How Confident Should the Religious Believer Be in the Face of Religious Pluralism?

2021 ◽  
pp. 65-90
Author(s):  
Sanford C. Goldberg

Chapter 3 explores the prospects for resisting the sorts of arguments in which religious diversity or disagreement seem to support skepticism regarding justified (or rational) religious belief. Those religious believers who would resist can (i) argue that the principles that convict the faithful of irrationality overreach, and would establish a more widespread skepticism about rational belief; (ii) downgrade their disagreeing interlocutor(s); (iii) appeal to epistemic permissivism; or (iv) argue that the believer is no worse off, epistemically speaking, than the atheist or agnostic non-believer. After presenting what the present author regards as the best version of the argument from diversity or disagreement, the chapter argues that any believer who hopes for truth will not get much solace from any of these responses.

2000 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 401-417 ◽  
Author(s):  
JEROME GELLMAN

In this paper I defend the possibility that a ‘contented religious exclusivist’, will be fully rational and not neglectful of any of her epistemic duties when faced with the world’s religious diversity. I present an epistemic strategy for reflecting on one's beliefs and then present two features of religious belief that make contented exclusivism a rational possibility. I then argue against the positions of John Hick, David Basinger, and Steven Wykstra on contented exclusivism, and criticize an overly optimistic conception of rationality. Finally, I describe a contented exclusivist who might very well not be fully rational in the face of religious diversity.


Author(s):  
John Pittard

This chapter begins by clarifying the focus of the book, which is what may be called the “higher-order argument for disagreement-motivated religious skepticism.” A key premise of this argument is that a suitably informed religious believer lacks justification for thinking that his or her process of religious belief formation is significantly more reliable than the collective reliability of the processes that otherwise epistemically qualified people use to form religious beliefs. Arguments for this premise that appeal to the rational symmetry of competing processes of religious belief formation are shown to be inadequate. It is argued that a viable argument for the key premise must posit three constraints on the factors that may justifiably ground epistemic self-trust in the face of religious disagreement: an “internal reason constraint,” an “agent impartiality constraint,” and a “reasons impartiality constraint.”


Author(s):  
John Bishop

The argument of this chapter is that the foundational problem of evil is the existential problem of maintaining hopeful commitment to virtuous living in the face of all that may undermine human fulfilment. Dealing with this problem at the cognitive level involves commitment to a view of reality as favourable to practical commitment to ethical ideals. An intellectual problem of evil then arises to the extent that it seems that the fact of evil is evidence against the truth of the salvific worldview we are inclined to adopt for dealing with it. In relation to theism’s ‘revelatory’ worldview, this intellectual problem is expressible as an Argument from Evil. A ‘normatively relativized’ version of the Argument from Evil is proposed that seeks to exclude rational belief in the ‘personal omniGod’. As a viable alternative conception of God is possible, however, the Argument fails to justify outright atheism.


1987 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 104-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
James W. Nickel

The United States has never been culturally or religiously homogeneous, but its diversity has greatly increased over the last century. Although the U.S. was first a multicultural nation through conquest and enslavement, its present diversity is due equally to immigration. In this paper I try to explain the difference it makes for one area of thought and policy – equal opportunity – if we incorporate cultural and religious pluralism into our national self-image. Formulating and implementing a policy of equal opportunity is more difficult in diverse, pluralistic countries than it is in homogeneous ones. My focus is cultural and religious diversity in the United States, but my conclusions will apply to many other countries – including ones whose pluralism is found more in religion than in culture.


1992 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Will Kymlicka

AbstractIn his most recent work, John Rawls argues that political theory must recognize and accomodate the ‘fact of pluralism’, including the fact of religious diversity. He believes that the liberal commitment to individual rights provides the only feasible model for accomodating religious pluralism. In the paper, I discuss a second form of tolerance, based on group rights rather than individual rights. Drawing on historical examples, I argue that this is is also a feasible model for accomodating religious pluralism. While both models ensure tolerance between groups, only the former tolerates individual dissent within groups. To defend the individual rights model, therefore, liberals must appeal not only to the fact of social pluralism, but also to the value of individual autonomy. This may require abandoning Rawls’s belief that liberalism can and should be defended on purely ‘political’, rather than ‘comprehensive’ grounds.


2013 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 150-174 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lyn Parker ◽  
Chang-Yau Hoon

Abstract Scholarly predictions of the secularization of the world have proven premature. We see a heterogeneous world in which religion remains a significant and vital social and political force. This paper reflects critically upon secularization theory in order to see how scholars can productively respond to the, at least partly, religious condition of the world at the beginning of the twenty first century. We note that conventional multiculturalism theory and policy neglects religion, and argue the need for a reconceptualization of understanding of religion and secularity, particularly in a context of multicultural citizenship — such as in Australia and Indonesia. We consider the possibilities for religious pluralism in citizenship and for “religious citizenship”. Finally, we propose that religious citizenship education might be a site for fostering a tolerant and enquiring attitude towards religious diversity.


Author(s):  
Rochana Bajpai

What role does secularism have in the governance of religious diversity in an age marked by the assertion of religio-cultural identities across the world? India, with its long history of religious pluralism, a state ideology of secularism, and the ascendancy of Hindu nationalism, is a key site for examining the disposition of secularism towards religious identities and diversity. Secularism and multiculturalism are often seen as opposed in political debates involving religious minorities, notably the well-known French headscarf case. Several scholars have suggested that religious traditions offer better resources for toleration than modern secularism (for India, see, for example, Madan 1998: 316; Nandy 1998:336–7). Others, more sympathetic to secularism, have also suggested that it may be deficient in the normative resources required for the accommodation of religious practices, particularly in the case of minorities (Mahajan, this volume; Modood 2010).


Author(s):  
Keith Ward

This chapter discusses the study of religions. The first section attempts to define the term ‘religion’, and shows that specific definitions of religion clearly express the inclinations of their propagators. The patterns of religion are examined, followed by a discussion of the various anthropological approaches. The phenomenological approach and social theories of religion are studied, along with reasons and religious belief. The problem of religious diversity is discussed in the latter portion of the chapter.


Author(s):  
Ronald F. Inglehart

Well into the 20th century, leading social thinkers argued that religious beliefs reflected a prescientific worldview that would disappear as scientific rationality spread throughout the world. Though the creationism of traditional religion did give way to evolutionary worldviews, this failed to discredit religion among the general public. Religious markets theory argues that the key to flourishing religiosity is strong religious competition, but recent research found no relationship between religious pluralism and religious attendance. The individualization thesis claims that declining church attendance does not reflect declining religiosity; subjective forms of religion are simply replacing institutionalized ones. But empirical evidence indicates that individual religious belief is declining even more rapidly than church attendance. Secularization’s opponents hold that humans will always need religion. This claim seems true if it is broadened to hold that humans will always need a belief system. Norris and Inglehart argue that as survival becomes more secure, it reduces the demand for religion.


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