Mao and Maoism

Author(s):  
Timothy Cheek

Mao Zedong played a central role in leading the largest communist revolution in the world outside the Soviet Union and in the ‘creative developments’ or ‘Sinification’ of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy to suit Chinese conditions. He combined the roles of Lenin and Stalin. The essay traces his rise to power in the Chinese Communist Party between the 1920s and 1949 and his career as leader of the People’s Republic of China from 1949 to 1976, looking at the part he played in key moments, including developments in the Yan’an base area from the late 1930s, the Great Leap Forward, and the Cultural Revolution. The essay examines the central ideas in Mao’s philosophy, such as the primacy of practice, contradiction, rectification, and concern with bureaucracy. It goes on to explore key debates in the historiography and asks what ‘Maoism’ really means. The personality cult around Chairman Mao culminated in outrageous veneration in the 1960s and his memory today elicits strong feelings, both positive and negative. Despite his many mistakes and towering cruelty, he is still widely respected in China, as can be seen from his appropriation in popular culture. His ideas continue to be influential in parts of Asia and Latin America and his image is still invoked by contending interests in China.

Author(s):  
Yang Kuisong ◽  
Stephen A. Smith

The article examines the rise of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) from its foundation in the May Fourth Movement, through the first and second united fronts with the Guomindang to victory following the Sino-Japanese War in 1945. It examines land reform and the campaigns against counter-revolutionaries and the attempt of Mao Zedong to leap into communism through the Great Leap Forward. It shows how Mao concluded from the ‘revisionism’ in the Soviet Union that advance from ‘undeveloped’ to ‘developed’ socialism depends on continuous class struggle against those who would take the capitalist road. The postscript traces China’s rise to the world’s second largest economic power, via policies of export-led and investment- led growth initiated by Deng Xiaoping. It shows that this has bought unprecedented prosperity but also unprecedented inequality. It concludes that rising social conflict does not at present threaten the stability of the CCP.


Author(s):  
A. James Gregor ◽  
Susan Xue

Throughout the history of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), disagreement has existed concerning the extent to which Chinese Communism might be considered authentically Marxist. In general, most of the available literature tends to simply accept the Chinese Communist self-identification as Marxist. No binding consensus among independent Sinologists, however, is found and resistance has taken on a variety of forms throughout the history of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)—some partisan and some genuinely analytic. The academic literature produced during the entire period of CCP rule in China has been characterized by wide differences in the acceptance of its Marxist authenticity. It has always been tacitly or explicitly accepted that the Marxism of the CCP at its founding in 1920–1921 was in a form acceptable to the Bolshevik rulers of revolutionary Russia. Having been founded directly through the influence of the Third (or Leninist) International, the CCP had to conform to the Bolshevik interpretation of Marxism. Since Lenin had taken “creative” liberties with the original doctrine, some have maintained that the Marxism of the CCP had never been truly Marxist. To add further difficulty to any analysis of the Marxism of the CCP, it is generally understood that Mao Zedong, who gradually assumed the leadership of the CCP, was not particularly well versed in any variant of Marxism. Over the years and under the pressure of circumstances, Mao delivered varied formulations of his revolutionary ideology. How much those formulations accorded with any variant of Marxism became a matter of interpretation. Some scholars hold that by the time of the “Great Leap Forward,” Mao had devised his own ideology. All of this speculation generated controversy within the CCP leadership. By the time of Mao’s demise in 1976, the doctrine of a “second revolution” animated Deng Xiaoping and his followers. It is still a matter of considerable controversy whether that post-Maoist doctrine, in any sense, is Marxist in content or aspiration.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 58
Author(s):  
Hsiung-Shen Jung ◽  
Jui-Lung Chen

The founding of the People’s Republic of China did not put an end to the political struggle of the Communist Party of China (CPC), whose policies on economic development still featured political motivation. China launched the Great Leap Forward Movement from the late 1950s to the early 1960s, in hope of modernizing its economy. Why this movement was initiated and how it evolved subsequently were affected by manifold reasons, such as the aspiration to rapid revolutionary victory, the mistakes caused by highly centralized decision-making, and the impact exerted by the Soviet Union. However, the movement was plagued by the nationwide famine that claimed tens of millions of lives. Thus, fueled by the Forging Ahead Strategy advocated by Mao Zedong, the Great Leap Forward that was influenced by political factors not only ended up with utter failure, but also deteriorated the previously sluggish economy to such an extent that the future economic, political and social development was severely damaged. This study will explore the causes, consequences and impact of the Great Leap Forward in China.


2021 ◽  
pp. 82-95
Author(s):  
Peter Martin

By the late 1950s, signs of strain in Chinese diplomacy were evident as Mao Zedong pushed the further radicalization of Chinese politics and society, culminating in the devastating famine during the Great Leap Forward. During the Great Leap Forward, China’s envoys undercut their country’s credibility with allies and foes alike by insisting that the tragedy was the result of ‘natural disasters,’ even as diplomats themselves went hungry and their loved ones starved. China’s relationship with the Soviet Union also deteriorated rapidly, resulting in the Sino-Soviet split and a decades-long polemical war between the two powers which set the stage for eventual Sino-American rapprochement.


