Relative Locations
The fact that physical laws often admit certain kinds of space-time symmetries is often thought to be problematic for substantivalism—the view that space-time is as real as the objects it contains. The most prominent alternative, relationism, avoids these problems but at the cost of giving abstract objects (rather than space-time points) a pivotal role in the fundamental metaphysics. This incurs related problems concerning the relation of the physical to the mathematical. This paper presents a version of substantivalism that respects Leibnizian theses about space-time symmetries, and argues that it is superior to both relationism and the more orthodox form of substantivalism.
2019 ◽
Vol 475
(2225)
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pp. 20190170
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2015 ◽
Vol 75
(19)
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pp. 11661-11682
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1955 ◽
Vol 27
(1)
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pp. 40-76
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2019 ◽
Vol 33
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pp. 8545-8552
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2003 ◽
Vol 2003
(24)
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pp. 1529-1546
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Keyword(s):
1955 ◽
Vol 27
(1)
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pp. 26-39
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