Partial Eclipse of Union Citizenship: From Grzelczyk to Dano

Author(s):  
Julio Baquero Cruz

This chapter looks at Union citizenship, the obvious choice when looking for a substantive area in which to test the state of health of the law of integration. The chapter analyses how the citizenship case law of the Court of Justice has tried to find a reasonable balance between solidarity and the territorial character of the welfare systems of the Member States, how that balance seems to have been modified with the judgment in the Dano case, as a result of the contemporary pressures on integration, and the reasons behind that decision.

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Niamh Nic Shuibhne

Abstract This paper examines the growing significance of the ‘territory of the Union’ in EU citizenship law and asks what it reveals about Union citizenship in the wider system of the EU legal order. In doing so, it builds on scholarship constructing the idea of ‘personhood’ in EU law by adding a complementary dimension of ‘place-hood’. The analysis is premised on territory as a place within—but also beyond—which particular legal qualities are both produced by and reflect shared objectives or values. In that respect, the paper offers a comprehensive ‘map’ of Union territory as a legal construct, with the aim of uncovering what kind of legal place the territory of the Union constitutes as well as the extent to which it is dis-connectable from the territories of the Member States. It also considers how Union territory relates to what lies ‘outside’. It will be shown that different narratives of Union territory have materialized in the case law of the Court of Justice. However, it is argued that these segregated lines of reasoning should be integrated, both to reflect and to progress a composite understanding of Union territory as a place in which concerns for Union citizens, for Member States, and for the system underpinning the EU legal order are more consistently acknowledged and more openly weighed.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Bridgette K. McLellan

<p>European Union citizenship was established by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. Intended to fall within the exclusive prerogative of the Member States, it soon became clear that the autonomy of Member States to determine matters relating to nationality would be restricted by the ever-expansive reach of the European Court of Justice. As such, the European Court of Justice transformed the law on citizenship in the 2010 case of Rottmann where measures affecting or depriving the rights conferred and protected by the European Union were held to fall within the scope ratione materiae of European Union law. While Rottmann affirmed the law as to the deprivation of European Union citizenship, it left unanswered the question whether the acquisition of nationality also falls within the scope of European Union law. This paper aims to identify and analyse the law arising post-Rottmann to determine whether the acquisition of nationality could fall within the scope of European Union law. It shall then analyse whether fundamental principles of European Union law, namely the principle of proportionality, could be applied in order to regulate the conditions imposed by Member States in relation to the acquisition of nationality.</p>


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Bridgette K. McLellan

<p>European Union citizenship was established by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. Intended to fall within the exclusive prerogative of the Member States, it soon became clear that the autonomy of Member States to determine matters relating to nationality would be restricted by the ever-expansive reach of the European Court of Justice. As such, the European Court of Justice transformed the law on citizenship in the 2010 case of Rottmann where measures affecting or depriving the rights conferred and protected by the European Union were held to fall within the scope ratione materiae of European Union law. While Rottmann affirmed the law as to the deprivation of European Union citizenship, it left unanswered the question whether the acquisition of nationality also falls within the scope of European Union law. This paper aims to identify and analyse the law arising post-Rottmann to determine whether the acquisition of nationality could fall within the scope of European Union law. It shall then analyse whether fundamental principles of European Union law, namely the principle of proportionality, could be applied in order to regulate the conditions imposed by Member States in relation to the acquisition of nationality.</p>


2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Chuks Okpaluba

‘Accountability’ is one of the democratic values entrenched in the Constitution of South Africa, 1996. It is a value recognised throughout the Constitution and imposed upon the law-making organs of state, the Executive, the Judiciary and all public functionaries. This constitutional imperative is given pride of place among the other founding values: equality before the law, the rule of law and the supremacy of the Constitution. This study therefore sets out to investigate how the courts have grappled with the interpretation and application of the principle of accountability, the starting point being the relationship between accountability and judicial review. Therefore, in the exercise of its judicial review power, a court may enquire whether the failure of a public functionary to comply with a constitutional duty of accountability renders the decision made illegal, irrational or unreasonable. One of the many facets of the principle of accountability upon which this article dwells is to ascertain how the courts have deployed that expression in making the state and its agencies liable for the delictual wrongs committed against an individual in vindication of a breach of the individual’s constitutional right in the course of performing a public duty. Here, accountability and breach of public duty; the liability of the state for detaining illegal immigrants contrary to the prescripts of the law; the vicarious liability of the state for the criminal acts of the police and other law-enforcement officers (as in police rape cases and misuse of official firearms by police officers), and the liability of the state for delictual conduct in the context of public procurement are discussed. Having carefully analysed the available case law, this article concludes that no public functionary can brush aside the duty of accountability wherever it is imposed without being in breach of a vital constitutional mandate. Further, it is the constitutional duty of the courts, when called upon, to declare such act or conduct an infringement of the Constitution.


2021 ◽  
pp. 203228442110276
Author(s):  
Tricia Harkin

The case law of the Court of Justice from 2016 to 2019 on the interpretation of ‘judicial authority’ in Article 6(1) FD-EAW essentially examines whether a public prosecutor can be an issuing judicial authority and if so, how Member States’ systems for issuing EAWs ensure effective judicial protection for the person concerned. For the Advocate General, applying the Court’s ‘rule of law’ jurisprudence, effective judicial protection when deprivation of liberty is involved can only be assured by a body with the highest level of judicial independence, being a court. The Court’s broader approach of including public prosecutors with sufficiency of independence from the executive and requiring their decisions to be amenable to review by a court, when applied in practice arguably falls short of the requisite standard of effective judicial protection. There is also a lack of clarity about access to the interpretative jurisdiction of the Court by public prosecutors acting as judicial authorities. Effective judicial protection and EU cooperation in criminal matters would now be better served by the designation in all Member States of a court as the issuing judicial authority for the FD-EAW. This is against the background of the uniquely coercive nature of the EAW in terms of deprivation of liberty; the differences in Member States’ institutional arrangements for public prosecutors and the post-Lisbon effective constitutionalisation of judicial protection of rights of individuals.


