International Court of Justice

Author(s):  
James Crawford ◽  
Tom Grant

This article explores what is commonly called the ‘World Court’. It examines the slow and steady growth of the global rule of law in detail, starting with the juridical experiment of the League of Nations: the Permanent Court of International Justice. It points out that the Court goes against the grain of contemporary international relations and the proliferation of actors because of Article 34 of its Statute.

1960 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 261-276 ◽  
Author(s):  
Max Sørensen

In his concluding volume in the Carnegie Endowment's series of National Studies on International Organization, Professor Maclver observes that the International Court of Justice, as set up in 1945, was not so much a new institution as a new promise. It was closely modelled on its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice, and Article 92 of the UN Charter expressly recognized the continuity with the past in affirming that the Statute of the new Court was based upon chat of the old one. The promise lay in the fact that the new Court was declared to be “the principal judicial organ of the United Nations” and thus called upon to play a more significant role than the old Court, which had never been an organic part of the League of Nations structure. Professor Maclver concludes, however, that the promise remains in important respects unfulfilled.


1999 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 889-900 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen M. Schwebel

When the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice was drafted by an Advisory Committee of Jurists in 1920, a paramount question was, should a judge of the nationality of a State party to the case sit?The sensitivity of the issue was encapsulated by a report of a committee of the Court in 1927 on the occasion of a revision of the Rules of Court. It observed that: “In the attempt to establish international courts of justice, the fundamental problem always has been, and probably always will be, that of the representation of the litigants in the constitution of the tribunal. Of all influences to which men are subject, none is more powerful, more pervasive, or more subtle, than the tie of allegiance that binds them to the land of their homes and kindred and to the great sources of the honours and preferments for which they are so ready to spend their fortunes and to risk their lives. This fact, known to all the world, the [Court's] Statute frankly recognises and deals with.”1


1985 ◽  
Vol 20 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 182-205 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shabtai Rosenne

En s'efforçant, au lendemain de la guerre [1914 – 1918], de poser les bases d'une société de peuples régie par le droit, les fondateurs de cette communauté internationale nouvelle se rendaient pleinement compte qu'il ne saurait y avoir une société organisée sans un pouvoir judiciaire chargé de veiller, en dehors de toute préoccupation de politique et de force, à la stricte observation du droit. C'est dans cette conviction qu'ils ont prévu, dès l'origine, la création de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale.Feinberg in 1931Reviewing the history of the Permanent Court of International Justice and of the International Court of Justice from 1922—the World Court, a convenient but possibly misleading expression which embraces both the Permanent Court from 1922 to 1945 and the present International Court of Justice established as an integral part of the United Nations since—four clearly separated periods can be discerned. They run from 1922 to 1931, 1932 to 1940, 1946 to 1966, and from 1967 onwards.The establishment of the League of Nations and the Permanent Court after a cataclysmic war in Europe and the awe-inspiring Russian Revolution released a wave of euphoria upon the exhausted and war-weary peoples of what is now known as Western Europe, and they placed great hopes in the new League and Court.


1980 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-171 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. G. Merrills

The 1928 General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes was the creation of the ninth session of the League of Nations. Containing important provisions on judicial settlement, as well as on conciliation and arbitration, the Act provided the Permanent Court of International Justice with an indisputable basis of jurisdiction. Whether the Act survived the demise of the League and is equally effective today is, however, a matter of some disagreement.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 111 ◽  
pp. 96-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vincent-Joël Proulx

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has mostly emphasized substance over form and developed a pragmatic, flexible, objective, and fact-based analytical approach to jurisdiction. That is until a recent series of judgments veering towards jurisdictional formalism. However, to truly reflect its designation as the “World” Court, the UN's principal judicial organ must surely adjudicate some of the “big cases” with global security implications and involving important obligations erga omnes beyond strictly bilateral dynamics: the Marshall Islands cases were as good contenders as any for the Court to enhance its legitimacy capital.1 As a corollary, accepting this role might entail that the Court interpret its jurisdiction in a flexible and progressive manner, which had always been its mantra up until recently, so that the “big cases” have a chance of getting their foot in the door and being litigated.


1946 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manley O. Hudson

The most significant event in the field of international judicial organization during the year 1945 was the adoption of the Statute of the International Court of Justice to replace the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice. The event marks at once an end and a beginning—closing a chapter of history which records an astonishing success, it opens a promising prospect for the continuance of the international administration of justice along precisely the same lines. Upon the termination of the Statute of 1920 the Permanent Court will technically cease to exist; but its place will be filled by a new Court so closely resembling the old one that the chain of continuity need not be broken and the accumulated experience need not be lost. If from a technical point of view it must be said that the Court of the future will be a new Court, from a practical point of view it is more accurate to say that the same Court will go on under a new name and with but slight modifications of its basic Statute.


1996 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 265-271
Author(s):  
A. S. Muller

The simplistic ideas about the judicial function in international relations are very harmful to the public perception of the role of the International Court of Justice. […] The general public both expects too much of the Court, and is then disappointed that there is so much violence in the world which the Court does not seem to be effective to control.


Author(s):  
L. C. Green

Traditionally, international law has come to be regarded as consensual in nature, depending for its authority upon the recognition and acceptance of those entities which it seeks to bind. This view was accepted by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the S.S. Lotus: “The rules of law binding upon States emanate from their own free will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law and established in order to regulate the relations between these co-existing independent communities or with a view to the achievement of common aims.” Article 38 of the Statute of the World Court, when listing the “sources” of international law, also acknowledges its consensual basis. In its substantive portion the article refers to conventions “establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting States.” It then refers to custom “as evidence of a general practice accepted as law,” which has been explained by the International Court of Justice in the Asylum Case: “The Party which relies on a custom … must prove that this custom is established in such a manner that it has become binding on the other Party. [It] must prove that the rule invoked by it is in accordance with a constant and uniform usage practised by the States in question, and that this usage is the expression of a right appertaining to the [one] State … and a duty incumbent on the [other] State.”


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