Institution-Induced Stability

2019 ◽  
pp. 84-102
Author(s):  
Kenneth A. Shepsle
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
Majority Rule ◽  
Institutional Arrangements ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Lewis Carroll ◽  
Simple Majority ◽  
Simple Majority Rule ◽  
Technical Literature ◽  
Marquis De Condorcet ◽  
Charles Dodgson

Simple majority rule is badly behaved. This is one of the earliest lessons learned by political scientists in the positive political theory tradition. Discovered and rediscovered by theorists over the centuries (including, famously, the Majorcan Franciscan monk Raymon Llull in the thirteenth century, the Marquis de Condorcet in the eighteenth, the Reverend Charles Dodgson (Lewis Carroll) in the eighteenth, and Duncan Black in the twentieth), the method of majority rule cannot be counted on to produce a rational collective choice. In many circumstances (made precise in the technical literature), it is very likely (a claim also made precise) that whatever choice is produced will suffer the property of not being “best” in the preferences of all majorities: for any candidate alternative, there will always exist another alternative that some majority prefers to it. This chapter suggests that while a collection of preferences often cannot provide a collectively “best” choice, institutional arrangements, which restrict comparisons of alternatives, may allow majority rule to function more smoothly. That is, where equilibrium induced by preferences alone may fail to exist, institutional structure may induce stability.

Voting Procedures: A Summary Analysis

1983 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 181-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hannu Nurmi
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Majority Rule ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
Collective Decision Making ◽  
Simple Majority ◽  
Simple Majority Rule ◽  
Research Tradition ◽  
Voting Procedures ◽  
Marquis De Condorcet ◽  
Condorcet Paradox

Roughly two centuries ago the Marquis de Condorcet and Chevalier Jean-Charles de Borda originated a research tradition – by no means a continuous one – that over the decades has produced results casting doubt on many widely used collective decision-making procedures. The phenomenon known as the Condorcet effect or the Condorcet paradox is the well-known problem of the simple majority rule. The paradox bearing the name of Borda is less commonly known, but it also relates to a procedure that is widely used, namely the plurality principle. Either one of these paradoxes is serious enough to make these procedures suspect unless one is convinced that the situations giving rise to these paradoxical features are extremely rare. In this article we review some voting procedures that have been introduced in the literature. We aim at giving a synthesis of the assessments of procedures with respect to various criteria.

Democratic Federalism

2020 ◽  
pp. 99-138
Author(s):  
Robert P. Inman ◽  
Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Economic Efficiency ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Majority Rule ◽  
National Government ◽  
Democratic Participation ◽  
Simple Majority ◽  
Simple Majority Rule ◽  
Goods And Services ◽  
National Legislature

This chapter details the likely economic, democratic, and rights performance of a decentralized national legislature with representatives elected from geographically specified local districts. The national legislature is assigned responsibility for national public goods and services and national regulations. Decisions in the legislature are made by simple majority rule. Independent local governments continue to be responsible for important local services, perhaps provided concurrently with the national government. On the dimensions of democratic participation and the protection of rights and liberties, Democratic Federalism is likely to do well, provided all citizens are represented in the legislature. It is on the dimension of economic efficiency that legislature-only Democratic Federalism is most likely to fall short.

When Do Conflicting Parties Share Political Power?

2015 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 139-151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Battaglini ◽  
Lydia Mechtenberg
Keyword(s):  
Majority Rule ◽  
Political Power ◽  
Small Extent ◽  
Simple Majority ◽  
Proportional Rule ◽  
Simple Majority Rule ◽  
Electoral Outcome ◽  
Costly Punishment ◽  
Voting Rule ◽  
Do So

AbstractWe conduct a laboratory experiment to study the incentives of a privileged group (the “yellows”) to share political power with another group (the “blues”). The yellows collectively choose the voting rule for a general election: a simple-majority rule that favors them, or a proportional rule. In two treatments, the blues can use a costly punishment option. We find that the yellows share power voluntarily only to a small extent, but they are more inclined to do so under the threat of punishment, despite the fact that punishments are not sub-game perfect. The blue group conditions punishments both on the voting rule and the electoral outcome.

Between the expert and majority rules

2003 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 941-960 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Berend ◽  
Luba Sapir
Keyword(s):  
Majority Rule ◽  
Simple Majority ◽  
Simple Majority Rule ◽  
Expert Rule ◽  
Special Cases ◽  
The Family ◽  
Majority Rules

Sapir (1998) calculated the probabilities of the expert rule and of the simple majority rule being optimal under the assumption of exponentially distributed logarithmic expertise levels. Here we find the analogous probabilities for the family of restricted majority rules, including the above two extreme rules as special cases, and the family of balanced expert rules. We compare the two families, the rules within each family, and all rules of the two families with the extreme rules.

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