Corporate Innovation and Returns

Author(s):  
Jan Bena ◽  
Lorenzo Garlappi

Abstract Among U.S. public firms, technological innovation is concentrated on a small set of large players, with innovation “leaders” having considerably lower systematic risk than “laggards.” To understand this fact, we build a winner-takes-all patent race model and show that a firm’s expected return decreases in its innovation output and increases in that of its rivals. Using a comprehensive firm-level panel of information on patenting activity by fields of technology in 1950–2010, we find strong support for the model’s predictions. Our results highlight that strategic interactions among firms competing in innovation are an important determinant of risk and expected returns. (JEL G12, G31) Received August 6, 2018; editorial decision October 19, 2019 by Andrew Ellul. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (9) ◽  
pp. 4318-4366
Author(s):  
Ali Boloorforoosh ◽  
Peter Christoffersen ◽  
Mathieu Fournier ◽  
Christian Gouriéroux

Abstract We develop a conditional capital asset pricing model in continuous time that allows for stochastic beta exposure. When beta comoves with market variance and the stochastic discount factor (SDF), beta risk is priced, and the expected return on a stock deviates from the security market line. The model predicts that low-beta stocks earn high returns, because their beta positively comoves with market variance and the SDF. The opposite is true for high-beta stocks. Estimating the model on equity and option data, we find that beta risk explains expected returns on low- and high-beta stocks, resolving the “betting against beta” anomaly. Authors have furnished code and an Internet Appendix, which are available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.


2021 ◽  
pp. 014616722199853
Author(s):  
Judith Gerten ◽  
Michael K. Zürn ◽  
Sascha Topolinski

For financial decision-making, people trade off the expected value (return) and the variance (risk) of an option, preferring higher returns to lower ones and lower risks to higher ones. To make decision-makers indifferent between a risky and risk-free option, the expected value of the risky option must exceed the value of the risk-free option by a certain amount—the risk premium. Previous psychological research suggests that similar to risk aversion, people dislike inconsistency in an interaction partner’s behavior. In eight experiments (total N = 2,412) we pitted this inconsistency aversion against the expected returns from interacting with an inconsistent partner. We identified the additional expected return of interacting with an inconsistent partner that must be granted to make decision-makers prefer a more profitable, but inconsistent partner to a consistent, but less profitable one. We locate this inconsistency premium at around 31% of the expected value of the risk-free option.


Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (6) ◽  
pp. 692
Author(s):  
Clara Calvo ◽  
Carlos Ivorra ◽  
Vicente Liern ◽  
Blanca Pérez-Gladish

Modern portfolio theory deals with the problem of selecting a portfolio of financial assets such that the expected return is maximized for a given level of risk. The forecast of the expected individual assets’ returns and risk is usually based on their historical returns. In this work, we consider a situation in which the investor has non-historical additional information that is used for the forecast of the expected returns. This implies that there is no obvious statistical risk measure any more, and it poses the problem of selecting an adequate set of diversification constraints to mitigate the risk of the selected portfolio without losing the value of the non-statistical information owned by the investor. To address this problem, we introduce an indicator, the historical reduction index, measuring the expected reduction of the expected return due to a given set of diversification constraints. We show that it can be used to grade the impact of each possible set of diversification constraints. Hence, the investor can choose from this gradation, the set better fitting his subjective risk-aversion level.


2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (8) ◽  
pp. 2997-3035 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giacomo Calzolari ◽  
Jean-Edouard Colliard ◽  
Gyongyi Lóránth

Abstract Supervision of multinational banks (MNBs) by national supervisors suffers from coordination failures. We show that supranational supervision solves this problem and decreases the public costs of an MNB’s failure, taking its organizational structure as given. However, the MNB strategically adjusts its structure to supranational supervision. It converts its subsidiary into a branch (or vice versa) to reduce supervisory monitoring. We identify the cases in which this endogenous reaction leads to unintended consequences, such as higher public costs and lower welfare. Current reforms should consider that MNBs adapt their organizational structures to changes in supervision. Received January 9, 2017; editorial decision September 15, 2018 by Editor Philip Strahan. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.


2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (8) ◽  
pp. 3036-3074 ◽  
Author(s):  
Borja Larrain ◽  
Giorgo Sertsios ◽  
Francisco Urzúa I

Abstract We propose a novel identification strategy for estimating the effects of business group affiliation. We study two-firm business groups, some of which split up during the sample period, leaving some firms as stand-alone firms. We instrument for stand-alone status using shocks to the industry of the other group firm. We find that firms that become stand-alone reduce leverage and investment. Consistent with collateral cross-pledging, the effects are more pronounced when the other firm had high tangibility. Consistent with capital misallocation in groups, the reduction in leverage is stronger in firms that had low (high) profitability (leverage) relative to industry peers. Received July 3, 2017; editorial decision April 7, 2018 by Editor Wei Jiang. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.


