Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1952)

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Richardson ◽  
Matt Statler ◽  
Saku Mantere
Keyword(s):  
Organizational Change ◽  
Ludwig Wittgenstein ◽  
Fyodor Dostoyevsky ◽  
Theory Of Change ◽  
Leo Tolstoy ◽  
Language Games ◽  
Arthur Schopenhauer ◽  
Organization Studies ◽  
Philosophical Investigations ◽  
Forms Of Life

At the age of fourteen, Ludwig Wittgenstein was exposed to the formative influence of Søren Kierkegaard, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Leo Tolstoy, and Arthur Schopenhauer. Two of his important works were Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, the only book published during his lifetime, and Philosophical Investigations. This chapter examines Wittgenstein’s philosophy, with an emphasis on his views about doubt, silence, and metaphysics, as well as his theory of change and his account of language games. It also considers Wittgenstein’s argument that forms of life are modes of organization in which our actions agree with one another. Finally, it discusses the implications of Wittgenstein’s work for organization studies, and especially organizational change.

scholarly journals Language-Games in the Later Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Michael Benjamin Warren Sinclair
Keyword(s):  
Ludwig Wittgenstein ◽  
Language Games ◽  
Primary Reason ◽  
Great Work ◽  
Philosophical Investigations ◽  
Going Concern ◽  
The People ◽  
Strange Feeling

<p>1.1 When I first looked, into Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations I felt not so much that this was great work, but that it was alive and exciting, a going concern. I next learned of its difficulty; it seemed to me then (as it does now) that Wittgenstein omitted all the preliminary easy bits that we usually find in philosophy books and, treated only of the very difficult problems which concerned him. That this was great philosophy had to be accepted, for most of the people I knew of as top philosophers said so. Its acknowledged greatness was not, however, the primary reason, nor even an important reason, for my continued reading of Wittgenstein's work it was the enigmatic style and. the strange feeling of depth in the remarks; I felt they really did say something glorious, make a powerful gesture (cf., PI, *610), if I could only figure out what.</p>

scholarly journals Forms of Life

2015 ◽  
pp. 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Hacker
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Philosophy Of Mathematics ◽  
Language Games ◽  
Truth Conditions ◽  
Philosophical Investigations ◽  
Form Of Life ◽  
Transformation Rules ◽  
Forms Of Life ◽  
A Minor ◽  
Varied History

The phrase ‘Lebensform’ (form of life) had a long and varied history prior to Wittgenstein’s use of it on a mere three occasions in the Philosophical Investigations. It is not a pivotal concept in Wittgenstein’s philosophy. But it is a minor signpost of a major reorientation of philosophy, philosophy of language and logic, and philosophy of mathematics that Wittgenstein instigated. For Wittgenstein sought to replace the conception of a language as a meaning calculus (Frege, Russell, the Tractatus) by an anthropological or ethnological conception. A language is not a class of sentences that can be formed from a set of axioms (definitions), formation and transformation rules and the meanings of which is given by their truth-conditions, but an open-ended series of interlocking language-games constituting a form of life or way of living (a culture). Wittgenstein’s uses of ‘Lebensform’ and its cognates, both in the Investigations and in his Nachlass are severally analysed, and various exegetical misinterpretations are clarified.

From words and sentences to interjections: The anatomy of exclamations in Peirce and Wittgenstein

Semiotica ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 (205) ◽  
pp. 37-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dinda L. Gorlée
Keyword(s):  
Ludwig Wittgenstein ◽  
Charles Sanders Peirce ◽  
Human Experience ◽  
Language Games ◽  
Metaphorical Language ◽  
Degenerate Form ◽  
Forms Of Life ◽  
Cultural Forms ◽  
Mixed Languages

AbstractInterjections are exclamatory signs fostering a realistic conception of the perils and uncertainties of human experience. Natural interjections are reactionary signs in degenerate pre-signs (preverbs or prenouns), unconnected to other syntactic forms of grammar. The simplicity of natural interjections are distinguished from the more complex occasional interjections, expressed in full pseudo-sentences with grammatical constructions. The prehistory of the natural interjections are first the simple cries of babies, and second the artificial construction of pidgin (creolization) of mixed languages. In interjections, literal language becomes transformed into figurative and metaphorical “language,” that is intermedial speech with vocalization and gestures. Peirce’s “syntax” (Charles Sanders Peirce 1839–1914) argues for the pragmatic interjections in the exclamations of spontaneous cries and shouts. In the framework of Peirce’s logical categories, interjections represent first of secondness. The degenerate form analyzes the vague or indeterminate meaning through pictures of diagrams. Wittgenstein’s social “grammar” (Ludwig Wittgenstein 1889–1951) of language-games is subject to cultural forms of life. Wittgenstein disagrees on accepting the “nonsensical” or meaningless interjections, but in his later writings he will agree to giving the interjections fuzzy meanings.

