If Not Combatants, Certainly Not Civilians

2003 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 138-140 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven R. David

Stein and I see targeted killing in fundamentally different ways. Stein sees the Palestinian terrorists as civilian noncombatants who are not engaged in war or even armed conflict with Israel. As such, there is no legal or moral right to target them. I see targeted killing as an appropriate response to an intolerable threat. Israel has the right and obligation to defend itself against armed Palestinians who seek to kill as many innocent Israeli civilians as possible. So long as the Palestinian Authority is incapable or unwilling to halt terrorist attacks, most interpretations of international law, Israeli law, and just war tradition support Israel's efforts to stop these murderous attacks before they can be carried out.

Author(s):  
Tamar Meisels ◽  
Jeremy Waldron

In this “for and against” book, Jeremy Waldron and Tamar Meisels defend competing positions on the legitimacy of targeted killing. The volume begins with a joint introduction, briefly setting out the terms of discussion, and presenting a short historical overview of the practice—i.e. what is targeted killing, and how has it been used in which conflicts and by whom. The debate opens with Meisels’ defense of targeted killing as a legitimate and desirable defensive anti-terrorism strategy, in keeping with both just war theory and international law. Meisels unreservedly defends the named killing of irregular combatants, most notably terrorists, during armed conflict. Additionally, she offers a possible moral justification for rare instances of assassination outside that framework, specifically with reference to recent cases of nuclear scientists developing weapons of mass destruction for the Iranian and Syrian governments. The debate continues with Waldron’s arguments focusing on the dangers and the inherent wrongness of governments’ having the right to maintain death lists—lists of named individuals who are to be hunted down and killed. Waldron notes the many differences between individualized targeting and ordinary combat, and he resists the attempt to assimilate targeted killing to killings in combat. Waldron also cautions us to consider carefully what a world of targeted killings will be like, the many abuses it is liable to, and why we should be very cautious, morally and strategically, in our thinking about it.


2003 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven R. David

Since the beginning of the second intifada in the fall of 2000, Israel has pursued a policy in which alleged Palestinian terrorists have been hunted down and killed by government order. The policy is not one of assassination and is consistent with international law because Israel is engaged in armed conflict with terrorists, those targeted are usually killed by conventional military means, not through deception, and the targets of the attacks are not civilians but combatants or are part of a military chain of command. Targeted killing has also been affirmed by Israel's High Court.Although targeted killing has been pursued by Israel throughout its history, the scale of the present effort and the use of sophisticated military assets such as helicopter gunships and jet fighters set it apart from earlier practices. The effectiveness of the policy is called into doubt because it has not prevented–and may have contributed to–record numbers of Israeli civilians being killed. The policy has also resulted in informers being revealed, intelligence resources diverted, potential negotiating partners eliminated. It has also produced murderous retaliation and international condemnation of Israel. Benefits of the policy include impeding the effectiveness of terrorist operations, keeping terrorists on the run, and deterring some attacks. In addition, it affords the Israeli public a sense of revenge and retribution.Because it targets the actual perpetrators of terrorism, targeted killing provides a proportionate and discriminate response to the threat Israel faces. Improving the policy will require better civilian oversight, greater care to eliminate harm to innocent bystanders, and refraining from killing political leaders. Despite its many shortcomings, Israel is justified in pursuing this policy so long as it faces a terrorist threat that the Palestinian Authority will not or cannot control.


Author(s):  
Ian Park

There is a difference between a State’s substantive and procedural right to life obligations. This chapter explores what amount to a state’s substantive right to life obligations with reference to Article 2, ECHR and Article 6, ICCPR. The respective provisions are analysed to determine the extent of a state’s substantive right to life obligations during armed conflict and then a comparison between the two international law instruments is undertaken. In order to undertake such a comparison, the exceptions to the right to life in both the ECHR and ICCPR are examined. Once determined, the planning and conduct of a military operation are considered, to assess the extent to which, in general terms, right to life obligations are considered in these areas.


1999 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth J Keith

The Right Honourable Sir Kenneth Keith was the fourth speaker at the NZ Institute of International Affairs Seminar. In this article he describes and reflects upon the role of courts and judges in relation to the advancement of human rights, an issue covered in K J Keith (ed) Essays on Human Rights (Sweet and Maxwell, Wellington, 1968). The article is divided into two parts. The first part discusses international lawmakers attempting to protect individual groups of people from 1648 to 1948, including religious minorities and foreign traders, slaves, aboriginal natives, victims of armed conflict, and workers. The second part discusses how from 1945 to 1948, there was a shift in international law to universal protection. The author notes that while treaties are not part of domestic law, they may have a constitutional role, be relevant in determining the common law, give content to the words of a statute, help interpret legislation which is in line with a treaty, help interpret legislation which is designed to give general effect to a treaty (but which is silent on the particular matter), and help interpret and affect the operation of legislation to which the international text has no apparent direct relation. 


