WHO Emergency Powers for Global Health Security

Author(s):  
Christian Kreuder-Sonnen

Chapter 6 analyzes two consecutive cases of exceptionalism in the World Health Organization (WHO). In the first case study, it explains how the WHO’s assumption of emergency powers in the 2003 SARS crisis led to their legal normalization. To confront the SARS outbreak, the WHO resorted to unprecedented emergency measures infringing on states’ sovereignty. Building on arguments of functionality, the WHO managed to create a broad consensus on the general appropriateness of such measures. They were thus enshrined in the new International Health Regulations in 2005 and came to their first reuse in the second case: the adoption of emergency powers during the H1N1 influenza “pandemic” in 2009. Due to a very mild course of the outbreak, however, this time it incited a societal backlash against the WHO. The emergency measures were delegitimized as excessive and futile, forcing the WHO to accept a procedural containment of its emergency powers.

2014 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 511-529 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sudeepa Abeysinghe

ArgumentScientific uncertainty is fundamental to the management of contemporary global risks. In 2009, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the start of the H1N1 Influenza Pandemic. This declaration signified the risk posed by the spread of the H1N1 virus, and in turn precipitated a range of actions by global public health actors. This article analyzes the WHO's public representation of risk and examines the centrality of scientific uncertainty in the case of H1N1. It argues that the WHO's risk narrative reflected the context of scientific uncertainty in which it was working. The WHO argued that it was attempting to remain faithful to the scientific evidence, and the uncertain nature of the threat. However, as a result, the WHO's public risk narrative was neither consistent nor socially robust, leading to the eventual contestation of the WHO's position by other global public health actors, most notably the Council of Europe. This illustrates both the significance of scientific uncertainty in the investigation of risk, and the difficulty for risk managing institutions in effectively acting in the face of this uncertainty.


Author(s):  
Roojin Habibi ◽  
Steven J. Hoffman ◽  
Gian Luca Burci ◽  
Thana Cristina de Campos ◽  
Danwood Chirwa ◽  
...  

Abstract The International Health Regulations (ihr), of which the World Health Organization is custodian, govern how countries collectively promote global health security, including prevention, detection, and response to global health emergencies such as the ongoing covid-19 pandemic. Countries are permitted to exercise their sovereignty in taking additional health measures to respond to such emergencies if these measures adhere to Article 43 of this legally binding instrument. Overbroad measures taken during recent public health emergencies of international concern, however, reveal that the provision remains inadequately understood. A shared understanding of the measures legally permitted by Article 43 is a necessary step in ensuring the fulfillment of obligations, and fostering global solidarity and resilience in the face of future pandemics. In this consensus statement, public international law scholars specializing in global health consider the legal meaning of Article 43 using the interpretive framework of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.


2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (01) ◽  
pp. 71-89
Author(s):  
Gearóid Ó Cuinn ◽  
Stephanie Switzer

AbstractThis article concentrates on a particular controversy during the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa; the mass cancellation of flights to and from affected countries. This occurred despite authoritative advice against such restrictions from the World Health Organization (WHO). During a public health emergency such as Ebola, the airplane sits at a site of regulatory uncertainty as it falls within the scope of two specialist and overlapping domains of international law; the WHO International Health Regulations (2005) and the Convention on International Civil Aviation. We explore how legal technicalities and objects, by promoting functional interactions between these two specialized regimes of law, were utilized to deal with this uncertainty. We show how the form and function of these mundane tools had a significant impact; assimilating aviation further into the system of global health security as well as instrumentalizing the aircraft as a tool of disease surveillance. This encounter of regimes was law creating, resulting in new international protocols and standards designed to enable the resumption of flights in and out of countries affected by outbreaks. This article therefore offers significant and original insights into the hidden work performed by legal techniques and tools in dealing with regime overlap. Our findings contribute to the wider international law literature on fragmentation and enrich our understanding of the significance of relational regime interactions in international law.


