At What Point Does Even Sweden Get a Xenophobic Party?

Economic and physical insecurity encourage xenophobia, authoritarian politics, and rigid adherence to traditional norms. Throughout history human survival was usually insecure, and one successful strategy was to close ranks behind a strong leader. Recovery from the Nazi era took time, but by the 1970s a pro-democratic political culture had taken root in Germany, and by the 21st century Germany was ranked as more democratic than the U.S. In 2015, as desperate Syrian refugees poured into Europe, the German government opened the country’s borders to all asylum seekers, admitting almost a million new immigrants. But Germany’s immunity to xenophobic right-wing parties suddenly ended in the 2017 national elections, when the xenophobic Alternative for Germany became Germany’s third largest party. It seems that no country can absorb an unlimited influx of immigrants without triggering a xenophobic reaction, whose strength is shaped by the socioeconomic environment. In already diverse settings, significant inflows of newcomers may not seem threatening because people have grown up with diversity, making it seem normal.

Secularization Accelerates in High-Income Countries

Although intergenerational population replacement involves long time lags, cultural change can reach a tipping point at which new norms become dominant. Social desirability effects then reverse polarity: instead of retarding cultural changes, they accelerate them. In the shift from pro-fertility norms to individual-choice norms, this point has been reached in a growing number of settings, starting with the younger and more secure strata of high-income societies, accelerating secularization. Analysis of religious change in countries from which time-series survey evidence was available from 1981 to 2007 found that the publics of 33 of the 49 countries had become more religious during this period. From 2007 to 2020, the dominant trend reversed itself, with 42 of the 49 countries showing declining religiosity. The most dramatic shift was found among the American public, which in 2007 had shown virtually no change since 1981, but from 2007 to 2020 showed the largest shift away from religion of any country for which we have data.

The Secularization Debate

Well into the 20th century, leading social thinkers argued that religious beliefs reflected a prescientific worldview that would disappear as scientific rationality spread throughout the world. Though the creationism of traditional religion did give way to evolutionary worldviews, this failed to discredit religion among the general public. Religious markets theory argues that the key to flourishing religiosity is strong religious competition, but recent research found no relationship between religious pluralism and religious attendance. The individualization thesis claims that declining church attendance does not reflect declining religiosity; subjective forms of religion are simply replacing institutionalized ones. But empirical evidence indicates that individual religious belief is declining even more rapidly than church attendance. Secularization’s opponents hold that humans will always need religion. This claim seems true if it is broadened to hold that humans will always need a belief system. Norris and Inglehart argue that as survival becomes more secure, it reduces the demand for religion.

The Shift from Pro-Fertility Norms to Individual-Choice Norms

Secularization is accelerating. From 1981 to 2007, more than two-thirds of the publics for which we have data became more religious, but then a major shift occurred: from 2007 to 2020, more than four-fifths of these publics became less religious. Up to 2007 the U.S. showed little change, but since then it showed the largest shift of any country away from religion and now ranks among the world’s least religious publics. One generally overlooked reason for accelerating secularization is that, for centuries, most religions encouraged pro-fertility norms that limit women to producing as many children as possible and discourage any sexual behavior not linked with reproduction. These norms were needed when facing high infant mortality and low life expectancy but now are rapidly giving way to individual-choice norms supporting gender equality and tolerance of divorce, abortion, and LGBTQ people. Pro-fertility norms are so strongly linked with religion that abandoning them undermines religiosity.

What’s Causing Secularization? Insecurity

Evolutionary modernization theory holds that both religiosity and pro-fertility norms are linked with existential insecurity, and a massive body of empirical evidence confirms this: secure people and secure countries show the lowest levels of religiosity. Existential security reflects not only a society’s per capita GDP but how evenly it is distributed, making income inequality a strong predictor of religiosity. Similarly, high levels of social welfare expenditures have a strong negative impact on religious attendance. Historic vulnerability to disease also has a persisting impact on religiosity: countries that were vulnerable to disease tend to be relatively poor and have low life expectancy and high infant mortality and high religiosity today. Overall, various indicators of existential security have a strong impact on religiosity, but this impact has a generational delay: the strongest predictor of religiosity around 2018 is the society’s level of infant mortality, not at the time of the survey but almost 40 years earlier, in 1980.

