The Role of Imaginary Cases in Ethics

2021 ◽  
pp. 62-74
Author(s):  
Jonathan Dancy

This paper examines the rationale for the standard practice in ethics of arguing from imaginary cases to real ones. Challengeable aspects of this practice are exposed. One question is whether an imaginary case is being taken to establish a Rossian prima facie duty or a duty proper. Another is whether, once we have established the correct account of an imaginary case, we can be sure that another case similar to the first in all respects relevant to our account of the first must be given the same account, irrespective of other differences. A generalist will try to extract principles from the imaginary case and apply them to the real case. This paper argues that this is hopeless. Is particularism in a better situation? A possible line is that what the imaginary case reveals is the importance that certain features can have and may have in the real case before us. No more can be expected.

2021 ◽  
pp. 37-50
Author(s):  
Jonathan Dancy

This paper follows a path that takes us from utilitarianism to particularism. Utilitarianism is the leading one-principle theory; its falsehood is here simply asserted. W. D. Ross’s theory of prima facie duty is offered as the strongest many-principle theory. Ross’s two accounts of his notion of a prima facie duty are considered and criticized. But the real criticism of his view is that being a prima facie duty is a context-sensitive notion, since a feature that is a prima facie duty-making feature in one case may be prevented from playing that role in another. Since the strongest many-principle theory is therefore false, the only conclusion is a no-principle theory: a theory that allows moral reasons but does not suppose that they behave in the regular way required for there to be moral principles—namely, moral particularism.


2020 ◽  
pp. 102-133
Author(s):  
Jonathan Gilmore

This chapter introduces and diagnoses the inadequacy of two prima facie plausible, but ultimately inadequate, arguments for the discontinuity thesis based on framing effects. The chapter then develops and defends a more powerful argument in discontinuity’s favor based on the functions of fictions. The chapter also looks at what turns on the debate between continuity and discontinuity, i.e., what consequences its resolution on the side of discontinuity has for the experimental study of the emotions; the role of responses to works of art as evidence of moral character; and the putatively edifying value of engaging with fictions in educating and refining attitudes about the real world.


2020 ◽  
pp. 11-29
Author(s):  
Jhonatan Crowe

This article examines the role of coercion in grounding a prima facie duty to obey the positive law. I argue that there is at least a weak prima facie duty to obey the positive law in a minimally effective and just legal system. The fact that a norm holds positive legal status within a minimally effective and just legal system gives people presumptive reason to believe that the norm is a salient and reasonable means of social coordination and therefore that they have pro tanto reason to follow it. Coercive sanctions may bolster the salience of social norms by giving people incentive to follow them. They also make it more likely that an agent’s decision to follow a particular norm will be reasonable, by creating the prospect that the reasons supplied by the sanctions will override any deficits in the salience or reasonableness of the norm itself. A legal system with strong coercive enforcement is therefore more likely than a less coercive system (other things being equal) to present its subjects with both prima facie and pro tanto moral obligations. This reliance on coercion, however, carries a significant moral hazard, since it may bootstrap inefficient or unreasonable norms into a position of epistemological and moral weight.


Author(s):  
Irina V. Bogdashina

The article reveals the measures undertaken by the Soviet state during the “thaw” in the fi eld of reproductive behaviour, the protection of motherhood and childhood. Compilations, manuals and magazines intended for women were the most important regulators of behaviour, determining acceptable norms and rules. Materials from sources of personal origin and oral history make it possible to clearly demonstrate the real feelings of women. The study of women’s everyday and daily life in the aspect related to pregnancy planning, bearing and raising children will allow us to compare the real situation and the course of implementation of tasks in the fi eld of maternal and child health. The demographic surge in the conditions of the economy reviving after the war, the lack of preschool institutions, as well as the low material wealth of most families, forced women to adapt to the situation. In the conditions of combining the roles of mother, wife and female worker, women entrusted themselves with almost overwork, which affected the health and well-being of the family. The procedure for legalising abortion gave women not only the right to decide the issue of motherhood themselves, but also made open the already necessary, but harmful to health, habitual way of birth control. Maternal care in diffi cult material and housing conditions became the concern of women and the older generation, who helped young women to combine the role of a working mother, which the country’s leadership confi dently assigned to women.


2016 ◽  
Vol 38 ◽  
pp. 34-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chuang-Chang Chang ◽  
Ching-Hsiang Chao ◽  
Jin-Huei Yeh

Topoi ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catarina Dutilh Novaes

AbstractSince at least the 1980s, the role of adversariality in argumentation has been extensively discussed within different domains. Prima facie, there seem to be two extreme positions on this issue: argumentation should (ideally at least) never be adversarial, as we should always aim for cooperative argumentative engagement; argumentation should be and in fact is always adversarial, given that adversariality (when suitably conceptualized) is an intrinsic property of argumentation. I here defend the view that specific instances of argumentation are (and should be) adversarial or cooperative to different degrees. What determines whether an argumentative situation should be primarily adversarial or primarily cooperative are contextual features and background conditions external to the argumentative situation itself, in particular the extent to which the parties involved have prior conflicting or else convergent interests. To further develop this claim, I consider three teloi that are frequently associated with argumentation: the epistemic telos, the consensus-building telos, and the conflict management telos. I start with a brief discussion of the concepts of adversariality, cooperation, and conflict in general. I then sketch the main lines of the debates in the recent literature on adversariality in argumentation. Next, I discuss the three teloi of argumentation listed above in turn, emphasizing the roles of adversariality and cooperation for each of them.


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