Antitrust and Competition Policy in Brazil

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eduardo Pontual Ribeiro ◽  
Camila Pires-Alves ◽  
Luis Carlos D. Prado
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Current Practice ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
Institution Building ◽  
Historical Evolution

This chapter presents and analyzes Brazil’s competition policy on merger control and the abuse of market power. Its role as an important Brazilian public policy derives from a combination of three factors: historical evolution, legal framework, and institution building. The chapter provides an analysis of the evolution of its main agency, the Administrative Council for Economic Defense (Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica, CADE), while focusing on the control of cartels and mergers. The chapter further discusses institution building over the years surrounding the practice of competition law. Current practice and challenges in this are also discussed in the chapter.

1. Competition policy and economics

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-48
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Market Share ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Market Definition ◽  
Economic Context ◽  
Market Shares ◽  
Competition Laws ◽  
Competition Process

This chapter provides an overview of competition law and its economic context. Section 2 describes the practices that competition laws attempt to control in order to protect the competition process. Section 3 examines the theory of competition and gives an introductory account of why the effective enforcement of competition law is thought to be beneficial. Section 4 considers the goals of competition law. Section 5 introduces two key economic concepts, market definition and market power, that are important to a better understanding of competition policy. The chapter concludes with a table of market share figures that are significant in the application of EU and UK competition law, while reminding the reader that market shares are only ever a proxy for market power and can never be determinative of market power in themselves.

10. An Introduction to EU Competition Policy and Law

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nigel Foster
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
State Aid ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Eu Merger Control ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Eu Competition Policy ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu

This chapter discusses EU competition law. It covers the basic outline of EU competition policy; Article 101 TFEU; Article 101(2) TFEU and the consequence of a breach; Article 101(3) TFEU exemptions; Article 102 TFEU and the abuse of a dominant position; the relationship between Arts 101 and 102 TFEU; the enforcement of EU competition law; conflict of EU and national law, state aid; and EU merger control.

28. Competition Law: Article 102

EU Law ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1126-1162
Author(s):  
Paul Craig ◽  
Gráinne de Búrca
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Legal Regulation ◽  
The Core ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Per Se ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu ◽  
Number Of Firms

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing students with a stand-alone resource. This chapter focuses on another principal provision concerned with competition policy: Article 102 TFEU. The essence of Article 102 is the control of market power, whether by a single firm or, subject to certain conditions, a number of firms. Monopoly power can lead to higher prices and lower output than would prevail under more normal competitive conditions, and this is the core rationale for legal regulation in this area. Article 102 does not, however, prohibit market power per se. It proscribes the abuse of market power. Firms are encouraged to compete, with the most efficient players being successful. The UK version contains a further section analysing issues concerning EU competition law and the UK post-Brexit. EU law

14. Horizontal agreements (2): oligopoly, tacit collusion and collective dominance

2021 ◽  
pp. 588-612
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Market Failure ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Tacit Collusion ◽  
Market Conditions ◽  
Law And Policy ◽  
Concerted Practice ◽  
Collective Dominance

Oligopoly exists where a few firms between them supply all or most of the goods or services on a market without any of them having a clear ascendancy over the others. The purpose of this chapter is to examine whether oligopoly presents a particular problem for competition policy and, if so, how that problem should be overcome. The chapter discusses the theory of oligopolistic interdependence and how oligopolies can lead to a well-known problem for competition law and policy: oligopolists are able, by virtue of the characteristics of the market, to behave in a parallel manner and to derive benefits from their collective market power without, or without necessarily, entering into an agreement or concerted practice of the kind generally prohibited by competition law. This phenomenon is known in economics as ‘tacit collusion’ and is the result of each firm’s individual and rational response to market conditions. The chapter identifies possible ways of dealing with the ‘oligopoly problem’, before considering the extent to which Articles 101 and 102 can be used to address that problem. The chapter also discusses UK law and, in particular, the possible use of the market investigations to address market failure that may arise in oligopolies.