scholarly journals Language-Games in the Later Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Michael Benjamin Warren Sinclair
Keyword(s):  
Ludwig Wittgenstein ◽  
Language Games ◽  
Primary Reason ◽  
Great Work ◽  
Philosophical Investigations ◽  
Going Concern ◽  
The People ◽  
Strange Feeling

<p>1.1 When I first looked, into Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations I felt not so much that this was great work, but that it was alive and exciting, a going concern. I next learned of its difficulty; it seemed to me then (as it does now) that Wittgenstein omitted all the preliminary easy bits that we usually find in philosophy books and, treated only of the very difficult problems which concerned him. That this was great philosophy had to be accepted, for most of the people I knew of as top philosophers said so. Its acknowledged greatness was not, however, the primary reason, nor even an important reason, for my continued reading of Wittgenstein's work it was the enigmatic style and. the strange feeling of depth in the remarks; I felt they really did say something glorious, make a powerful gesture (cf., PI, *610), if I could only figure out what.</p>

Technological Investigations

2018 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 296-313
Author(s):  
Langdon Winner ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Ludwig Wittgenstein ◽  
Philosophy Of Technology ◽  
Language Games ◽  
Contemporary Society ◽  
Theoretical Frameworks ◽  
Technology Studies ◽  
Digital Electronics ◽  
Forms Of Life ◽  
Fresh Insight ◽  
Contemporary Technology

Although Ludwig Wittgenstein did not offer a fully developed philosophy of technology, his writings contain an approach to inquiry that can be employed to explore situations in which people contend with technological devices and systems. His notions of ‘language games’ and ‘forms of life’ as well as the dramatic, imaginary dialogues in his later writings offer ways to transcend the sometimes rigid theoretical frameworks in contemporary technology studies. Especially as applied to rapidly moving infusions of computing and digital electronics in contemporary society, Wittgenstein’s writings offer possibilities for fresh insight and even some practical alternatives.

L’hypothèse de Firth

2014 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Béatrice Godart-Wendling
Keyword(s):  
Ludwig Wittgenstein ◽  
Philosophical Investigations ◽  
Bronislaw Malinowski ◽  
Mode D’Action ◽  
Bronisław Malinowski

Résumé Le but de cet article est d’évaluer l’hypothèse de John Rupert Firth (1890–1960) énonçant que l’article de l’anthropologue Bronislaw Malinowski (1884–1942), “The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages” (1923), constituerait une des sources d’inspiration ayant conduit Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) à élaborer une nouvelle conception de la signification en termes d’‘usage’. S’appuyant sur certains passages des Philosophical Investigations (1953), Firth établit ainsi une filiation entre les deux grandes idées phares de Malinowski, à savoir l’importance de la notion de ‘contexte de situation’ et l’idée que le langage serait un ‘mode d’action’ et les principales thèses (la signification comme usage, l’acquisition du langage, le langage comme un ensemble de jeux) que développera Wittgenstein. L’examen du bien fondé de cette hypothèse conduira à préciser la synergie des idées qui eut lieu en matière de pragmatique dans l’Angleterre de la première moitié du XXe siècle.

scholarly journals Wittgenstein’s language and Beckett: The limits of language and the absurd

2017 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 365-376
Author(s):  
Marialena Avgerinou
Keyword(s):  
Language Games ◽  
Philosophical Investigations ◽  
Problematic Use ◽  
Waiting For Godot

This paper provides a parallel linguistic and conceptual reading of Wittgenstein?s and Beckett?s works. More specifically, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and the Philosophical Investigations are looked at in relation to the absurd plays Not I and Waiting for Godot, respectively. The limits of language as described in the Tractatus are part of the verbally and conceptually asphyxiating world brought on stage by Beckett in the monologue Not I, while the transition to ?language games? of the Philosophical Investigations can be identified in parts of Waiting for Godot. The suggested conclusion is that Wittgenstein?s expression of the ineffable, the problematic use of language and (its) meaning can be and have been expressed in a form of art, while the meanings of Wittgenstein?s writings are in harmony with their stylistic form, his concept of ?showing? further illustrating this idea.

In Praise of Description

2012 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 609-625 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANNE ORFORD
Keyword(s):  
Michel Foucault ◽  
Ludwig Wittgenstein ◽  
Philosophical Investigations ◽  
Legal Writing

AbstractIn hisPhilosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein declared: ‘We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place.’ Michel Foucault in turn repeatedly referred to his method of study as description, arguing that the role of philosophy is not to reveal what is hidden, but rather to make us see what is seen. This essay suggests why the turn to description as a mode of legal writing might be a productive move at this time.

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