The Justification and Critique of Coercion as World Order Politics

Author(s):  
Christopher Daase ◽  
Nicole Deitelhoff

The present chapter turns from the justification of war (the use of force) to the justification of coercion. It proceeds on the assumption that to stabilize the current international order requires less ‘legitimate force’ and more ‘legitimate coercion’ since in most institutions the enforcement of norms—as the very basis of order—does not only or even primarily rely on physical force but on various forms of political and economic coercion. The chapter distinguishes various forms of coercion and reconstructs debates in International Law and International Relations with regard to their legality, legitimacy, and effectiveness. Doing so, Christopher Daase and Nicole Deitelhoff intend to broaden the debate on world order by redirecting the focus from the use of force to the use of less violent coercive measures. Specifically, the chapter introduces a concept of sanction as a means of communicating normative expectations to the normative community rather than executing punishments.

The history of war is also a history of its justification. The contributions to this book argue that the justification of war rarely happens as empty propaganda. While it is directed at mobilizing support and reducing resistance, it is not purely instrumental. Rather, the justification of force is part of an incessant struggle over what is to count as justifiable behaviour in a given historical constellation of power, interests, and norms. This way, the justification of specific wars interacts with international order as a normative frame of reference for dealing with conflict. The justification of war shapes this order and is being shaped by it. As the justification of specific wars entails a critique of war in general, the use of force in international relations has always been accompanied by political and scholarly discourses on its appropriateness. In much of the pertinent literature the dominating focus is on theoretical or conceptual debates as a mirror of how international normative orders evolve. In contrast, the focus of the present volume is on theory and political practice as sources for the re- and de-construction of the way in which the justification of war and international order interact. The book offers a unique collection of papers exploring the continuities and changes in war discourses as they respond to and shape normative orders from early modern times to the present. It comprises contributions from International Law, History and International Relations and from Western and non-Western perspectives.


Author(s):  
W Scholtz

This article focuses on three instances of the use of armed force in international relations. The three instances that are explored are the intervention by NATO in Kosovo, the armed attack by mainly the USA and the UK against Afghanistan and the war against Iraq in 2003. The purpose of this investigation is to examine the legality of the coercive measures in order to ascertain the effects that these actions had in relation to article 2(4) of the UN Charter. The proposed justifications for the attacks differ and these are carefully scrutinized against the jus ad bellum as to determine the legality of the attacks. The notion of humanitarian intervention was used as a ground for justification by various international scholars to explain the use of force in Kosovo, but this concept is not recognized in terms of international law. The attack on Afghanistan was based on article 51 of the UN Charter. The attacks were directed at Afghanistan as this state harboured the terrorists responsible for the attacks on the USA. The mere harbouring of terrorists does not give rise to the use of armed force on the basis of article 51 and as such the use of coercive measures against Afghanistan was illegal. The use of force in Iraq was mainly based on the doctrine of pre-emptive force which is alien to international law. The USA and its coalition partners also acted in contravention with the jus ad bellum in this regard. The author poses certain proposals in relation to the jus ad bellum and stresses the importance of article 2(4) which must ensure that international relations are not once more regulated by the use of armed force. 


1989 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 301-323
Author(s):  
D.P. Verma

The law of nations was not concocted by ‘bookworms’, ‘jurists’ or ‘professors’, but was created and elaborated by the deeds of statesmen, diplomats, generals, and admirals.1 This statement of the celebrated English jurist, Professor Holland, appears very much true, when attention is given to the achievements of the first Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru. Being a world statesman, he projected India's constitutional vision of international order, which reflects in the doctrine of Panchsheel, as five principles of peace. The aim of this paper is to study, in general, Nehru's contribution to the maintenance of peace, good neighbourliness and the idea of moral conduct in international relations. To keep this paper within limits, it is addressed to two objectives: First, a survey of the Constituent Assembly debates in order to provide an account of the thoughts of the framers of the Indian Constitution and to find out how far Nehru's ideas influenced the drafting of articles relating to India's international relations; and Second, an evaluation of the concept of Panchsheel that characterizes the development of International Law in Asia. It is also felt useful to take this opportunity to note Nehru's idea of peace and the Asian phase of his political thought. It will be concluded that Nehru's Panchsheel message reflected India's constitutional vision of world order, and it will be further submitted in respect of the doctrine that the contribution has, at least, at the normative level, strengthened the regime of the principles of International Law and peace. The paper is divided into four parts. The first part deals with Nehru's constitutional vision; the second discusses his idea of peace and the third analyses the doctrine. Finally, the fourth part is the conclusion.


Author(s):  
A. N. Vylegzhanin ◽  
B. I. Nefedov ◽  
E. R. Voronin ◽  
O. S. Magomedova ◽  
P. K. Zotova