10. An Introduction to EU Competition Policy and Law

2019 ◽  
pp. 352-392
Author(s):  
Nigel Foster
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
State Aid ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Eu Merger Control ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Eu Competition Policy ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu

This chapter discusses EU competition law. It covers the basic outline of EU competition policy; Article 101 TFEU; Article 101(2) TFEU and the consequence of a breach; Article 101(3) TFEU exemptions; Article 102 TFEU and the abuse of a dominant position; the relationship between Articles 101 and 102 TFEU; the enforcement of EU competition law; conflict of EU and national law; state aid; and EU merger control.

1. Competition policy and economics

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Market Share ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Market Definition ◽  
Economic Context ◽  
Competition Laws ◽  
Competition Process

This chapter provides an overview of competition law and its economic context. Section 2 describes the practices that competition laws attempt to control in order to protect the competition process. Section 3 examines the theory of competition and gives an introductory account of why the effective enforcement of competition law is thought to be beneficial for consumer welfare. Section 4 considers the expected functions of a system of competition law. Section 5 then introduces two key economic concepts, market definition and market power, that are important to a better understanding of competition policy. The chapter concludes with a table of market share figures that are significant in the application of EU and UK competition law.

27. Competition Law:

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Craig ◽  
Gráinne de Búrca
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Legal Regulation ◽  
Monopoly Power ◽  
The Core ◽  
Per Se ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu ◽  
Number Of Firms ◽  
Academic Debate

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing able students with a stand-alone resource. This chapter focuses on another principal provision concerned with competition policy: Article 102 TFEU. The essence of Article 102 is the control of market power, whether by a single firm or, subject to certain conditions, a number of firms. Monopoly power can lead to higher prices and lower output than would prevail under more normal competitive conditions, and this is the core rationale for legal regulation in this area. Article 102 does not, however, prohibit market power per se. It proscribes the abuse of market power. Firms are encouraged to compete, with the most efficient players being successful.

scholarly journals The loss of potential competition in UK merger control – the emergence of an analytical framework in the CMA's recent decisional practice

2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 112-127
Author(s):  
Joe Williams ◽  
Stephen Wisking
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Analytical Framework ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
The Other ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
Policy Debate ◽  
Phase 2 ◽  
Potential Competition ◽  
Assessment Guidelines

Loss of potential, rather than actual, competition as a theory of harm in merger control has been a hot topic in competition policy debate. The UK's Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) does not face the same jurisdictional constraints that have prevented some of its peer agencies from investigating transactions which give rise to loss of potential competition concerns, and it has adopted a number of recent merger decisions in this area, in many cases after the conclusion of a detailed Phase 2 review. This article outlines the applicable legal framework and explores the CMA's recent decisional practice by reference to three categories of transaction potentially giving rise to a loss of potential competition where the concern is that absent the transaction: (1) one party would have been a market entrant; (2) one or both parties would have become a greater competitive constraint on the other; and/or (3) there was an alternative purchaser which would have made the target more competitive. It then summarizes the CMA's approach to assessing such transactions, including its intention, ability and incentive framework. It concludes by setting out the case for revision to the CMA's Merger Assessment Guidelines to reflect explicitly its approach to these types of transactions.

European Union competition law in the digital era

2015 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Massimiliano Kadar
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
Digital Era ◽  
Competition Law Enforcement ◽  
Specific Regulation ◽  
European Competition Law ◽  
Union Competition

AbstractWhat is the role of European competition policy in the digital economy? Even if it cannot deal with all perceived issues in digital markets, competition law enforcement is the appropriate tool to remedy distortions to competition caused by market power, without the introduction of pervasive ex-ante sector-specific regulation being required. Whilst some of the proposals for reform of the European competition law legal framework recently brought may have some merit in principle, the current regime appears to be suitable and sufficiently flexible to allow the Commission to intervene effectively and remedy competitive distortions in digital markets.

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