Taking Stock

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Dancy
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Practical Reasons ◽  
A Value ◽  
Theoretical Reasoning ◽  
Similar Explanation

This chapter considers some general issues about the nature of the account that is emerging. It asks whether moral reasoning should have been treated as it was in Chapter 5. It also askes whether an explanation of practical reasons by appeal to value could be mirrored by a similar explanation of theoretical reasoning if one thinks of truth as a value. One might also think of the probability of a belief as a respect in which it is of value. The chapter ends by introducing the idea of a focalist account, and maintains that the account offered of practical reasoning is focalist.

Moral Reasoning and the Primacy of the Practical

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Dancy
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Complete Theory ◽  
Practical Reasons ◽  
Moral Thought

This chapter considers how to locate moral reasoning in terms of the structures that have emerged so far. It does not attempt to write a complete theory of moral thought. Its main purpose is rather to reassure us that moral reasoning—which might seem to be somehow both practical and theoretical at once—can be perfectly well handled using the tools developed in previous chapters. It also considers the question how we are to explain practical reasoning—and practical reasons more generally—by contrast with the explanation of theoretical reasons and reasoning offered in Chapter 4. This leads us to the first appearance of the Primacy of the Practical. The second appearance concerns reasons to intend.

Practical Shape

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Dancy
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Good Sense ◽  
Practical Syllogism ◽  
Theoretical Reasoning

This book offers a theory of practical reasoning which is Aristotelian in spirit, since it maintains that one can reason to action in very much the same ways as those in which one can reason to belief. But the book gives its own, non-Aristotelian account of what those ways are; the practical syllogism hardly appears at all. Instead, there are accounts of reasons as considerations favouring a certain response, and of other ways in which considerations can be relevant to that response. Practical reasoning involves the attempt to see how the different relevant considerations come together to favour responding in a certain way (understood here as the attempt to determine the practical shape of the situation) and in acting in that way, in the light of those considerations. The only difference between this and theoretical reasoning is that in the latter, the relevant response is a belief rather than an action. The ‘therefore’ that is involved on both sides is a ‘for these reasons’ sort of therefore. The book also shows how the account offered can make good sense of moral reasoning and of the special forms of practical reasoning that are instrumental.

scholarly journals MORALITY, LAW AND CONFLICTING REASONS FOR ACTION

2012 ◽  
Vol 71 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Cane
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Broad Sense ◽  
Moral Reasons ◽  
Reasons For Action ◽  
Human Conduct ◽  
Morality Plays ◽  
Moral Assessment ◽  
The Concept Of Law ◽  
The Relationship

AbstractIn The Concept of Law, H.L.A. Hart suggested that four formal features of morality distinguish it from law: importance, immunity from deliberate change, the nature of moral offences and the form of moral pressure. On closer examination, none of these supposed features clearly distinguishes morality from law, at least in the broad sense of ‘morality’ that Hart adopted. However, a fifth feature of morality mentioned by Hart – namely the role that morality plays in practical reasoning as a source of ultimate standards for assessing human conduct – does illuminate the relationship between law as conceptualised by Hart and morality variously understood. Because morality has this feature, law is always subject to moral assessment, and moral reasons trump legal reasons. It does not follow, however, that law is irrelevant to moral reasoning.

Correct reasoning

2020 ◽  
pp. 141-188
Author(s):  
Andreas Müller
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Practical Reasons ◽  
Ontological Status ◽  
Correct Reasoning

According to the account of practical reasons presented in Chapter 4, those reasons are ultimately grounded in the soundness of certain episodes of practical reasoning. This chapter addresses what it is for an episode of practical reasoning to be correct, which is a necessary condition for their soundness. It first shows that, at least when it is applied to reasoning, the notion of correctness need not itself be understood in terms of reasons, which would render the constructivist’s overall view circular. Then, it presents an account that characterizes correct reasoning as reasoning in compliance with the constitutive rules of that activity. It also discusses how those rules can be determined, and what the constructivist should say about their ontological status.

Practical Nous in the Nicomachean Ethics

2020 ◽  
pp. 219-248
Author(s):  
Benjamin Morison
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Nicomachean Ethics ◽  
Know How ◽  
Cognitive States ◽  
Theoretical Reasoning ◽  
Deliberative Reasoning

The paper presses an analogy between Aristotle’s conception of practical reasoning and theoretical reasoning. It argues that theoretical reasoning has two optimal cognitive states associated with it, episteme and (theoretical) nous, and that practical reasoning has two counterpart states, phronēsis and (practical) nous. Theoretical nous is an expertise which enables those who have it to understand principles as principles, i.e. among other things, to know how to use them to derive other truths in their domain. It is a cognitively demanding state, which only experts have. Aristotelian practical nous is structurally similar to theoretical nous in that it requires the agent not only to know certain everyday truths, but also to know how and when to use them in deliberative reasoning. It is also a cognitively demanding notion, and only moral experts will have it.

