Standing

2019 ◽  
pp. 6-36
Author(s):  
Shelly Kagan
Keyword(s):  
Moral Status ◽  
Moral Standing ◽  
Logical Possibility ◽  
Ability To Act ◽  
Lower Status ◽  
Important Idea ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient

This chapter introduces the key notions of moral standing and moral status, and notes the logical possibility that different individuals might have a higher or a lower status. It then turns to questions concerning the basis for having any kind of moral standing at all. A very common proposal is that sentience—the ability to feel pleasure and pain—is both necessary and sufficient for standing, but the author argues that an equally important idea (perhaps more important) is that of agency, having preferences about how things should go as well as the ability to act on those preferences. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the connection between having standing and having a welfare (being such that things can be better or worse for you).

The Animal Antinomy, Part 1

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine M. Korsgaard
Keyword(s):  
New Species ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
Domestic Animals ◽  
Moral Standing ◽  
Phase Out

Does a commitment to the moral standing of animals obligate us to try to end predation? “Creation ethicists,” who answer yes, believe that if we could, we ought to create new species of animals who would not need predation. The probable result would be that all animals are domestic. “Abolitionists,” who answer no, argue that the only way we can treat animals well is by leaving them alone. We should not interfere with predation, and should phase out domestic animals. The result would be that all animals are wild. This chapter raises some worries about the creationist position, although it grants that these worries are inconclusive. Since we would be substituting different kinds of animals for the ones that exist now, we need to understand the moral status of groups, including species, and to determine what is bad about extinction, before we can decide whether creating new species is a good solution to the problem of predation.

Literalism and Moral Status

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carrie Figdor
Keyword(s):  
Moral Status ◽  
Moral Standing ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Moral Boundaries ◽  
Psychological Capacities

Chapter 9 presents the idea that Literalism undermines current social and moral boundaries for moral status. Possession of psychological capacities, moral standing, and respectful treatment are a standard package deal. So either many more beings enjoy moral status than we now think, or the relative superiority of human moral status over other beings is diminished. It introduces the role of psychological ascriptions in drawing social and moral boundaries by examining dehumanization and anthropomorphism. It argues that in the short term Literalism does not motivate us to do more than make minor adjustments to current moral boundaries. We can distinguish the kinds of psychological capacities that matter for moral status from the kinds that best divide nature at its joints. In the long run, however, Literalism prompts us to reconsider the anthropocentric standards that govern current moral boundaries.

scholarly journals Disability, Narrative, and Moral Status

2016 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth B. Purcell
Keyword(s):  
Moral Status ◽  
Cognitive Impairments ◽  
Moral Standing ◽  
Moral Action ◽  
Social Ability ◽  
Present Essay

<p>The present essay aims to respond to recent arguments which maintain that persons with severe cognitive impairments should not enjoy the full moral status or equal dignity as other "cognitively-able" humans. In the debate concerning moral standing and worth, philosophers Singer and McMahan have argued that individuals with certain impairments should not be granted full moral status and therefore, by extension, should not be awarded the same inviolability as humans without cognitive impairments. In response, I argue that an overlooked social ability – the capacity to narrate – provides grounds for the full moral status of individuals with severe cognitive impairments, and thus provides a defense and support for individuals with such "disabilities" to play a robust role in moral action and contribution to human living. </p>

All Animals are Equal, but Some More than Others?

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 342-357
Author(s):  
Huub Brouwer ◽  
Willem van der Deijl
Keyword(s):  
Review Essay ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
Moral Standing ◽  
Common View ◽  
Status Hierarchy ◽  
Compelling Argument

Does the moral badness of pain depend on who feels it? A common, but generally only implicitly stated view, is that it does not. This view, ‘unitarianism’, maintains that the same interests of different beings should count equally in our moral calculus. Shelly Kagan’s project in How to Count Animals, more or less (2019) is to reject this common view, and develop an alternative to it: a hierarchical view of moral status, on which the badness of pain does depend on who feels it. In this review essay, we critically examine Kagan’s argument for status hierarchy. In particular, we reject two of the central premises in his argument: that (1) moral standing is ultimately grounded in agency and (2) that unitarianism is overdemanding. We conclude that moral status may, despite Kagan’s compelling argument to the contrary, not be hierarchical.

CONTRACTARIANISM AND INTERSPECIES WELFARE CONFLICTS

2008 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 227-257 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew I. Cohen
Keyword(s):  
Moral Status ◽  
Moral Standing ◽  
Nonhuman Animals

AbstractIn this essay I describe how contractarianism might approach interspecies welfare conflicts. I start by discussing a contractarian account of the moral status of nonhuman animals. I argue that contractors can agree to norms that would acknowledge the “moral standing” of some animals. I then discuss how the norms emerging from contractarian agreement might constrain any comparison of welfare between humans and animals. Contractarian agreement is likely to express some partiality to humans in a way that discounts the welfare of some or all animals. While the norms emerging from the contract might be silent or inconsistent in some tragic or catastrophic cases, in most ordinary conflicts of welfare, contractors will agree to norms that produce some determinate resolution. What the agreement says can evolve depending upon how the contractors or the circumstances change. I close with some remarks on contractarian indeterminacy.

