Counterterrorism Strategies

Author(s):  
Daniel Byman

This chapter offers a comparison of eight counterterrorism strategies and instruments, many of which overlap or are pursued simultaneously: (1) crushing terrorist groups directly with massive force; (2) targeting terrorist leaders for death and arrest; (3) relying on allies to strike terrorist groups; (4) containing the terrorist group to limit its effectiveness and encourage internal divisions; (5) improving defenses against terrorism; (6) delegitimating the group’s cause; (7) conciliating terrorists; and (8) going after supposed root causes of terrorism. It examines the strengths and weaknesses of each approach and identifies some of the conditions under which it is most likely to be effective. It concludes by offering recommendations for further research.

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ze Li ◽  
Duoyong Sun ◽  
Bo Li ◽  
Zhanfeng Li ◽  
Aobo Li

Predicting terrorist attacks by group networks is an important but difficult issue in intelligence and security informatics. Effective prediction of the behavior not only facilitates the understanding of the dynamics of organizational behaviors but also supports homeland security’s missions in prevention, preparedness, and response to terrorist acts. There are certain dynamic characteristics of terrorist groups, such as periodic features and correlations between the behavior and the network. In this paper, we propose a comprehensive framework that combines social network analysis, wavelet transform, and the pattern recognition approach to investigate the dynamics and eventually predict the attack behavior of terrorist group. Our ideas rely on social network analysis to model the terrorist group and extract relevant features for group behaviors. Next, based on wavelet transform, the group networks (features) are predicted and mutually checked from two aspects. Finally, based on the predicted network, the behavior of the group is recognized based on the correlation between the network and behavior. The Al-Qaeda data are investigated with the proposed framework to show the strength of our approaches. The results show that the proposed framework is highly accurate and is of practical value in predicting the behavior of terrorist groups.


2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 109
Author(s):  
Imam Malik ◽  
Khoirul Anam ◽  
Sukron Ma’mun

The development of online media has long played big roles in the spreading of intolerance and radicalism, in some levels, the online media is also used as a media to spread propaganda and to conduct online recruitment. Data compiled by Gabriel Weimann shows that radical groups use online media seriously to spread their wings in influencing and asking people to joint their movement. In 1998, radical-terrorist groups only had 12 sites, while in 2003 they had 2.650 sites. The number increased so high in 2014 where these groups are known to have more than 9.800 sites. The shifting place, from offline to online, used by radical groups to conduct their activities impacts to the targets they aim; online radicalism targets youth to become ‘jihadis’. A national survey conducted by Wahid Foundation on potency of intolerance and radicalism in Rohis (an after-school program focused on Islamic spirituality) shows this fact; 33% Rohis put terrorist suspect like Amrozi, Imam Samudra, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, and Bahrun Na’im as the living example of Muslim practicing the real jihad. 37% believes that Osama bin Laden died syahid, 6% of them even support international terrorist group, ISIS. The article is designed to analyze how radical groups use online media to radicalize youth, as well as supporting factors surrounding the live of youth, especially in big cities of Indonesia.


Author(s):  
David B. Carter ◽  
Saurabh Pant

The state sponsorship of terrorist groups poses significant risks to international security. Accordingly, a growing body of scholarship focuses on understanding different aspects of the relationship between the patron state, the sponsored terrorist group, and the target state. This chapter first reviews the findings and arguments in this literature, exploring both the theoretical and empirical work over the strategic dynamics of and the effects of state support. Existing research contains numerous insights and provides some counterintuitive advances to our understanding of the different manifestations of sponsorship, the rationale for sponsorship, and the impact of sponsorship on both the terrorist group and the target state. Yet, there is much more work that remains to be done in this field. Specifically, we propose that further study on the connections between sponsorship and other important security issues in world politics is necessary to better understand the broader role that sponsorship plays in international relations. To promote this end, we empirically demonstrate the connection between territorial disputes, the state sponsorship of militant groups, and the onset of interstate conflict. This evidence is preliminary but opens a potentially promising new avenue for research on the effects of state sponsorship of terrorist groups.


Proceedings ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 77 (1) ◽  
pp. 19
Author(s):  
Mary Beth Altier

Recent interest in terrorist risk assessment and rehabilitation reveals that the likelihood and risk factors for terrorist disengagement, re-engagement, and recidivism are poorly understood. In this presentation, I review related literature on criminal desistance, disaffiliation from new religious movements, commitment, and turnover in traditional work organizations, role exit, and the investment model to develop a series of theoretical starting points for gauging the likelihood and predictors of risk, which can help inform evaluation efforts. I then highlight key findings from the existing literature on terrorist disengagement and re-engagement/recidivism as well as key differences across samples and the methodological challenges associated with such research—mainly the absence of control groups, relatively small sample sizes, the need for a lengthy time horizon, and inconsistencies in what constitutes re-engagement and recidivism. Then, using data collected on 185 terrorist engagement events for 85 individuals representing over 70 unique terrorist groups, I present my and my colleagues’ findings on the drivers of terrorist disengagement and re-engagement. We find that terrorist disengagement is a lengthy process more commonly driven by “push” rather than “pull” factors, specifically disillusionment with the strategy or actions of the terrorist group, disillusionment with leaders or other members, disillusionment with one’s day-to-day tasks, burnout, difficulty living a clandestine lifestyle, difficulty coping with attacks, and psychological distress. Importantly, “de-radicalization” is only cited as playing a “large role” in just 16% of disengagement events in our sample. I then discuss how one’s role within a terrorist group offers insight into the disengagement process. Our research shows that leaders and violent operatives have a harder time disengaging than those in logistical or support roles because of the sunk costs associated with their involvement and/or the fewer opportunities available to them. We also find that individuals in certain roles are more/less likely to experience certain push/pull factors for disengagement. I conclude by discussing our research on terrorist re-engagement, which shows that in the short term, a deep commitment to the ideology, maintaining ties to individuals still involved in terrorism, and being young increase the likelihood one will return to terrorism.


