Introduction

This volume tackles the nature and normativity of defeat, as well as its relation to other important normative notions, such as knowledge, reasons, and justification. Traditionally, the notion of defeat has been central to epistemology, practical reasoning, and ethics. Justification, be it moral, practical, or epistemic, is widely thought to be defeasible, in that it can be undermined or undercut. This section does two things; first, it surveys the extant literature on defeat, by focusing, in particular, on debates about the nature and extent of defeat, as well as work on kinds of defeaters. Second, we give brief overview of each chapter of the volume in turn.

Author(s):  
Kealeboga J Maphunye

This article examines South Africa's 20-year democracy by contextualising the roles of the 'small' political parties that contested South Africa's 2014 elections. Through the  prism  of South  Africa's  Constitution,  electoral legislation  and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, it examines these parties' roles in South Africa's democratisation; their influence,  if any, in parliament, and whether they play any role in South Africa's continental or international engagements. Based on a review of the extant literature, official documents,  legislation, media, secondary research, reports and the results of South Africa's elections, the article relies on game theory, rational choice theory and theories of democracy and democratic consolidation to examine 'small' political parties' roles in the country's political and legal systems. It concludes that the roles of 'small' parties in governance and democracy deserve greater recognition than is currently the case, but acknowledges the extreme difficulty experienced by the 'small'  parties in playing a significant role in democratic consolidation, given their formidable opponent in a one-party dominant system.


2018 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 149-166 ◽  
Author(s):  
F. Todd DeZoort ◽  
Travis P. Holt ◽  
Jonathan D. Stanley

SUMMARY Materiality remains a challenging concept for auditors to implement in practice. The challenges underlying auditor materiality assessments are compounded by the fact that courts, regulation, and professional standards emphasize that materiality should be based on a “reasonable investor” perspective. Despite the investor orientation and ambiguous nature of the “reasonable investor” criterion, the extant literature lacks empirical evidence about investor materiality judgments and decision-making. To address this problem, we model sophisticated and unsophisticated investors' materiality judgments in a policy-capturing study and compare them to experienced auditors charged with assessing materiality from an investor perspective. The results indicate significant differences in materiality judgments, judgment consensus, and cue utilization among the three participant groups. We conclude the paper with discussion of the study's implications, highlighting that the overall results suggest the need for further consideration of ways to help auditors meet standards and expectations in this critical domain.


2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 153-167
Author(s):  
John R. Lauck ◽  
Stephen J. Perreault ◽  
Joseph R. Rakestraw ◽  
James S. Wainberg

SYNOPSIS Auditing standards require external auditors to inquire of client-employees regarding their knowledge of actual or suspected fraud (PCAOB 2010b; AICPA 2016). However, the extant literature provides little guidance on practical methods that auditors can employ to increase the likelihood of fraud disclosure and improve audit quality. Drawing upon best practices in the whistleblowing literature and psychological theories on self-regulation, we experimentally test the efficacy of two practical strategies that auditors can employ during the fraud inquiry process: actively promoting statutory whistleblower protections and strategically timing their fraud inquiries. Our results indicate that auditors are more likely to elicit client-employee fraud disclosures by actively promoting statutory whistleblower protections and strategically timing the fraud inquiry to take place in the afternoon, when client-employee self-regulation is more likely to be depleted. These two audit inquiry strategies should be of considerable interest to audit practitioners, audit committees, and those concerned with improving audit quality. Data Availability: From the authors by request.


Author(s):  
Robert Audi

This book provides an overall theory of perception and an account of knowledge and justification concerning the physical, the abstract, and the normative. It has the rigor appropriate for professionals but explains its main points using concrete examples. It accounts for two important aspects of perception on which philosophers have said too little: its relevance to a priori knowledge—traditionally conceived as independent of perception—and its role in human action. Overall, the book provides a full-scale account of perception, presents a theory of the a priori, and explains how perception guides action. It also clarifies the relation between action and practical reasoning; the notion of rational action; and the relation between propositional and practical knowledge. Part One develops a theory of perception as experiential, representational, and causally connected with its objects: as a discriminative response to those objects, embodying phenomenally distinctive elements; and as yielding rich information that underlies human knowledge. Part Two presents a theory of self-evidence and the a priori. The theory is perceptualist in explicating the apprehension of a priori truths by articulating its parallels to perception. The theory unifies empirical and a priori knowledge by clarifying their reliable connections with their objects—connections many have thought impossible for a priori knowledge as about the abstract. Part Three explores how perception guides action; the relation between knowing how and knowing that; the nature of reasons for action; the role of inference in determining action; and the overall conditions for rational action.


Author(s):  
Timothy Williamson

This chapter develops and refines the analogy between knowledge and action in Knowledge and its Limits. The general schema is: knowledge is to belief as action is to intention. The analogy reverses direction of fit between mind and world. The knowledge/belief side corresponds to the inputs to practical reasoning, the action/intention side to its outputs. Since desires are inputs to practical reasoning, the desire-as-belief thesis is considered sympathetically. When all goes well with practical reasoning, one acts on what one knows. Belief plays the same local role as knowledge, and intention as action, in practical reasoning. This is the appropriate setting to understand knowledge norms for belief and practical reasoning. Marginalizing knowledge in epistemology is as perverse as marginalizing action in the philosophy of action. Opponents of knowledge-first epistemology are challenged to produce an equally systematic and plausible account of the relation between the cognitive and the practical.


Author(s):  
Jonathan Dancy

This chapter considers some general issues about the nature of the account that is emerging. It asks whether moral reasoning should have been treated as it was in Chapter 5. It also askes whether an explanation of practical reasons by appeal to value could be mirrored by a similar explanation of theoretical reasoning if one thinks of truth as a value. One might also think of the probability of a belief as a respect in which it is of value. The chapter ends by introducing the idea of a focalist account, and maintains that the account offered of practical reasoning is focalist.


Author(s):  
Jonathan Dancy

This chapter considers how to locate moral reasoning in terms of the structures that have emerged so far. It does not attempt to write a complete theory of moral thought. Its main purpose is rather to reassure us that moral reasoning—which might seem to be somehow both practical and theoretical at once—can be perfectly well handled using the tools developed in previous chapters. It also considers the question how we are to explain practical reasoning—and practical reasons more generally—by contrast with the explanation of theoretical reasons and reasoning offered in Chapter 4. This leads us to the first appearance of the Primacy of the Practical. The second appearance concerns reasons to intend.


Author(s):  
Jessica Brown

This chapter distinguishes between fallibilism and infallibilism by appeal to entailment: infallibilists hold that knowledge that p requires evidence which entails that p; fallibilists deny that. It outlines some of the recent motivations for infallibilism, including the infelicity of concessive knowledge attributions, the threshold problem, closure, and the knowledge norm of practical reasoning. Further, we see how contemporary infallibilists attempt to avoid scepticism by appeal either to a generous conception of evidence or a shifty view of knowledge, such as contextualism. The chapter explains the book’s focus on non-shifty versions of infallibilism which defend a generous conception of evidence. It ends by defending the entailment definition of infallibilism over other potential definitions, and outlining the chapters to come.


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