PLoS ONE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. e0248828
Author(s):  
José Ignacio Nazif-Muñoz ◽  
Sebastián Peña ◽  
Youssef Oulhote

Background On January 30th 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared a international health emergency due to the unprecedented phenomenon of COVID-19. After this declaration countries swiftly implemented a variety of health policies. In this work we examine how rapid countries responded to this pandemic using two events: the day in which the first case of COVID-19 was reported, and first day in which countries used school closure as one of the measures to avoid outbreaks. We also assessed how countries’ health systems, globalization, economic development, political systems, and economic integration to China, Republic of Korea and Italy increased the speed of adoption. Methods We compiled information from multiple sources, from December 31st 2019 to June 1st 2020, to trace when 172 countries reported their first COVID-19 case and implemented school closure to contain outbreaks. We applied cross-national Weibull survival analysis to evaluate the global speed of detection of first COVID-19 reported cases and school closure. Results Ten days after WHO declared COVID-19 to be an international emergency, relative to seven days from this declaration, countries were 28 (95% CI: 12–77) times more likely to report first COVID-19 cases and 42 (95% CI: 22–90) times more likely to close schools. One standard deviation increase in the epidemic security index rises the rate of report first cases by 37% (Hazard Ratio (HR) 1.37 (95% CI: 1.09–1.72) and delays the adoption for school closures by 36% (HR 0.64 (95% CI:0.50–0.82). One standard deviation increase in the globalization index augments the adoption for school closures by 74% (HR 1.74 (95% CI:1.34–2.24). Conclusion After the WHO declared a global emergency, countries were unprecedently acting very rapidly. While countries more globally integrated were swifter in closing schools, countries with better designed health systems to tackle epidemics were slower in adopting it. More studies are needed to assess how the speed of school closures and other policies will affect the development of the pandemic.


2021 ◽  
pp. 295-310
Author(s):  
Iqra Khan ◽  
Salman Akhtar ◽  
Mohammad Kalim Ahmad Khan

With the transforming world, awareness of lifestyle-based variation is necessary. The availability of the locally available network and smart devices like wearable health devices (WHDs) based on artificial intelligence (AI) technology prompted us to learn about the disease, its causes, spreads, and precautions. Socioeconomic, environmental and behavioural factors, international travel and migration foster and increase the spread of communicable diseases. Vaccine-preventable, foodborne, zoonotic, healthcare-related and communicable diseases pose significant threats to human health and may sometimes threaten international health security. On the other hand, non-communicable diseases, also known as chronic diseases, are more prolonged. It could be the cause of different factors like genetic, environmental, behavioural or physiological disturbances. Smart wearables help to keep these diseases in check through different sensors installed in them. They can check for the difference in body function, but they can also help the needy consult the physician or practitioner. The data collected from these devices can also check the current health status when compiled with data collected practically. Organizations viz., World Health Organization (WHO), Food and Drug Administration (FDA) work collaboratively, leading global efforts to expand health coverage. WHO keeps the nation safe through connecting its people on the health and awareness interactive platforms, and FDA promotes public health through supervision and control, defending its role in human health and services.


2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (5) ◽  
pp. 568-580 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederick M. Burkle

AbstractIf the Ebola tragedy of West Africa has taught us anything, it should be that the 2005 International Health Regulations (IHR) Treaty, which gave unprecedented authority to the World Health Organization (WHO) to provide global public health security during public health emergencies of international concern, has fallen severely short of its original goal. After encouraging successes with the 2003 severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) pandemic, the intent of the legally binding Treaty to improve the capacity of all countries to detect, assess, notify, and respond to public health threats has shamefully lapsed. Despite the granting of 2-year extensions in 2012 to countries to meet core surveillance and response requirements, less than 20% of countries have complied. Today it is not realistic to expect that these gaps will be solved or narrowed in the foreseeable future by the IHR or the WHO alone under current provisions. The unfortunate failures that culminated in an inadequate response to the Ebola epidemic in West Africa are multifactorial, including funding, staffing, and poor leadership decisions, but all are reversible. A rush by the Global Health Security Agenda partners to fill critical gaps in administrative and operational areas has been crucial in the short term, but questions remain as to the real priorities of the G20 as time elapses and critical gaps in public health protections and infrastructure take precedence over the economic and security needs of the developed world. The response from the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network and foreign medical teams to Ebola proved indispensable to global health security, but both deserve stronger strategic capacity support and institutional status under the WHO leadership granted by the IHR Treaty. Treaties are the most successful means the world has in preventing, preparing for, and controlling epidemics in an increasingly globalized world. Other options are not sustainable. Given the gravity of ongoing failed treaty management, the slow and incomplete process of reform, the magnitude and complexity of infectious disease outbreaks, and the rising severity of public health emergencies, a recommitment must be made to complete and restore the original mandates as a collaborative and coordinated global network responsibility, not one left to the actions of individual countries. The bottom line is that the global community can no longer tolerate an ineffectual and passive international response system. As such, this Treaty has the potential to become one of the most effective treaties for crisis response and risk reduction worldwide. Practitioners and health decision-makers worldwide must break their silence and advocate for a stronger Treaty and a return of WHO authority. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2015;9:568–580)


Author(s):  
Pascale Ondoa ◽  
Tjeerd Datema ◽  
Mah-Sere Keita-Sow ◽  
Linda Oskam ◽  
Jean-Bosco Ndihokubwayo ◽  
...  

