Justifying Terrorism: Four Attempts

Chapter 5 examines four categories of attempted philosophical justification for terrorist acts in certain circumstances. Each one, in different ways, reflects less formal and less carefully articulated views that are proclaimed not only by those who resort to terrorist acts but also by many members of the general public throughout the world, especially when the acts purporting to be justified are committed by their own people or others with whose cause they sympathize. The justifications considered are: utilitarian/consequentialist arguments that may reject the principle of discrimination outright; the argument from self-defense; the tit-for-tat argument; and the argument from the need for a fighting chance. These four attempted justifications raise a more general and very challenging issue about the difficulties of moral philosophizing in the face of absolute moral prohibitions.

Combatants, Non-Combatants, and the Question of Innocence

Chapter 4 tackles issues surrounding the concept of combatant/non-combatant and the related notions of guilt/innocence, and the connection of these to the soldier/civilian distinction. The investigation is partly conceptual, but it also inevitably raises moral questions and their significance, since the tactical definition’s reliance upon such concepts relates immediately to the moral assessments enshrined in the just war principle of discrimination, which prohibits the direction of lethal violence at non-combatants and reflects a wider moral principle that prohibits violence against the innocent. Whether one or both of these principles should be rejected, modified, or allow of exceptions are further questions addressed in Chapters 5 and 6. The present chapter requires extended discussion of contemporary debates within the complex just war tradition, particularly between those loosely styled “traditionalist” and “revisionist.” It offers a judgment on the debate and discusses its relation to the author’s account of the nature of terrorist acts.

PROTECTION OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION AS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF DISCRIMINATION

Legal research aims to solve the problems that arise in connection with the application of the principle of distinction (distinction principle) in terms of the protection of civilians in international armed conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. The object of study in legal research is devoted to applying the principle of distinction against the civilian population as a victim of war under international humanitarian law in armed conflict international. To solve these problems, they need to be supported by the data in the form of legal material. The data was obtained through the study of literature and via the Internet. From this legal research to achieve results that provide answers to the problems that exist, the Israeli aggression on Palestine has violated international humanitarian law provisions and has caused misery for the Palestinian population. As a result of these actions, the Israelis may be subject to liability in the form of sanctions or punishment according to international humanitarian law provisions applicable in the international community

The Significance of the Division of Linguistic Labor

This essay aims to explore the significance of Hilary Putnam’s reflections on the division of linguistic labor by putting them into contrast with those of Gareth Evans. Whereas Putnam’s reflections purport to uncover neglected aspects of the contribution of social environment to the meaning and the reference-fixing of conceptual terms, Evans’s reinterpretation of the division of linguistic labor results in obliterating its antisubjectivist and instrumentalist dimension. The crux of the disagreement between Putnam and Evans on the significance of the division of linguistic labor lies in Evans endorsing, while Putnam rejects, the principle of discrimination—a generalization of what Evans calls “Russell’s principle.”

Amoral realism or just war morality? Disentangling different conceptions of necessity

This paper addresses a misconception in the popular contrast between amoral realism and just war theory and clarifies the linguistic source of the misconception by disentangling the two interpretations of necessity. First, we can, and should, distinguish the Thucydidean “causal” conception of necessity, which is the basis for just war thinkers when they attack realist thought, from the Machiavellian “telic” conception. The paper, then, proceeds to reconsider the relationship between realism and morality through a textual analysis of representative contemporary realist theories and clarifies that their necessity judgments contain both causal and telic meanings. According to those supporting the moral view, the pursuit of national interest and security can be interpreted as emerging from their sense of moral duty. Realists are, even if partially, in line with just war theorists in evaluating the moral appropriateness of a war in itself and its methods. Finally, the paper explores the substantive disagreement between the two camps regarding the principle of discrimination, to demonstrate why they should still be assumed to have separate theories. In conclusion, their difference lies in not whether they place importance on the necessity judgment, among other considerations on the morality of war, but the extent to which they do so.

Intra-European Union investor–State arbitration post-Achmea: RIP? An assessment in the aftermath of the Court of Justice of the European Union, Case C-284/16, Achmea, Judgment of 6 March 2018, EU:C:2018:158

In its judgment in Case C-284/16 Achmea, the Court of Justice of the European Union declared the investor–State dispute settlement provisions included in intra-European Union Bilateral Investment Treaties incompatible with European Union law. The court based its finding on the adverse effect on the autonomy of European Union law, while avoiding a discussion of other grounds of potential incompatibilities (such as compatibility with the principle of discrimination or substantive incompatibilities). This article presents the judgment of the court and provides an account of its implications for the future of intra-European Union investment arbitration.

The principle of discrimination: Investigating perceptions of soldiers

The principle of discrimination states that soldiers are legitimate targets of violence in war, whereas civilians are not. Is this prescriptive rule reflected in the descriptive judgments of laypeople? In two studies ( Ns = 300, 229), U.S. Mechanical Turk workers were asked to evaluate the character traits of either a soldier or a civilian. Participants also made moral judgments about scenarios in which the target individual (soldier or civilian) killed or was killed by the enemy in war. Soldiers were consistently viewed as more dangerous and more courageous than civilians (Study 1). Participants also viewed killing by (and of) soldiers as more permissible than killing by (and of) civilians, in line with the principle of discrimination (Study 1). Altering the war context to involve a clearly just and unjust side (in Study 2) did not appear to moderate the principle of discrimination in moral judgment, although soldiers and civilians on the just side were evaluated more positively overall. However, the soldiers on the unjust side of the war were not attributed greater courage than were civilians on the unjust side. Theoretical and practical implications of these descriptive findings are discussed.

The principle of discrimination: Investigating perceptions of soldiers

The principle of discrimination states that soldiers are legitimate targets of violence in war, whereas civilians are not. Is this prescriptive rule reflected in the descriptive judgments of laypeople? In 2 studies (Ns = 300, 229), U.S. Mechanical Turk workers were asked to evaluate a soldier or a civilian in terms of their character traits. Participants also made moral judgments about scenarios in which the target individual (soldier vs. civilian) killed or was killed by the enemy in war. We found that soldiers were consistently viewed as more dangerous and more courageous than civilians (Study 1). Participants also viewed killing by (and of) soldiers as more permissible than killing by (and of) civilians, in line with the principle of discrimination (Study 1). Altering the war context to involve a clearly just and unjust side (in Study 2) did not appear to moderate the principle of discrimination in moral judgment, although soldiers and civilians on the just side were evaluated more positively overall. However, the soldiers on the unjust side of the war were not attributed greater courage than were civilians on the unjust side. Theoretical and practical implications of these descriptive findings are discussed.