2016 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Deborah Kaple

This article chronicles the interactions between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC) during the years of the Sino-Soviet alliance (1949–1960) as experienced by the Soviet advisers in China. Based on interviews, archival sources, and other materials, the article shows that the Soviet advisers who came to the PRC during that time brought with them the management techniques of the late Stalin period, known as High Stalinism (meaning strict Communist Party control over all aspects of political, cultural, and economic life and severe management methods including a heavy reliance on mass methods, education and reeducation techniques, coercion, and the threat of imprisonment). High Stalinism was a useful management tool that fit into Mao Zedong's own plan for the “economic Stalinization” of China and helped to pave the way for Mao's later radicalization. After differences emerged between the two countries in 1956 about the merits of de-Stalinization, Mao and the Chinese Communist Party began promoting radical policies such as the Great Leap Forward, which dramatically deviated from the Soviet experience and led to the removal of Soviet advisers in 1960.


Author(s):  
Paul Betts

Chronicling the failure of communist regimes to match the consumer desires of its citizens has become shorthand for rereading the events of 1989 as a Whiggish victory of Western ‘soft power’ over its more militaristic, hard-line Soviet rival. However, consumerism did play a key role in communism. The essay explores the meanings of consumerism from the 1930s, when the Soviet Union attempted to accommodate shifts from long-preached ascetism and sacrifice to an increasing yearning to get and spend. In Eastern Europe in the 1960s communist governments used the Great Leap Forward in ‘consumer socialism’ to showcase their political legitimacy. Yet consumerism aroused acquisitive appetites that the state could not satisfy and thus subjected the populace to cycles of arousal and frustration. Seemingly banal problems of provisioning shaded into trenchant political criticisms of communism’s ability to make good on its material promises, a key factor in the collapse of communism.


2015 ◽  
Vol 58 ◽  
pp. 261-291 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cole Roskam

The current international attention devoted to contemporary Chinese-financed and constructed development in Africa has tended to obscure complex and multivalent histories of the relationships between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and numerous African nations; and many of these histories date back decades. The ideological origins behind socialist China’s engagement with Africa, and the geopolitical dynamics that continue to propel them forward, trace back to the time of Chairman Mao Zedong, who first coined the term ‘intermediate zone’ in 1946 to position the vast expanse of contested territories and undecided loyalties existing between the ideological poles of the Soviet Union and the United States after World War II. Nine years later (1955), at the first Non-Aligned Movement conference held in Bandung, Indonesia, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai declared thatever since modern times most of the countries of Asia and Africa in varying degrees have been subjected to colonial plunder and oppression, and have thus been forced to remain in a stagnant state of poverty and backwardness […]. We need to develop our countries independently with no outside interference and in accordance with the will of the people.


Author(s):  
Thomas J. Christensen

This chapter examines the Sino-Soviet split and its implications for the United States' policies in Asia, Europe, and the Americas during the period 1956–1964. Coordination and comity in the communist camp peaked between 1953 and 1957, but alliance between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC) was relatively short-lived. This was caused by ideological differences, distrust, and jealous rivalries for international leadership between Nikita Khrushchev and Mao Zedong. The chapter explains what caused the strain in Sino-Soviet relations, and especially the collapse of Sino-Soviet military and economic cooperation. It also considers the effects of the Sino-Soviet disputes on third-party communists in Asia, China's foreign policy activism, and the catalytic effect of the Sino-Soviet split on Soviet foreign policy.


1967 ◽  
Vol 32 ◽  
pp. 3-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Neuhauser

The recent events in China are surely drama of the highest order, but at times it has seemed that the actors themselves were not entirely sure who was writing the lines. In fact what we seem to be witnessing is a form of commedia dell'arte: improvisation within a certain tacitly understood framework. The cultural revolution appears to have taken new turns and to have broken into new channels precisely because the actors have been faced with new and unforeseen circumstances as it has run its course. No faction in the struggle has been able to impose its will on the Party or the country by fiat; new devices and stratagems have been brought into play in what has looked like desperate attempts to gain the upper hand. It has clearly been a battle of the utmost seriousness, but there appear to have been limitations on the resultant chaos. Economic disorganisation does not seem to have occurred on the scale of the later stages of the Great Leap Forward. Nor, despite the clashes, confusion and bitter infighting, have new centres of power, totally divorced from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) itself, arisen. The cultural revolution has been pre-eminently a struggle within the Party.


2010 ◽  
Vol 201 ◽  
pp. 176-194 ◽  
Author(s):  
Felix Wemheuer

AbstractIn the aftermath of the famine in 1962, Mao Zedong took formal responsibility for the failure of the Great Leap Forward in the name of the central government. Thousands of local cadres were made scapegoats and were legally punished. This article focuses on the question of how the different levels of the Chinese state, such as the central government, the province and the county, have dealt with the question of responsibility for the famine. The official explanation for the failure of the Great Leap will be compared to unofficial memories of intellectuals, local cadres and villagers. The case study of Henan province shows that local cadres are highly dissatisfied with the official evaluation of responsibility. Villagers bring suffering, starvation and terror into the discourse, but these memories are constructed in a way to preserve village harmony. This article explains why these different discourses about responsibility of the famine are unlinked against the background of the “dual society”; the separation between urban and rural China. Finally, it will be shown that the Communist Party was unable to convince parts of society and the Party to accept the official interpretation.


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