2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (9) ◽  
pp. 136
Author(s):  
Abbas Tadayoni ◽  
Azita Partavousi

Daesh or the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), is one of the most intimidating terrorist groups of contemporary world. In addition to many statements, resolutions and meetings, various airstrikes have been organized by different countries to counteract the terrorist group of ISIS. However, the use and success of these airstrikes are open to doubt. Given the significance of having a better understanding of this topic and finding an efficient method to fight and eradicate terrorism, the present essay analyzes the issue in its multifaceted dimensions. More specifically, the essay investigates the role of the coalition for the use of airstrikes and the indifference of some countries to the problem. In doing so, first a definition and brief survey of the concept of terrorism are given. Then, the rise of ISIS and its beliefs are discussed, followed by discussing the role of anti-ISIS coalition and the different meetings in fighting ISIS with an emphasis on the use and efficiency of airstrikes. Finally, a conclusion of the discussion is presented.


2019 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 199-225 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dongfang Hou ◽  
Khusrav Gaibulloev ◽  
Todd Sandler

This article introduces an extended data set of 760 terrorist groups that engaged in attacks during 1970 to 2016. Unlike most extant group data sets, the extended data on terrorist groups (EDTG) is not tied to terrorist groups and attacks listed in the RAND terrorism data; rather, EDTG is linked to terrorist groups and attacks given in the Global Terrorism Database. Terrorist groups’ variables in EDTG include ideology, main goals, start date, duration, base country, attack diversity, peak size, alternative endings (if relevant), and others. We display interesting features of EDTG through a series of tables and figures. Our EDTG-based survival analysis is at odds with some of the literature: for example, the demise of a leader and a larger share of transnational terrorist attacks increase the group’s odds of failure. After 2001, religious terrorist groups are more resilient than those with other ideologies. We also analyze terrorist group lethality and productivity.


Author(s):  
Todd Sandler

What Is a Terrorist Group? The main “player” or participant in terrorist attacks is the terrorist group; hence, it is essential that such a group be defined. A terrorist group is a subnational collective of individuals who pursue a common political goal...


2016 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 355-377 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seden Akcinaroglu ◽  
Efe Tokdemir

Why does one terrorist group employ actions that win the hearts and minds of its constituency while another resorts to tactics that alienate their support? The paper investigates terrorist groups’ strategy of building reputation in their constituency/in-group population and non-constituency/out-group population. Studying all domestic terrorist groups between 1980 and 2011 with original data, we find that ethnic/religious groups and those with territorial control invest in positive reputation in their constituency as they can minimize the risks of returns. Radical groups and those with cross-border support, however, tend to build negative constituency reputation. While the former type of group has a small constituency, the latter ones can find resources across borders, which reduces their dependency on the constituency. Lastly, we find that terror groups seeking policy concessions avoid building a negative reputation in their non-constituency as this strategy enhances their chances of negotiating with the government.


2012 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 559-577 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ursula E. Daxecker ◽  
Michael L. Hess

The question of how coercive government policies affect the duration and outcome of terrorist campaigns has only recently started to attract scholarly interest. This article argues that the effect of repression on terrorist group dynamics is conditional on the country's regime type. Repression is expected to produce a backlash effect in democracies, subsequently lengthening the duration of terrorist organizations and lowering the probability of outcomes favourable to the government. In authoritarian regimes, however, coercive strategies are expected to deter groups’ engagement in terrorism, thus reducing the lifespan of terrorist groups and increasing the likelihood of government success. These hypotheses are examined using data on terrorist groups for the 1976–2006 period; support is found for these conjectures on terrorist group duration and outcomes.


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 153-168
Author(s):  
Victor Osae Ihidero

Nigeria, Kenya and Somalia are few of the countries in Africa faced with terrorism and militancy. The rise and expansion of terrorist groups such as Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, the Niger-Delta Volunteer Force, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and recently, the Avengers, has risen to vent terror on the peoples of Nigeria, Kenya and Somalia. Whilst each of these countries has its own distinct challenges that led to the formation of such terrorist groups, the emergence of terrorism in Nigeria remains complex. One of the ways an explicit explanation has been given to these complexes in Nigeria is through thriller fiction. Nollywood as well as other film industries in Africa has produced several thriller fictions that attempt to explicate the reasons behind militancy and terrorism in Africa. October 1 and Eye in the Sky are two examples of African cinema that have attempted to film the recent rise of terrorism in Nigeria and Kenya. Within the lens of October 1, terrorism in Nigeria, and by extension Africa, is rooted on ethnic and religious divide fuelled by external contact with other cultures; in this case, the culture of imperial England. This study, using the premise of postcolonial reading, examined Kunle Afolayan's award winning terror thriller, October 1 and attempted to bring out the powercultural interplay that bred terrorism in Nigeria. The study found out that the ideology of Boko Haram ("Western education is a sin") terrorist group, as bad as it seems, is a postcolonial stance against [neo]colonialism. However, the ideology lost its steam because it failed to reassert the Nigerian humanity or show any humanist tendencies to reclaiming the African glorious past. Keywords: Terror thriller, Traditionality, African cinema, Postcoloniality, Terrorism


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