2012 ◽  
Vol 64 (2) ◽  
pp. 180-201
Author(s):  
Vladan Joncic ◽  
Milos Petrovic

The fundamental question of international law of armed conflict is the question of military necessity principle in international law of armed conflict, ie. in international humanitarian law. Hearings on this issue is necessary because it is still the danger that the principle of recognition of the needs of military regulations and deceive the application of international law of armed conflict. That?s why the military needs to be seen as a permitted deviation from compliance with rules of war. Extreme, this concept has led to the emergence of the theory of the military. Its radical variant of the proceeds from the Maxims of German classical scholars of international law. The result of theoretical assumptions had the effect of limiting the acceptance of military necessity of the first codification of the day. The four Geneva Conventions of 1949. The heavily consider the military. In all the texts of international conventions is determined by military necessity, as a circumstance or set of circumstances which affect the duty of obeying the regulations of international law. In international law there is no general rule of military necessity as a basis or reason for justified violations of rules of international law of armed conflict. The rules of international law represent a compromise between the desire for a decoration rules of warfare and the need to ensure all the necessary tools that can lead to victory. The four Geneva Conventions of 1949. the military need to provide in terms of the principles of humanity. Set rules on military necessity in the Geneva Conventions give the right correction factor in the role of the law of armed conflict. The Geneva Conventions there is a degree of confusion in terminology, where the concept of military necessity needlessly allocated a number of synonyms. This is because the international law of armed conflict and emerged as a normative regulation of proportionality between the military needs) and general principles and humane principles.


TheHandbookconsists of 32 Chapters in seven parts. Part I provides the historical background and sets out some of the contemporary challenges. Part II considers the relevant sources of international law. Part III describes the different legal regimes: land warfare, air warfare, maritime warfare, the law of occupation, the law applicable to peace operations, and the law of neutrality. Part IV introduces key concepts in international humanitarian law: weapons and the notion of superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering, the principle of distinction, proportionality, genocide and crimes against humanity, grave breaches and war crimes, internal armed conflict. Part V looks at key rights: the right to life, the prohibition on torture, the right to fair trial, economic, social and cultural rights, the protection of the environment, the protection of cultural property, and the human rights of the members of the armed forces. Part VI covers key issues such as: the use of force, terrorism, unlawful combatants, the application of human rights in times of armed conflict, forced migration, and issues of gender. Part VII deals with accountability issues including those related to private security companies, the need to focus on armed groups, as well as questions of state responsibility brought before national courts, and finally, the book addresses issues related to transitional justice.


Author(s):  
Ward Thomas

International law and armed conflict have a rather contentious history together. One the one hand, armed conflict implies and absence of law, and yet, on the other, international law plays an important role in codifying the use of force. The UN Charter’s restrictions on the use of force, drafted in the waning days of a second cataclysmic world war, were intended to radically transform the centuries-old ideology of raison d’état, which viewed war as a sovereign prerogative. More precisely, Article 2(4) of the Charter forbids not just war but force of any kind, or even the threat of it. On its face, the Charter system is a model of simplicity, consisting of a clear prohibition and two exceptions to that prohibition. The apparent simplicity is misleading, however. Article 2(4) is violated so often that experts disagree about whether it should even be considered good law. The Chapter VII enforcement exception is rarely used, and the meaning of self-defense under Article 51 is the subject of contentious disagreement. Moreover, even some UN bodies have supported creating another exception (humanitarian intervention) that coexists uneasily with the organization’s foundational principles. In addition, there is yet another exception (the use of force by national liberation movements) that may be as significant as the others, yet is little discussed by contemporary commentators.


2019 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 741-757
Author(s):  
Elisabeth Schweiger

AbstractOver the last decade, the concept targeted killing has received much attention in debates on the customary interpretation of the right to self-defence, particularly in the context of practices such as US armed drone attacks. In these debates, government silence has often been invoked as acquiescence to the jus ad bellum aspects of targeted killing. Focusing on the question of state silence on targeted killing practices by the Israeli and US governments in recent years, this article investigates over 900 UN Security Council and Human Rights Council debates and argues that there has been no tacit consent to targeted killing. The analysis firstly shows that the majority of states have condemned Israeli targeted killing practices and have raised concerns about armed drone attacks, while falling short of directly protesting against US practices. The article, secondly, applies the customary international law requirements for acquiescence and challenges the idea that silence on US armed drone attacks can be understood as a legal stance towards targeted killing. The article, finally, investigates the political context and engages with alternative interpretations of silence. Contextualizing acts of protest and lack of protest within an asymmetrical political context, the article posits that the invocation of silence as acquiescence in the case of targeted killing is problematic and risks complicity of legal knowledge production with the violence of hegemonic actors.


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