scholarly journals HOW STRICTLY DID THE ATHENIAN COURTS APPLY THE LAW? THE ROLE OF EPIEIKEIA

2013 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
EDWARD HARRIS
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
General Rule ◽  
Nicomachean Ethics ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The City ◽  
Positivist Approach

Abstract H. Meyer‐Laurin has claimed that the Athenian courts took a stricti iuris approach to the law and did not take extenuating circumstances into account. Other scholars (Mirhady, Todd) have claimed that the courts sometimes ignored the law and took extra‐legal considerations into account, which was called ‘fairness’ (epieikeia). The essay begins with a careful reading of Aristotle's analysis of ‘fairness’ (epieikeia) in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Rhetoric and draws on an important essay by J. Brunschwig. Fairness was not a doctrine that attempted to undermine the authority of the law or placed the law of the city in opposition to the unwritten laws or the common law of mankind. Nor did the application of fairness introduce non‐legal factors into adjudication. Rather, fairness dealt with the problem of treating exceptions to the general rule contained in a specific written law. The essay then shows how litigants used arguments based on fairness and how the courts sometimes took extenuating circumstances into account. When Athenian judges swore to decide according to the laws of Athens, they did not just consider the law under which the accuser had brought his case. They could also take into account general principles of justice implicit in the laws of Athens as a whole. In this way, they avoided a rigid positivist approach to law. Finally, the essay sheds some light on the relationship between Aristotle's Rhetoric and the arguments used in the Athenian courts.

Duress and the Criminal Law: Another About Turn by the House of Lords

1988 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. P. Milgate
Keyword(s):  
Northern Ireland ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Common Law ◽  
General Rule ◽  
The Past ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Second Degree

In the field of criminal law we should be used to the House of Lords changing its mind. In the course of the past three years the House has fundamentally altered its view on the meaning of intention, on the relationship between statutory and common law conspiracy and on the law of impossible attempts. Now we have another about turn. In R. v. Howe and Bannister the House of Lords has unanimously decided that duress can never be a defence to murder. Yet elsewhere in the criminal law (with the exception of some forms of treason) duress operates as a complete defence, leading to acquittal if raised successfully. In making murder an exception to this general rule the House, using its power under the Practice Statement of 1966, has departed from its previous decision in D.P.P. for Northern Ireland v. Lynch which allowed the defence of duress to be raised by principals in the second degree to murder. The Lynch decision, which had stood as part of the common law for some twelve years, is now consigned to the legal scrapheap.

scholarly journals Economics, Public Policy, and Law

1996 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Susan Rose-Ackerman
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Public Administration ◽  
Law And Economics ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Collective Decision Making ◽  
The World ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Relationship

Some lawyers view the law as a self-contained body of wisdom independent of the contaminating influences of other branches of knowledge. Such lawyers resist efforts to combine law with economics. In doing so, the author argues that these lawyers miss an opportunity for gaining a deeper understanding of the way law works in the world. This article thus explores the relationship between economics as a methodology, public policy, and the law. The author first tackles the argument that the economist's concentration on efficiency is flawed because it is unconcerned with justice. The author then discusses the role of economics in light of collective decision-making found throughout society. Economics and the design of efficient regulatory schemes are also discussed, as well as in the comparative law context. It is argued that the intersection between the common law and economics must be widely accepted, even though it suffers from limitations in resolving difficult policy issues. Thus, the author concludes that economic analysis alone cannot be an all-purpose resolver of the problems of the modern capitalist welfare state. Nonetheless, economic frameworks remain useful for lawyerly thinking; law and economics must thus be joined by a broader range of subjects, including political science and public administration. 

The Relationship between Disability Non-Discrimination Law and Quota Schemes

2019 ◽  
pp. 94-117
Author(s):  
Lisa Waddington
Keyword(s):  
Public Sector ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
People With Disabilities ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Common ◽  
Public And Private Sector ◽  
The Relationship

This chapter explores the relationship between disability quota schemes and non-discrimination law in Europe. While at first sight they seem to sit uneasily beside each other, the chapter reveals how, in some instances, quota schemes can serve to facilitate compliance with non-discrimination legislation. At the same time, the chapter explores seeming incompatibilities between the two approaches and considers whether there are differences between common and civil law jurisdictions in this respect. Tentative conclusions suggest that there is a greater willingness to establish quota schemes through legislation in civil law jurisdictions compared to common law jurisdictions, and that quota schemes in civil law jurisdictions are more likely to provide for the imposition of a levy in the case that employers fail to meet their quota obligations through employing the required number of people with disabilities. There also seems to be some indication that there is greater awareness of the potential for conflict or tension, in various forms, between non-discrimination law and quota schemes in common law jurisdictions than in civil law jurisdictions. Finally, the two schemes operating in the common law states are only applicable to the public sector—whilst in civil law states quotas are generally applied to both public and private sector employers. This may indicate different perceptions regarding the role of public sector employers and the legitimacy of imposing quota requirements.

1. The historical origins of the trust

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
JE Penner
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
The Core ◽  
Administrative Power ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Historical Origins

Titles in the Core Text series take the reader straight to the heart of the subject, providing focused, concise, and reliable guides for students at all levels. This chapter traces the historical roots of the trust. The law of trusts is the offspring of a certain English legal creature known as ‘equity’. Equity arose out of the administrative power of the medieval Chancellor, who was at the time the King’s most powerful minister. The nature of equity’s jurisdiction and its ability to provide remedies unavailable at common law, the relationship between equity and the common law and the ‘fusion’ of law and equity, and equity’s creation of the use, and then the trust, are discussed.