Evolutionary Modernization Theory and Secularization

The degree to which people experience threats to their survival shapes their basic values. Throughout history, most people lived just above the starvation level, but in the years after World War II, unprecedented prosperity and social welfare safety nets launched an intergenerational shift from survival to self-expression values. When the first postwar birth cohort reached adulthood in the 1960s, student protests erupted, inaugurating pervasive cultural changes. Historically, a coherent set of pro-fertility norms evolved that limits women to producing as many children as possible and that stigmatizes any other form of sexual behavior not linked with reproduction. Because pro-fertility norms require people to repress strong drives, there is a built-in tension between them and their polar opposite, individual-choice norms. Throughout history, societies that lacked pro-fertility norms tended to die out, but in recent decades, a growing number of societies have attained high existential security, long life expectancy, and low infant mortality, opening the way for a shift from pro-fertility norms to individual-choice norms.

What Is Replacing Religion?

People have evolved to seek patterns and explanations and seek to put them together into coherent belief systems. This is conducive to mental health. People need coherent belief systems, but religion is declining. What comes next? Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, and the Netherlands have consistently been at the cutting edge of cultural change since 1990. Protestantism left an enduring imprint, but the welfare state that emerged in the 20th century added universal health coverage; high levels of state support for education, welfare spending, child care, and pensions; and an ethos of social solidarity. These countries are also characterized by rapidly declining religiosity. What does this portend? Today, these countries rank high on numerous indicators of a well-functioning society, including economic equality, gender equality, low homicide rates, subjective well-being, environmental protection, and democracy. They have become less religious, but their people have high levels of interpersonal trust, tolerance, honesty, social solidarity, and commitment to democratic norms.

Religion Matters

Religion became pervasive and enduring because it was conducive to individual and societal survival: it encouraged norms of sharing and charity, which were crucial to survival when there was no social security system, and it supported mental health and coping with insecure conditions by ensuring that a higher power will make things work out—in this life or the next. In virtually every country, religious people are happier than nonbelievers. Religion also inculcated pro-fertility norms, which were linked with societal survival under the conditions of low life expectancy and high infant mortality. Moreover, the fact that a society was historically shaped by a Protestant, Catholic, Islamic, Orthodox, or Confucian heritage set that society on a trajectory that continues to influence subsequent development even after religious institutions fade away.

What Comes Next?

Rapid cultural change, exacerbated by economic distress, has triggered a powerful authoritarian reflex. Whether this is the wave of the future depends on how we learn to cope with the winner-takes-all economies of advanced knowledge societies. Traditional religions present each culture’s norms as universal values, which can be dangerously divisive. To function positively in a globalizing world, religion needs a universal perspective. The cosmology of the Big Bang is at least as impressive as the account in Genesis. That universe had the potential to develop good and evil, benevolence and meaning—but none of these existed before intelligent life emerged. The account of creation in the book of Genesis can be seen as a first approximation of the more recent account provided by the Big Bang theory—which is only a first approximation of the ultimate account. Both traditional religion and modern science provide successive approximations of a truth that is still being fathomed.

What's causing it? The rise of Individual-choice norms

Many factors are contributing to secularization, including reactions against fundamentalists’ unconditional support for authoritarian politicians, against the Roman Catholic Church’s long history of covering up child abuse, and against terrorism by religious extremists. But one generally overlooked reason for accelerating secularization is the decline of pro-fertility norms. All major religions encourage these norms, which help societies replace their populations when facing high infant mortality and low life expectancy. These norms require people to suppress strong drives, but with low infant mortality and high life expectancy they are no longer are needed. After an intergenerational time lag, pro-fertility norms are giving way to individual-choice norms supporting gender equality and tolerance of divorce, abortion, and homosexuality. Pro-fertility norms are so strongly linked with traditional religious worldviews that abandoning them undermines religiosity.