2002 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-52
Author(s):  
Alan Dashwood

IN its Keck judgment—famous or notorious according to taste—the Court of Justice drew a distinction, for the purposes of the application of the prohibition in Article 28 EC against measures having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions (“MEEQRs”), between two categories of national measures. On the one hand were “product requirements”: measures specifying requirements to be met, in order to obtain access to the market of a Member State, by products coming from other Member States where they are lawfully manufactured and marketed, like the minimum alcohol requirement for fruit liqueurs in Cassis de Dijon (Case 120/78 [1997] E.C.R. 649). Such product requirements are liable to constitute MEEQRs, and therefore require specific justification, in order to escape prohibition, on one of the public interest grounds recognised by Community law. On the other hand was the category of measures described in the judgment as “provisions restricting or prohibiting certain selling arrangements”. An example was the legislation at issue in the main proceedings in Keck, which prohibited the resale of products below their purchase price, thereby depriving retailers of a form of sales promotion. Other examples, attested by the case law post-Keck, are measures regulating advertising methods, the kind of shop in which goods of a certain description can be sold, shops’ opening hours and Sunday trading. National provisions in this latter category are not normally such as to hinder trade between Member States under the test formulated by the Court in Dassonville (Case 8/74 [1974] E.C.R. 837, at para. 5), and so do not call for justification; not, that is, “so long as those provisions apply to all relevant traders operating within the national territory and so long as they affect in the same manner, in law and in fact, the marketing of domestic products and those from other Member States”: see Joined Cases C-267 and 268/9 [1993] E.C.R. I-6097, at paras. 15–17.


2001 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-24
Author(s):  
Herwig Verschueren

This article seeks to provide a clearer picture of the role of methods for funding social security benefits in EC Coordination Regulation 1408/71. In past literature and in the case law surrounding Regulation 1408/71, this role has seldom been mentioned. However, this is changing in light of increasing numbers of questions emerging at both the policy-making level and at the level of Court of Justice proceedings. The first part of this paper deals with the role of different methods of financing social security in determining the material scope of the coordination regulation and the question of whether the method of financing certain benefits has a bearing on this material scope. The second part deals with the existing link within the coordination context between paying or having paid contributions and entitlement to benefits. I discuss, inter alia, the extent to which benefit levels are determined by the same legislation as that which determines contribution levels. I examine the extent to which Member States collecting contributions are also responsible for bearing the cost of the corresponding benefits and the extent to which a person who is paying or has paid contributions is entitled to benefits corresponding to those contributions. In light of this examination of the facts as they stand, I endeavour to consider possible alternatives, including the desirability of having a more direct link within the coordination context between payment of contributions and entitlement to benefits.


Author(s):  
Joni Heliskoski

Whatever terminology one might wish to employ to describe the form of integration constituted by the European Union and its Member States, one fundamental attribute of that arrangement has always been the division, as between the Union and its Member States, of competence to conclude international agreements with other subjects of international law. Today, the fact that treaty-making competence—as an external facet of the more general division of legal authority—is divided and, to some extent, shared between the Union and its Member States is reflected by some of the opening provisions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Notwithstanding the changes to the scope and nature of the powers conferred upon the Union, resulting from both changes to primary law and the evolution of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the basic characteristics of the conferment as an attribution of a limited kind has always been the same; there has always existed a polity endowed with a treaty-making authority divided between and, indeed, shared by, the Union and its Member States. In the early 1960s mixed agreements—that is, agreements to which the European Union


Author(s):  
Urška Šadl ◽  
Fabien Tarissan

The chapter argues that the network approach is a viable methodology in legal empirical research, which can be used to study the case law of the Court of Justice. To demonstrate this potential, the chapter: first, shows how to obtain detailed information about the law from the citation network; second, it illustrates how to assess the legal relevance of cases by looking at case citations; and, third, it explores how to infer the doctrinal influence of selected landmark cases. All examples adapt different citation network tools to the study of legal structures and legal discourse which can focus, frame, support, and guide doctrinal analysis.


2009 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 291-314 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tobias Lock

The article explores the limits of the ECJ's exclusive jurisdiction by addressing two main issues: firstly, whether there are exceptions to that exclusivity, such as the application of the CILFIT case law or the exclusion of Community law from the dispute. Secondly, it asks whether other international courts must respect the ECJ's jurisdiction over a case. The article commences by briefly discussing the ECJ's exclusive jurisdiction as it was established in Opinion 1/91 and the Mox Plant-Case and draws conclusions from this case law. It then addresses the above-mentioned points and comes to the conclusion that there are generally no exceptions to the ECJ's exclusive jurisdiction and that the only option open to Member States is to exclude Community law from a dispute (and even that option is subject to limitations). Furthermore, after exploring several routes advanced in the academic discussion, the article comes to the conclusion that other courts must respect the ECJ's jurisdiction and as a consequence declare the case inadmissible.


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