Imperative logic

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mitchell Green
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Literal Meaning ◽  
Empty Stomach ◽  
Truth Conditions ◽  
Proper Understanding ◽  
Imperative Logic ◽  
The Status ◽  
Logic Of Imperatives ◽  
Shed Light

Imperatives lie at the heart of both practical and moral reasoning, yet they have been overshadowed by propositions and relegated by many philosophers to the status of exclamations. One reason for this is that a sentence’s having literal meaning seems to require its having truth-conditions and ‘Keep your promises!’ appears to lack such conditions, just as ‘Ouch!’ does. One reductionist attempt to develop a logic of imperatives translates them into declaratives and construes inferential relations among the former in terms of inferential relations among the latter. Since no such reduction seems fully to capture the meaning of imperatives, others have expanded our notion of inference to include not just truth – but also satisfaction – preservation, according to which an imperative is satisfied just in case what it enjoins is brought about. A logic capturing what is distinctive about imperatives may shed light on the question whether an ‘ought’ is derivable from an ‘is’; and may elucidate the claim that morality is, or comprises, a system of hypothetical imperatives. Furthermore, instructions, which are often formulated as imperatives (‘Take two tablets on an empty stomach!’), are crucial to the construction of plans of action. A proper understanding of imperatives and their inferential properties may thus also illuminate practical reasoning.

scholarly journals Market Reasoning as Moral Reasoning: Why Economists Should Re-engage with Political Philosophy

2013 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 121-140 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael J Sandel
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Market Mechanisms ◽  
The Public ◽  
Market Values ◽  
A Value ◽  
Economic Reasoning ◽  
Economic Thinking ◽  
Related Theme

In my book What Money Can't Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets (2012), I try to show that market values and market reasoning increasingly reach into spheres of life previously governed by nonmarket norms. I argue that this tendency is troubling; putting a price on every human activity erodes certain moral and civic goods worth caring about. We therefore need a public debate about where markets serve the public good and where they don't belong. In this article, I would like to develop a related theme: When it comes to deciding whether this or that good should be allocated by the market or by nonmarket principles, economics is a poor guide. Deciding which social practices should be governed by market mechanisms requires a form of economic reasoning that is bound up with moral reasoning. But mainstream economic thinking currently asserts its independence from the contested terrain of moral and political philosophy. If economics is to help us decide where markets serve the public good and where they don't belong, it should relinquish the claim to be a value-neutral science and reconnect with its origins in moral and political philosophy.

Practical Reasoning and Practical Reasons in Hume

Hume Studies ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 189-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karl Schafer
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Practical Reasons

scholarly journals Distinguishing Practical and Theoretical Reasoning: A Critique of Deanna Kuhn's Theory of Informal Argument

1996 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Wilks Keefer
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Theoretical Reasoning ◽  
Informal Argumentation ◽  
Evidence Model ◽  
Adequate Evidence ◽  
Practical Arguments

Deanna Kuhn's theory of informal argumentation (1991) evaluates arguments according to a theory/evidence model where subjects first articulate a theory and then must provide critical testing of alternatives on the basis of evidence. Using this model, Kuhn reports that many subjects fail to supply adequate evidence for their 'theories' and are often unable or unwilling to generate alternatives. In this paper an account of practical reasoning is provided that suggests an alternate interpretation for Kuhn's subjects' poor perfonnance. It is argued that treating practical arguments as failed theoretical justifications causes Kuhn to misrepresent the contribution of many of her subjects' arguments.

scholarly journals Diskursus Akhlak dalam Filsafat Mulla Sadra

2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 78
Author(s):  
Thuba Kermani
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Short Discussion ◽  
Moral Science ◽  
Mulla Sadra ◽  
The World ◽  
Theoretical Reasoning ◽  
Moral Ethics ◽  
Human Psyche ◽  
Moral Questions

<div><p><strong>Abstract :</strong> In Mulla Sadra’s system of thought, the discussion of  philosophy of  moral (ethics), morality, the nature of morality and matters related, that is the soul (nafs) and the spirit, is not a short discussion. All forms of action and the nature of malakah imprinted in the human psyche that will participate in the world hereafter. Therefore, some of the matters of the soul is a postulate of science of moral. Yet despite the differences in the ethics’s school of thoughts, it can be said that almost Muslim philosophers agree to the connection of moral with the perfection of soul. And the foundation of moral questions rests on the principle of perfection of the soul and the effects of the moral act. Without them, there will be no perfect rational and philosophical explanations of the good and bad character. However, in understanding how the process of perfection of the soul through moral acts, it is necessary to understand the perfection of the soul and make it a goal for human.</p><p><em>Keywords : philosophy of moral, science of moral, theoretical reasoning, practical reasoning, intuition, meta-ethics. </em></p><p><em><br /></em></p><p><strong>Abstrak :</strong> Dalam  struktur  pemikiran Mulla Sadra pembahasan  filsafat  akhlak,  akhlak,  sifat-sifat akhlak dan  hal yang berkaitan  dengannya,  yaitu  jiwa  (nafs) dan ruh, bukan  pembahasan  yang  ringkas. Segala bentuk tindakan dan sifat malakah yang terpatri dalam jiwa manusia akan menyertainya di alam akhirat kelak. Oleh karena itu  sebagian  dari  persoalan-persoalan  jiwa  merupakan  postulat  ilmu  akhlak.  Namun  meskipun  terdapat perbedaan dalam aliran-aliran pemikiran filsafat akhlak, dapat dikatakan hampir semua filsuf Islam sepakat bahwa akhlak berkaitan dengan kesempurnaan jiwa. Dan fondasi persoalan-persoalan akhlak bersandar pada prinsip kesempurnaan jiwa dan pengaruh dari perbuatan akhlak. Tanpa hal itu, penjelasan rasional dan filosofis atas kebaikan dan keburukan akhlak tidak akan sempurna. Bagaimanapun juga, dalam memahami bagaimana proses kesempurnaan jiwa melalui perbuatan-perbuatan akhlak, perlu untuk memahami kesempurnaan jiwa dan menjadikannya sebagai tujuan bagi diri manusia.</p><p><em>Kata-kata Kunci : filsafat akhlak, ilmu akhlak, akal teori, akal praktis, jiwa, intuisi, meta-etika.</em></p></div>

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document