2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 20
Author(s):  
Elli Kraizberg

<p dir="LTR">In many countries around the globe, portfolio managers utilize well accepted models, assuming that a partial stake of ownership is proportionally valued. This assumption is incorrect  in markets in which traded firms or publicly held firms are controlled by major owners who would take any possible measure to protect and maintain a 'lock' on control, so they can secure a sellable asset to another control seeker. In this case, estimation of key parameters such as, volatility, expected returns and diversification effect, may be grossly distorted.</p><p dir="LTR">We would argue that a major trigger for the value of the benefits of control is the ability of control owners to transfer assets from their own portfolio to a controlled publicly traded firm. While it is obvious that these transfers will take place, if and only if, it is beneficial to the control owners, the impact on the minor shareholders may not necessarily be negative and may vary depending on several parameters. Thus, the benefits of control are not entirely "private", i.e. appropriation and diversion of the resources of publicly traded firms for the benefit of the control owners.     </p><p dir="LTR">This paper aims to model the effect of the benefits of control on the value of a minority held public firms. It focuses on two related issues that are discussed in the literature on the benefits of control: what drives the value of the benefits of control, given the   empirical evidence that control seekers are willing to pay a significant premium for control, and secondly, can these benefits be rationally modeled? To better understand these issues, it then models a specific drive on the part of control seekers who, in addition to their stake in a publicly traded firm, own a private portfolio. It could be argued that they may 'transfer' inferior investments to the public firms that they control exploiting less than perfect transparency. However, while they own this valuable option of 'transferring' inferior investments into the public firm, these actions may still be beneficial to the minority shareholders.</p><p dir="LTR">We establish a model and derive a simulation procedure that are applied to several cases in which transfers  are made in exchange for cash or equity, instances of full disclosure or partial transparency, the likelihood that the control owners' actions will be contested in court, level of risk, and other parameters. Then we will compare the results to empirical finding.  The final model will be greatly simplified so that the end formula can be easily used by practitioners. </p>


IQTISHODUNA ◽  
2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sri Yati

This study aims to analyze rate of return and risk as the tools to form the portfolio analysis on 15 the most actives stocks listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange. Descriptive analytical method is used to describe the correlation between three variables: stock returns, expected returns of stock market, and beta in order to measure the risk of stocks to help the investors in making the investment decisions. The research materials are 15 the most actives stocks listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange during 2008-2009. The results show that PT. Astra International Tbk. has the highest average expected return of individual stock (Ri) of 308,3355685, while PT. Perusahaan Gas Negara Tbk. has the lowest of -477,0827847. The average expected return of stock market (Rm) is 0,00247163. PT. Astra International Tbk. has the highest systematic risk level of 20229,14205, while the lowest of -147,5793279 is PT. Kalbe Farma Tbk. Furthermore, the results also indicate that there are 9 stocks can be combined to form optimal portfolio because they have positive expected returns.


2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 256-295 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael J Fleming ◽  
Giang Nguyen

Abstract We study the workup protocol, an important size discovery mechanism in the U.S. Treasury market. We find that workup order flow shocks explain 6%–8% of the variation of returns on benchmark notes and, across maturities, 10% of the variation of the yield curve level factor. Information related to proprietary client order flow is more likely to show up in workup trades, whereas information derived from public announcements tends to come through preworkup trades. Our findings highlight how the nature of information affects the trade-off between speed and execution price when informed traders choose between the lit and workup channels. Received May 3, 2017; Editorial decision August 1, 2018 by Editor Thierry Foucault. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online. Internet Appendix tables are numbered with “IA” prefix.


1985 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
N. Bhana

The efficient market hypothesis submits that the expected returns on shares and other financial assets are identical for all the days of the week. Studies of share returns on the New York Stock Exchange have revealed that the expected returns are not identical for the various days of the week. This article examines two hypotheses that have attempted to explain the distribution of returns over different days of the week. The calendar-time hypothesis states that the expected return for Monday is three times the expected return for the other days of the week. The trading-time hypothesis states that the expected return is the same for each day of the week. During the period 1978-1983, the daily returns on shares traded on the JSE were inconsistent with both hypotheses. The average return for Monday was significantly negative while the average return for the other trading days was positive with Wednesday showing the highest return. Evidence is presented to show that Treasury Bills have the same weekend effect as share transactions. An investment strategy based on the observed pattern of share returns over different days of the week is suggested. The implications of the effect of day of the week for tests of market efficiency are examined.


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