Law in Judicial Decision-Making

Author(s):  
David Klein

Years of effort by many talented and creative scholars to gauge the influence of law on judicial decision-making have produced payoffs, but the payoffs do not seem commensurate with the work that has gone into producing them. After reviewing some of the most important approaches and findings, this chapter identifies key obstacles to progress and suggests a new strategy for making more headway against them. The strategy begins by recognizing that ultimately the questions driving empirical and theoretical inquiry into law’s influence are often less about law itself than about the propriety of judicial decision-making. The chapter concludes with suggestions for empirical questions to complement more familiar ones about the role of law in judges’ decisions.

Author(s):  
Linda Tvrdíková

If we look at the literature about judicial decision-making and interpretation of law, we can find many texts which are dedicated to legal arguments, logic and legal reasoning – in those texts the rationality, analytical and logical thinking is glorified and an interpretation seems ‘just’ as a logical operation where judges subsume certain facts under general legal norm or norms, those norms are formulated linguistically, so it seems that the whole job of judges is to analyze texts. What we can see more rarely are discussions and texts exploring the role of intuitions, feelings and emotions and their role in judicial decision-making – at least in the Czech Republic. Those of our faculties are seen as the source of bias and distortion. Even if we look to the past, those themes are not so common among legal theorists and philosophers – especially in our tradition where we are still influenced by Hans Kelsen and František Weyr and their normative theory – but we can find exceptions and those are the American legal realists. In this paper, we will show that their observations and insights seem to be right. How can we know it? Because in last decades cognitive scientists have made big progress in the area of decision-making and it seems that we are not so rational as we thought us to be. They have explored that our thinking does not take place only through the deliberative system but, surprisingly, there is also another one system which influences our decisions. This system is automatic, fast, and intuitive – some call this system S1, Seymour Epstein an experiential system. This automatic system is more influential than our deliberative system because it is always heard – we can use Jonathan Haidt’s metaphor of an elephant and a rider. S1, the intuitive, experiential system, is an elephant and S2, the deliberative, analytical system is the rider – in legal theory, we have talked about the rider a lot but we do not explore the elephant sufficiently. This paper will try to uncover the nature of the elephant.


2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-234 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea L. Miller

Although the influence of gender ideology on lay decision-making has been established, it is not known to what extent expertise may mitigate gendered biases and improve decision-making quality. In a set of controlled experiments, trial court judges and laypeople evaluated a hypothetical child custody case and a hypothetical employment discrimination case. The role of expertise was tested in two ways: by comparing judges’ and laypeople’s decision-making and by examining relative differences in expertise among judges. Judges were no less influenced by litigant gender and by their own gender ideology than the lay sample. Judges with greater subject-matter expertise were also no less influenced by gender ideology than other judges. In some cases, expertise was associated with greater, not less, bias. The results of this study suggest that expertise does not attenuate gendered biases in legal decision-making.


2010 ◽  
Vol 40 (5) ◽  
pp. 363-380 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christina L. Riggs Romaine ◽  
Naomi E. Sevin Goldstein ◽  
Elizabeth Hunt ◽  
David DeMatteo

2021 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivana Bodrožić ◽  
Đorđe Đorđević

From the adoption of the Criminal Code in 2006 until the latest amendments of 2019, the Serbian criminal legislation treated recidivism as an optional aggravating circumstance, which had its specific legal status in comparison with other mitigating and aggravating circumstances. According to the new legal solution, instead of being optional, recidivism has become a mandatory aggravating circumstance, which together with clearly specified conditions for harsher penalties narrows down the possibility of free judicial decision-making when meting out punishment. The paper answers several questions: whether harsher penalties for recidivists are only the result of continuous tightening of repression at a normative level, whether and to what extent the criminal-law framework has been improved, and whether returning to some solutions, which were not normally applied in court practice, can be marked as approriate to achieve the desired degree of crime prevention. Final critical conculusion is that the new legal solution on recidivism appears regressive, given that the court is strictly bound by the law through oblitatory conditions regarding prior and persistent offending, which is in compliance with the general trend of tightening repression at the normative level and reducing the role of the court to the level of administrative application of the norm.


Teisė ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 71 ◽  
pp. 147-162
Author(s):  
Rūta Kazanavičiūtė

Straipsnyje aptariami realistinis ir socioekonominis požiūris į teisėjo vaidmenį santykyje su teise, žvel­giant iš teisės atradimo / kūrimo perspektyvos. Šie požiūriai dar gali būti vadinami laisvo teisėjų sprendi­mų priėmimo ir racionalaus teisėjų sprendimų priėmimo modeliais. Nagrinėjami svarbiausi šių požiūrių bruožai, paskirų teisės mokslininkų pozicijos. The article deals with two groups of possible approaches to the role of the judge in interpreting and ap­plying the law. One of the analyzed approaches is so-called the realistic approach or the model of free judicial decision-making. The second approach is the so-called socio-economic approach or the model of rational judicial decision-making. The main features, examples and problems of these approaches are discussed in this article.


2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 399-415 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian D. Marder ◽  
Jose Pina-Sánchez

Although it has long been acknowledged that heuristics influence judicial decision making, researchers have yet to explore how sentencing guidelines might interact with heuristics to shape sentencing decisions. This article contributes to addressing this gap in the literature in three ways: first, by considering how heuristics might help produce the phenomenon of sentence clustering, in which a significant proportion of sentences are concentrated around a small number of outcomes; second, by reflecting on the role of sentencing guidelines as a feature of the environment within which sentencing decisions are made; and third, by analysing the guidelines from Minnesota and from England and Wales, theorizing how their content might interact with heuristics to make clustering more or less likely. Ultimately, we argue that sentencing guidelines likely affect the role played by heuristics in shaping sentencing decisions and, consequently, that their design should be informed by research evidence from the decision sciences.


Sociologija ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 57 (4) ◽  
pp. 593-619
Author(s):  
Tilen Stajnpihler

The article attempts to verify a common conception that has by now become an integral part of legal culture in civil law jurisdictions, namely, the conception that despite its unresolved legal status, case law (i.e. the body of past judicial decisions) is widely used by the courts when they are justifying their interpretative choices. For this purpose, an exploratory empirical study of court citation practices was conducted. The study focused on a sample of the officially reported decisions of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia and the appellate (Higher) courts on civil matters in 2011 that were publicly accessible on the official internet database of the Slovene courts. The aim of the study, which provides the first systematic outline of the use of case law in the judicial decision making process within the Slovene legal system, was to verify whether case law in fact constitutes an important factor in judicial decision-making. It did so by focusing on the extent and the manner in which Slovene courts refer to case law, as these may be inferred from the reasoning of their decisions.


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