Dignity and Equality in Pufendorf’s Natural Law Theory

2019 ◽  
pp. 147-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simone Zurbuchen
Keyword(s):  
Social Inequality ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
The Other ◽  
Moral Standing ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Natural Law Theory ◽  
The One ◽  
In Virtue Of

The chapter explores the ambiguity of the notion of dignity in Pufendorf’s natural law theory. On the one hand, dignity (dignatio) denotes the moral status of human beings in virtue of which they have to treat each other as equals. On the other hand, Pufendorf holds dignity and natural equality to be compatible with social inequality, notably with servitude and slavery. Moreover, when he deals with the comparative value and reputation (existimatio) of human beings, he admits that their moral status is conditioned by their readiness to behave as social beings. Human beings can thus lose their basic moral standing and are then considered as common enemies of all.

How the Moral Community Evolves

2021 ◽  
pp. 231-249
Author(s):  
Rachell Powell ◽  
Irina Mikhalevich ◽  
Allen Buchanan
Keyword(s):  
Moral Status ◽  
Cognitive Biases ◽  
Moral Community ◽  
Moral Standing ◽  
Modern World ◽  
Moral Progress ◽  
Animal Minds ◽  
Attitudes And Behaviors ◽  
Adaptive Mechanisms ◽  
Moral Attitudes

Moral reasoning is modulated by emotions and other cognitive biases. How do these covert biasing mechanisms shape perceptions of more fundamental moral categories, such as moral standing and moral status (together, “MSS”), out of which specific moral attitudes and behaviors flow? This chapter explains the centrality of MSS to human evolution, and examines several evolved biases that distort MSS ascription. These include tendencies to deny moral standing, or to attribute lower moral status, to beings that elicit feelings of disgust or fear, as well as to those that are perceived as less similar, less attractive, less individualized, and less disposed toward reciprocal cooperation. These adaptive mechanisms may have served human groups well in the evolutionary past, but in the modern world they pose an obstacle to moral progress and play a key role in moral regression. The chapter argues that these biases have also influenced philosophical and scientific research on animal minds. The aim is to develop a richer, biocultural understanding of how conceptions of the moral community evolve.

Contractarianism and Moral Standing Inegalitarianism

Dialogue ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 55 (4) ◽  
pp. 639-658
Author(s):  
ANDREW I. COHEN
Keyword(s):  
Moral Status ◽  
Moral Standing ◽  
David Gauthier ◽  
Nonhuman Animals

Contractarianism is more inclusive than critics (and, indeed, David Gauthier) sometimes suggest. Contractarianism can justify equal moral standing for human persons (in some respects) and provide sufficient moral standing for many nonhuman animals to require what we commonly call ‘decent treatment.’ Moreover, contractarianism may allow that some entities have more moral standing than do others. This does not necessarily license the oppression that liberal egalitarians rightly fear. Instead, it shows that contractarianism may support a nuanced account of moral status.

An Interest-Based Model of Moral Status

2021 ◽  
pp. 40-56
Author(s):  
David DeGrazia
Keyword(s):  
Social Relations ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
Self Awareness ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Special Interests ◽  
Moral Relevance ◽  
Special Obligations ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient ◽  
Sentient Beings

This chapter briefly defends each of the following theses, which together comprise an interest-based model of moral status: (1) Being human is neither necessary nor sufficient for moral status; (2) The capacity for consciousness is necessary but not sufficient; (3) Sentience is necessary and sufficient; (4) Social relations are not a basis for moral status but may ground special obligations to those with moral status; (5) The concept of personhood is unhelpful in modeling moral status, unless a non-vague conception is identified and its moral relevance clarified; (6) Sentient beings are entitled to equal consequentialist consideration; and (7) Sentient beings with substantial temporal self-awareness have special interests that justify the added protection of rights. This model will be engaged in illuminating the moral status of ordinary, self-aware human beings, non-paradigm humans, animals, robots and AI systems, brain organoids, and post-humans with superior self-awareness.

We Must Create Beings with Moral Standing Superior to Our Own

2014 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 58-65 ◽  
Author(s):  
VOJIN RAKIĆ
Keyword(s):  
Moral Status ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
Moral Enhancement ◽  
Moral Standing ◽  
List Type ◽  
Type Number ◽  
Inductive Argument ◽  
The Creation ◽  
To Come ◽  
Status Enhancement

Abstract:Several lines of reasoning have been employed to both approve and disapprove two of Nicholas Agar’s positions: his argument that the creation of postpersons (based on moral status enhancement) is imaginable and possible and his inductive argument disfavoring the creation of postpersons. This article discusses a number of these lines of reasoning, arguing that1)The creation of postpersons is imaginable if they are envisaged as morally enhanced beings.2)The creation of postpersons is justified, subject to the condition that we create morally enhanced postpersons.The reason given for the first point is that it is possible to imagine postpersons who are morally enhanced, provided that we consider moral enhancement as an augmented inclination to act in line with how we believe we ought to act. There are two reasons offered for the second point: the first indicates probability, and the second offers proof. That is, if we assume that the higher moral status of postpersons implies their enhanced morality, we can conclude, inductively, that (morally enhanced) postpersons will not be inclined to annihilate mere persons. For if mere persons have moral inhibitions against obliterating some species of a lower moral status than their own, morally enhanced postpersons will be even less likely to do the same to mere persons. In fact, they might consider it their moral duty to preserve those beings who enabled them to come into existence. Moreover, even if morally enhanced postpersons decide to annihilate mere persons, we can conclude, deductively, that such a decision is by necessity a morally superior stance to the wish of mere persons (i.e., morally unenhanced persons) to continue to exist.

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