Background: Functional national laboratory networks and systems are indispensable to the achievement of global health security targets according to the International Health Regulations. The lack of indicators to measure the functionality of national laboratory network has limited the efficiency of past and current interventions to enhance laboratory capacity in resourcelimited-settings.Scorecard for laboratory networks: We have developed a matrix for the assessment of national laboratory network functionality and progress thereof, with support from the African Society of Laboratory Medicine and the Association of Public Health Laboratories. The laboratory network (LABNET) scorecard was designed to: (1) Measure the status of nine overarching core capabilities of laboratory network required to achieve global health security targets, as recommended by the main normative standards; (2) Complement the World Health Organization joint external evaluation tool for the assessment of health system preparedness to International Health Regulations (2005) by providing detailed information on laboratory systems; and (3) Serve as a clear roadmap to guide the stepwise implementation of laboratory capability to prevent, detect and act upon infectious threats.Conclusions: The application of the LABNET scorecard under the coordination of the African Society of Laboratory Medicine and the Association of Public Health Laboratories could contribute to the design, monitoring and evaluation of upcoming Global Health Security Agenda-supported laboratory capacity building programmes in sub Saharan-Africa and other resource-limited settings, and inform the development of national laboratory policies and strategic plans. Endorsement by the World Health Organization Regional Office for Africa is foreseen.


2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (6) ◽  
pp. 5-12
Author(s):  
Vasily I. Orel ◽  
Natalya A. Gureva ◽  
Olga M. Nosireva ◽  
Viktoriya I. Smirnovа ◽  
Tatiana I. Buldakova ◽  
...  

So far in the history of mankind, the pandemic has been declared only twice. The first was the H1N1 influenza pandemic of 1918-1920, known as the Spanish flu or Spanish. The second is the 2009-2010 H1N1 flu pandemic, referred to in the media as swine flu. At the end of 2019, there was an outbreak of a new coronavirus infection COVID-19 with an epicenter in the peoples Republic of China (PRC) in the city of Wuhan (Hubei province), and since the beginning of 2020, cases of a new coronavirus infection have been recorded in other countries whose citizens visited the PRC. In some territories, such as South Korea, Iran and Italy, the epidemiological situation for COVID-19 has sharply worsened, which subsequently led to a significant increase in the number of cases in the world associated with travel to these countries. In connection with the current epidemiological situation, on March 11, 2020, the Director-General of the world health organization (who), Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, said at a briefing in Geneva that the spread of the new coronavirus in the world has become a pandemic. According to experts, the new coronavirus infection has a number of features, both epidemiological and clinical. Currently, information about this is quite limited, which makes it difficult to prevent and treat this disease. In our article, we tried to present some aspects of the new coronavirus infection COVID-19, referring to data published in open scientific literature sources, and reporting data from two administrative districts of the city of St. Petersburg.


2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hanan Noman ◽  
Fekri Dureab ◽  
Iman Ahmed ◽  
Abdulwahed Al Serouri ◽  
Taha Hussein ◽  
...  

Abstract Background Yemen that has been devastated by war is facing various challenges to respond to the recent potential outbreaks and other public health emergencies due to lack of proper strategies and regulations, which are essential to public health security. The aim of this study is to assess the implementation of the International Health Regulations (IHR 2005) core capacities under the current ongoing conflict in Yemen. Methods The study simulated the World Health Organization (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) tool to assess the IHR core capacities in Yemen. Qualitative research methods were used, including desk reviews, in-depth interviews with key informants and analysis of the pooled data. Result Based on the assessment of the three main functions of the IHR framework (prevention, detection, and response), Yemen showed a demonstrated or developed capacity to detect outbreaks, but nevertheless limited or no capacity to prevent and respond to outbreaks. Conclusion This study shows that there has been poor implementation of IHR in Yemen. Therefore, urgent interventions are needed to strengthen the implementation of the IHR core capacities in Yemen. The study recommends 1) raising awareness among national and international health staff on the importance of IHR; 2) improving alignment of INGO programs with government health programs and aligning both towards better implementation of the IHR; 3) improving programmatic coordination, planning and implementation among health stakeholders; 4) increasing funding of the global health security agenda at country level; 5) using innovative approaches to analyze and address gaps in the disrupted health system, and; 6) addressing the root cause of the collapse of the health services and overall health system in Yemen by ending the protracted conflict situation.


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