INTRODUCTION. The term “rules-based order” is increasingly referred to in speeches within many international forums as well as declared from national political tribunes. The initial question is whether this notion is of purely political nature (since it is not used in the UN Charter or in other universal international conventions and this term is not relied upon by the International Court of Justice or by the UN International Law Commission). On the other hand, with the popularization of such a political discourse, the frequent usage of this term by representatives of some states (not only of Western States, but also of China, for example) can affect international law. The very application of this term definitely provokes a splash of other questions. How does the term “rules-based order” correlate with the universally recognized term “international legal order”? Does the idea to use the term “rules-based order” have substantive legal grounds? Which rules in concreto1 are meant by the term? Who and how creates these rules? What is the nature of these rules – are they rules of national law and if so – national rules of what State? If these are rules of international law – why is it not reflected in the term? Due to the attractive wording the concept gets widespread, but lacking a common understanding of its content, everyone might put a different meaning into the concept. Does it result in the fact that some officials, representing states, become politically entitled with the right to abuse the international legal order as it is established by modern international law? This research examines these theoretic aspects of the concept “rules-based order”, taking into account that in the context of international relations it may be referred to also as “rules-based international order”. An additional question to answer is whether the concept might be regarded as one of the numerous attempts to adapt the current international law to new challenges.MATERIALS AND METHODS. The research paper is based on the analysis of numerous statements of representatives of states, in which their attitude to the “rules-based order” concept is manifested, positive and critical remarks relating to the concept made by international lawyers, as well as other research papers of Russian and foreign international scholars. The methodological instruments include general scientific and special methods, among them the historical method, methods of formal logic, analysis, synthesis, as well as systemic, comparative legal methods.RESEARCH RESULTS. Although the above-noted questions about the legal meaning of the term “rulesbased order” have arisen only in recent years mainly in the context of the anti-Russian rhetoric of Western politicians, the term has been used much earlier at different levels in a wide variety of topics. The question of inconsistent perceptions of this term is another reflection of a more general problem of weakening or strengthening the universal legally binding international order. One of the appropriate interpretive versions of this concept might be that “rules-based order” means first and foremost the world order which is based on norms of international law (which are mandatory as well known), and on applicable non-binding international rules containing a normative element, such as international rules provided in the documents of intergovernmental organizations and conferences, interstate political arrangements, and other mutually accepted rules, formed in the contemporary practice of international relations. This interpretation allows to bring the concept in line with modern international law. Nevertheless, even within such interpretation, it is necessary to respect the distinction between the norms of international law, which are binding, and other rules, which do not create State’s obligations under international law. Thus, unilateral or “blocking” imposition of values of one State on other States under the guise of rules on which, according to the first State, the world order is based, will not be allowed.DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS. If another interpretation prevails, the “rules-based order” concept may have a negative impact on the existing international legal order insofar as it “washes out” the established legitimate procedures of international law-making, thus rejecting traditional international values of legal stability and diminishing the role of international law in international relations. Such scenario would not only multiply legal uncertainly and even unreasonable expectations among the participants of the international processes, but also might lead to undermining the very fundamentals of modern international law based on the UN Charter. The latter in its turn will inevitably lead to the global legal instability and will dramatically increase the risks of World War III. At the moment, the frequent abuse of the term “rules-based order” by the representatives of the NATO countries in support of their politically motivated statements, agreed upon only among them, impedes achievement of accepted understanding of the concept at the universal level, that might be consistent with international law.


2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 52-79
Author(s):  
V. T. Yungblud

The Yalta-Potsdam system of international relations, established by culmination of World War II, was created to maintain the security and cooperation of states in the post-war world. Leaders of the Big Three, who ensured the Victory over the fascist-militarist bloc in 1945, made decisive contribution to its creation. This system cemented the world order during the Cold War years until the collapse of the USSR in 1991 and the destruction of the bipolar structure of the organization of international relations. Post-Cold War changes stimulated the search for new structures of the international order. Article purpose is to characterize circumstances of foundations formation of postwar world and to show how the historical decisions made by the leaders of the anti-Hitler coalition powers in 1945 are projected onto modern political processes. Study focuses on interrelated questions: what was the post-war world order and how integral it was? How did the political decisions of 1945 affect the origins of the Cold War? Does the American-centrist international order, that prevailed at the end of the 20th century, genetically linked to the Atlantic Charter and the goals of the anti- Hitler coalition in the war, have a future?Many elements of the Yalta-Potsdam system of international relations in the 1990s survived and proved their viability. The end of the Cold War and globalization created conditions for widespread democracy in the world. The liberal system of international relations, which expanded in the late XX - early XXI century, is currently experiencing a crisis. It will be necessary to strengthen existing international institutions that ensure stability and security, primarily to create barriers to the spread of national egoism, radicalism and international terrorism, for have a chance to continue the liberal principles based world order (not necessarily within a unipolar system). Prerequisite for promoting idea of a liberal system of international relations is the adjustment of liberalism as such, refusal to unilaterally impose its principles on peoples with a different set of values. This will also require that all main participants in modern in-ternational life be able to develop a unilateral agenda for common problems and interstate relations, interact in a dialogue mode, delving into the arguments of opponents and taking into account their vital interests.


Author(s):  
Lothar Brock ◽  
Hendrik Simon

In the book’s concluding chapter Lothar Brock and Hendrik Simon take up the notions of change, progress, and structural repetition (Wiederholungsstrukturen) as understood by Reinhart Koselleck. From a genealogical viewpoint, how and in which way do theories and practices of the justification of war and their meaning for world order change from early modernity to the present? Are there any signs of progress in terms of hedging collective violence and if so, what makes the difference? Or does the history of the justification of war repeat itself in endless cycles of justifying, criticizing, and reproducing war so that change and progress (if any) are stuck in these cycles? Whichever answer seems plausible: the contributions to this book show that international law is more than the white handkerchief in the dinner jacket of crocks.


Author(s):  
Nico Schrijver

This chapter focuses on Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which prohibits the use of force in international relations. After discussing pre-Charter attempts to restrict states’ freedom to resort to warfare, it examines the emergence of a normative doctrine on a bellum justum. It considers the history of Article 2(4) and the other articles of the Charter that touch on the use of force and outlines exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force, including the so-called Uniting for Peace procedure. It examines the interpretation of Article 2(4) in the practice of the General Assembly, Security Council, and International Court of Justice), together with its inclusion in a number of multilateral treaties. Finally, it assesses the question whether the use of force after 1945 conforms to the object and purpose of Article 2(4), as well as the legal status of the prohibition to use force in contemporary international law.


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