No-Oral-Modification Clauses

Author(s):  
Melvin A. Eisenberg
Keyword(s):  

Chapter 57 concerns no-oral-modification (n.o.m.) clauses. Often a written contract includes a provision that the contract cannot be modified except by a writing. The general rule at common law was that an oral modification of a written contract that includes an n.o.m. clause was enforceable not withstanding the clause. UCC Section 2-209(2) now provides that if a contract for the sale of goods includes an n.o.m. clause modifications must be in writing. The force of Section 2-209(2) is moderated by Section 2-209(4), which provides that although an attempt at modification does not satisfy Section 2-209(2) it can operate as a waiver.

Author(s):  
Lusina HO

This chapter examines the law on contract formation in Hong Kong which is closely modelled on the English common law but adapts the English solutions to the local context if and when required. The test for ascertaining the parties’ meeting of the minds is objective, the agreement (an offer with a matching acceptance) must be certain, complete, and made with the intention to create legal relations—the latter being presumed to be present in a commercial context and absent in a familial or social context. Offers are freely revocable although the reliance of the offeree is protected in exceptional circumstances. Acceptances become effective as soon as they are dispatched. In the ‘battle of forms’ scenario, the Hong Kong courts follow the traditional ‘last-shot’ rule. There is no general duty to negotiate in good faith, and even agreements to negotiate in good faith are normally unenforceable for lack of certainty. As a general rule, contracts can be validly made without adhering to any formal requirement. Online contracts will normally be valid and enforceable; the formation of such contracts is governed by common law as supplemented by legislation.


contract law principles may state a general rule, very often, the law for the purposes of employment contracts may differ. The classical model of contractual relations outlined above works on the basis of freedom of contract. It assumes the contract arena is a level playing field on which all participants are equal in terms of bargaining power. But this is patently not the case. Many of the rules developed in the 20th century recognise that individual consumers do not have the same bargaining strength as a multinational company. The consumer requires protection, especially in the light of the widespread use by business of the ‘standard form’ contract. Some rules towards this end have been developed at common law but, to a large extent, common law development has been hindered by the conflict between the needs of consumers and the principle of freedom of contract espoused in the classical theory. Even in the field of purely commercial contracts, where the classical theory appears to have its strongest hold, there are exceptions. What must be appreciated is that traders operate on an international level and the ancient law merchant had started to develop before the 19th century classical theory took hold. In order to cater for the needs of the trading community, some of the classical rules were modified to take account of established trading practice. Thus, a number of the rules gathered together under the doctrine of consideration are modified to take account of practices established many

1995 ◽  
pp. 56-56

Author(s):  
Martin Hannibal ◽  
Lisa Mountford

Hearsay evidence in criminal cases most often arises in two situations: if a witness testifies about facts of which he has no personal knowledge because the facts were communicated to the witness by another person who is not in court; and where a witness’ written statement is put before the court because the witness is unable to attend court to give oral evidence. This chapter discusses the general rule of hearsay evidence; identifying hearsay evidence; statutory exceptions to the hearsay rule; hearsay evidence under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) 2003; hearsay admissible under the preserved common law rules; procedure for admitting hearsay evidence; and hearsay evidence and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 1950.


Author(s):  
Martin Hannibal ◽  
Lisa Mountford

Hearsay evidence in criminal cases most often arises in two situations: if a witness testifies about facts of which he has no personal knowledge because the facts were communicated to the witness by another person who is not in court; and where a witness’ written statement is put before the court because the witness is unable to attend court to give oral evidence. This chapter discusses the general rule of hearsay evidence; identifying hearsay evidence; statutory exceptions to the hearsay rule; hearsay evidence under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) 2003; hearsay admissible under the preserved common law rules; procedure for admitting hearsay evidence; and hearsay evidence and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 1950.


