as stipulated by the laws governing civil servants must not be disregarded when this group of people voices religious or political sentiments, nor must the official duties subject to sanctions under disciplinary law be ignored.

Lisbon in Karlsruhe: Maastricht's Epigones At Sea

2009 ◽  
Vol 10 (8) ◽  
pp. 1201-1218 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christoph Schönberger
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Legitimacy ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Federal States ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
German Constitution ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Moment ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court

On 30 June 2009, the Second Senate of the German Federal Constitutional Court handed down its long-awaited decision on the compatibility of the Treaty of Lisbon with the German Constitution, the Basic Law. It was no surprise that the Court upheld the constitutionality of the treaty. Even the plaintiffs could not have imagined in their wildest dreams that the Court would actually say “no”. What is more than disturbing, however, is the tortuous way in which the Court's vast and verbose opinion purports to be justifying the approval of the treaty. There is probably no other judgment in the history of the Karlsruhe Court in which the argument is so much at odds with the actual result. To the point of perplexity and bewilderment, the reader of the opinion is hardly able to find any reasons supporting the outcome of the case. At the moment when the Court approves the most far-reaching revision of the European founding treaties since Maastricht, it does not present any serious argument supporting the conclusion it has reached, except sketchy evocations of a principle of “openness towards European law” it finds enshrined in the Basic Law and brief solemn reminders of a murderous past. Instead, the main thrust of the argument is a ringing indictment of European integration based on a certain idea of egalitarian and majoritarian parliamentary democracy that the Court derives from the Basic Law. Unfortunately, this standard of democratic legitimacy can only describe certain centralized states; it is unable to account for federal States, including Germany, and cannot be made to fit the federal system of the European Union.

The Participation of the German Länder in Formulating German EU-policy

2009 ◽  
Vol 10 (9) ◽  
pp. 1215-1255 ◽  
Author(s):  
Magdalena Suszycka-Jasch ◽  
Hans-Christian Jasch
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
German Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Treaty Of Lisbon ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
German Länder ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court

On the 30 June 2009 the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, FCC) has passed its long-awaited decision on the compatibility of the Act approving the Treaty of Lisbon and the accompanying legislation with the Basic law (Grundgesetz). The FCC's decision according to which the ratification law is compatible with the Basic law was greeted with relief by many German and European policy makers. It has removed another obstacle for the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon in the European Union (EU), which still has to be ratified by Ireland, Poland and the Czech Republic, though. But also Germany's ratification still depends on the amendment of the accompanying “Act Extending and Strengthening the Rights of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat in European Union Matters” (“Extending Act”) which the FCC has declared incompatible with the Basic law insofar as the legislature, Bundestag and Bundesrat, have not been accorded sufficient rights of participation in European law-making and treaty amendment procedures. The FCC has therefore ruled that the Federal Republic of Germany's instrument of ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon may not be deposited as long as the constitutionally required legal elaboration of the parliamentary rights of participation has not entered into force. This puts pressure on German law-makers to amend the accompanying “Extending Act” possibly before the referendum in Ireland and before German elections in autumn 2009.

The Basic Law as a Barrier against a Transformation of the EU into a State

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dieter Grimm
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Integration ◽  
Democratic Legitimacy ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Legal Basis ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Court ◽  
The Eu

This chapter examines how Germany’s Basic Law can prevent the transformation of the European Union into a state. It begins with a discussion of the German Federal Constitutional Court’s (Bundesverfassungsgericht) 2009 decision on the compatibility of the Lisbon Treaty with the Basic Law. In particular, it highlights the message of the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s judgment: that European integration will not be hindered by Germany but finds it limits in the Basic Law. It then explains why, on the side of the EU, the German Court puts so much weight on the treaty character of the EU’s legal basis and why, on the side of the Member States, much emphasis is placed on sovereignty. It also considers the question of whether Germany would be allowed to join a federal European state if its democratic legitimacy were at the level required by Article 79(3) Basic Law.

International Integration and its counter-Limits

2019 ◽  
pp. 410-430
Author(s):  
Andreas L. Paulus ◽  
Jan-Henrik Hinselmann
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Court ◽  
International Integration ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Governance Systems ◽  
The Status ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Protection Of Human Rights ◽  
Decision Making Processes ◽  
International Responsibility ◽  
German Bundestag

This chapter analyzes the German Basic Law as the epitome of Open Statehood. The constitutional openness for international integration rests on distinct provisions on supranational engagement going beyond regular treaty law. Thereby, the Basic Law seeks to overcome the supposed dichotomies between state sovereignty and international integration and between national democracy and international legality. Further, the Basic Law distinguishes European from classical international integration. In both instances, the German Bundestag increasingly claims the status as coequal branch. Parliament also has the power to unilaterally modify the domestic effect of treaties, albeit within constitutional limits. Yet, disengagement comes at the price of incurring international responsibility. In line with the principle of mutual respect, the Federal Constitutional Court has developed three doctrinal devices, so-called counter-limits, to integration, to accommodate the diverse multilayered decision-making processes of multilevel governance systems, namely, the effective protection of human rights Solange, constitutional control of ultra vires acts, and the absolute protection of constitutional identity. In this way, the constitutional judiciary buttresses the concept of Open Statehood by reconciling at times diverging interests of national democracy and international integration.

Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) Case

2021 ◽  
Vol 192 ◽  
pp. 451-511
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Central ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

451Economics, trade and finance — European Monetary Union — Fiscal sovereignty — Public debt — Monetary policy — Economic policy — European Union — Asset purchase programme — Quantitative easing — Central banks — European Central Bank — European System of Central Banks — BundesbankTreaties — Treaty-making powers — Constitutional limitations on treaty-making powers — Transfers of powers by States to intergovernmental and other transnational authorities — Whether compatible with constitutional prerogatives of national parliament — Overall budgetary responsibility — Basic Law of GermanyInternational organizations — European Union — Powers — Member States as masters of the treaties — Principle of conferral — Whether Union having competence to determine or extend its own powers — Principle of subsidiarity — Court of Justice of the European UnionRelationship of international law and municipal law — European Union law — Interpretation — Application — Judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — Weiss — Principle of proportionality — Whether application of EU law having absolute primacy — Whether German Federal Constitutional Court having absolute duty to follow judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — Compatibility with Basic Law of Federal Republic of Germany — Openness of German Basic Law to European integration — Whether purchase programme ultra vires — Whether ultra vires acts applicable in Germany — Whether having binding effect in relation to German constitutional organsJurisdiction — European Union institutions — Whether jurisdiction of German Federal Constitutional Court extending to Court of Justice of the European Union and European Central Bank — Whether acts of EU institutions subject to national constitutional review — Ultra vires review — Review of core identity of national constitution — Whether application of EU law having absolute primacy — Whether absolute duty to follow judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — The law of Germany

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