An Outline of the Law Governing the Relationship between Banker and Customer in Kenya

1975 ◽  
Vol 19 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 52-65
Author(s):  
Margaret Rogers
Keyword(s):  
United Kingdom ◽  
Common Law ◽  
General Application ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Relationship

It is perhaps desirable to start off by reminding ourselves as to what generally is the law which is applicable to bankers in Kenya. We know that the sources of Kenya law as set out in the Judicature Act, 19671 are:“;(a) the Constitution;(b) subject thereto, all other written laws, including the Acts of Parliament of the United Kingdom, cited in Part I of the Schedule to this Act, modified in accordance with Part II of that Schedule;(c) subject thereto and so far as the same do not extend or apply, the substance of the common law, the doctrines of equity and the statutes of general application in force in England on the 12th August, 1897, and the procedure and practice observed in courts of justice in England at that date:…”;

scholarly journals Smith v Chief Constable of Sussex Police; [2008] UKHL; 50

2012 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-152
Author(s):  
Carol Brennan
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Law Reform ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
Human Rights Act ◽  
Human Rights Act 1998 ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Exclusive Focus

WHO HAS FIRST CLAIM ON “THE LOYALTY OF THE LAW”?Smith v Chief Constable of the Sussex Police (hereafter Smith) was heard by the House of Lords at the same time as Chief Constable of the Hertfordshire Police v Van Colle and another because they had two uniting factors. First, they both concerned the recurring question of the ambit of police liability in the situation described by Lord Bingham thus: “…if the police are alerted to a threat that D may kill or inflict violence on V, and the police take no action to prevent that occurrence, and D does kill or inflict violence on V, may V or his relatives obtain civil redress against the police, and if so, how and in what circumstances?”2  Secondly, considering the cases together highlighted the wider issue of the relationship between decisions under the Human Rights Act 1998 (hereafter the HRA) and the development of the common law. The Law Lords embarked on a more extensive examination of these issues in Smith and thus that case will be the exclusive focus of this note.  In addition, the study of Smith raises questions regarding proposals for law reform as well as about judicial perceptions of policy priorities. 

20. Unconscionability and Inequality of Bargaining Power

Contract Law ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 662-679
Author(s):  
Ewan McKendrick
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law

This chapter considers a group of cases in which the courts have been asked to grant relief on the basis that the contract concluded between the parties was, in some way, unfair, outlining examples drawn both from the common law (including equity) and from statutes. The rise and fall of a doctrine of inequality of bargaining power is also noted. It then considers the arguments in favour of drawing these disparate cases together into one general doctrine, and concludes by drawing on some academic reflections on the case-law and the role of fairness in the law of contract more generally.

6. Liability of Occupiers and Builders

2019 ◽  
pp. 243-277
Author(s):  
Simon Deakin ◽  
Zoe Adams
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Present Form ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Law Commission

Occupier’s liability is, essentially, part of the law of negligence, although it takes statutory form. Its present form is, moreover, the product of various successive legislative accretions. As such, prime importance must be attached to the wording of the statutes, assisted wherever necessary by reference to the preparatory publications of the Law Commission. This chapter will discuss the Occupiers’ Liability Act of 1957, which deals with the liability of Occupiers towards persons (‘visitors’) permitted to be on the Occupier’s land; the Occupiers’ Liability Act of 1984, that deals with the liability of Occupiers towards trespassers; and the liability of non-occupiers, such as vendors, landlords, and builders. It will also explore the relationship between the statutory regime, and the common law of negligence.

Intention vs. Negligence

2019 ◽  
pp. 175-184
Author(s):  
George P. Fletcher
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Mens Rea ◽  
Criminal Cases ◽  
Reasonable Person ◽  
The Face ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law

This chapter explores the role of mental state in criminal cases, considering the concept of negligence. Lawyers trained in the common law tradition are familiar with the concept of mens rea and the maxim actus non facit reus nisi mens sit rea. Literally this means that there is no criminal (or guilty) act without a criminal (or guilty) mind. The problem is that there are both descriptive and normative interpretations of mens rea and of the maxim. The normative or moral interpretation of mens rea holds that the term equivalent to a guilty mind, for example, a basis for blaming the actor for their conduct, is something not possible in the face of the defenses considered in the last chapter. Meanwhile, negligence is based, as in the classic definition from the law of torts, on the conduct of “a reasonable person under the circumstances.” The important point is that negligence is based on the fault of not knowing.

scholarly journals The common law defence of automatism: a quagmire for the psychiatrist

2015 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 242-250 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith J. B. Rix
Keyword(s):  
Mental Health ◽  
Psychiatric Disorder ◽  
Psychotropic Drugs ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Burden Of Proof ◽  
Standard Of Proof ◽  
Mental Health Act ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law

SummaryThis article sets out the complicated and confused law on automatism and identifies the role of the psychiatrist, including paradoxically a role in cases of non-psychiatric disorder where the law requires evidence from a doctor approved under section 12 of the Mental Health Act. Legal definitions of automatism are introduced. The internal/external distinction, evidential burden, burden of proof, standard of proof, prior fault, intoxication and the degree of impairment illustrate how the courts limit the defence. Detailed accounts are given of cases in which the defence of automatism has been based on psychiatric disorder and on the effects of psychotropic drugs. Suggestions are made for approaches to assessment and medicolegal reporting.

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