1999 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 921-936 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nelson E. Enonchong

It is generally accepted that, in actions in personam, the foundation of the court's jurisdiction at common law is the service of process.1 To this extent the rules as to service define the limits of the court's jurisdiction. So, for a claimant to establish the jurisdiction of the English court over an overseas company2 he must be able to serve process on the company in accordance with the rules of service. The general rule is that an overseas company, like an individual, may be served with process in England if present within the jurisdiction.3 However, since a company is only a legal (not natural) person, it cannot be present in the same way as an individual. It has therefore been necessary for special rules to be laid down by which it can be determined whether or not an overseas company is present in England and therefore may be served with process here. Before 1992 those rules were contained in sections 691 and 695 of the Companies Act 19854 (the pre-1992 regime). However, in 1992 the law was amended and a separate provision was laid down in section 694A of the Companies Act 1985 to regulate the service of process on any overseas company with a branch in Great Britain (the 1992 regime).


2013 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
EDWARD HARRIS

Abstract H. Meyer‐Laurin has claimed that the Athenian courts took a stricti iuris approach to the law and did not take extenuating circumstances into account. Other scholars (Mirhady, Todd) have claimed that the courts sometimes ignored the law and took extra‐legal considerations into account, which was called ‘fairness’ (epieikeia). The essay begins with a careful reading of Aristotle's analysis of ‘fairness’ (epieikeia) in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Rhetoric and draws on an important essay by J. Brunschwig. Fairness was not a doctrine that attempted to undermine the authority of the law or placed the law of the city in opposition to the unwritten laws or the common law of mankind. Nor did the application of fairness introduce non‐legal factors into adjudication. Rather, fairness dealt with the problem of treating exceptions to the general rule contained in a specific written law. The essay then shows how litigants used arguments based on fairness and how the courts sometimes took extenuating circumstances into account. When Athenian judges swore to decide according to the laws of Athens, they did not just consider the law under which the accuser had brought his case. They could also take into account general principles of justice implicit in the laws of Athens as a whole. In this way, they avoided a rigid positivist approach to law. Finally, the essay sheds some light on the relationship between Aristotle's Rhetoric and the arguments used in the Athenian courts.


Author(s):  
Jonathan Hill

This chapter deals with contract disputes which have foreign elements that come before the English court: one or both of the parties may be foreign; the making or performance of the contract may be connected with a number of foreign countries. In this type of case which law is the court to apply? The general principle is that every international contract has a governing law — known at common law as the ‘proper law’and under EU law as the ‘applicable law’. Subject to certain limitations, parties to a contract are free to choose the applicable law; if the parties fail to make a choice, the governing law is, as a general rule, the law of the country with which the contract is most closely connected. The remainder of the chapter focuses on the Rome I Regulation, including its scope and interpretation; determining the applicable law; the limits of the applicable law; articles 5 to 8; and choice of law aspects of various contractual issues.


Author(s):  
Martin Hannibal ◽  
Lisa Mountford

Hearsay evidence in criminal cases most often arises in two situations: if a witness testifies about facts of which he has no personal knowledge because the facts were communicated to the witness by another person who is not in court; and where a witness’ written statement is put before the court because the witness is unable to attend court to give oral evidence. This chapter discusses the general rule of hearsay evidence; identifying hearsay evidence; statutory exceptions to the hearsay rule; hearsay evidence under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) 2003; hearsay admissible under the preserved common law rules; procedure for admitting hearsay evidence; and hearsay evidence and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 1950.


2021 ◽  
pp. 311-319
Author(s):  
Paul S. Davies

This chapter discusses the issue of capacity. The general rule is that contracts are valid but unenforceable on minors (persons under 18 years of age). However, they are enforceable against adults, and a minor can ratify a contract upon attaining the age of majority so that the contract is enforceable against both parties. At common law, mental incapacity is not by itself a reason to set aside a contract. But if the other party knows, or ought to know, of the mental incapacity, then the contract can be set aside. The Mental Capacity Act 2005 makes it clear that a person who lacks capacity must still pay a reasonable price for necessary goods and services.


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