scholarly journals Asking ‘why?’ enhances theory of mind when evaluating harm but not purity violations

2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (7) ◽  
pp. 699-708 ◽  
Author(s):  
James A Dungan ◽  
Liane Young
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Brain Regions ◽  
Judgment Task ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Norms ◽  
Temporoparietal Junction ◽  
Task Instructions ◽  
Right Temporoparietal Junction ◽  
The Right

Abstract Recent work in psychology and neuroscience has revealed important differences in the cognitive processes underlying judgments of harm and purity violations. In particular, research has demonstrated that whether a violation was committed intentionally vs accidentally has a larger impact on moral judgments of harm violations (e.g. assault) than purity violations (e.g. incest). Here, we manipulate the instructions provided to participants for a moral judgment task to further probe the boundary conditions of this intent effect. Specifically, we instructed participants undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging to attend to either a violator’s mental states (why they acted that way) or their low-level behavior (how they acted) before delivering moral judgments. Results revealed that task instructions enhanced rather than diminished differences between how harm and purity violations are processed in brain regions for mental state reasoning or theory of mind. In particular, activity in the right temporoparietal junction increased when participants were instructed to attend to why vs how a violator acted to a greater extent for harm than for purity violations. This result constrains the potential accounts of why intentions matter less for purity violations compared to harm violations and provide further insight into the differences between distinct moral norms.

scholarly journals Neural substrates for moral judgments of psychological versus physical harm

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lily Tsoi ◽  
James A Dungan ◽  
Alek Chakroff ◽  
Liane Young
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Psychological Impact ◽  
Brain Regions ◽  
Autism Spectrum ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Anterior Cingulate ◽  
Adults With Autism ◽  
Temporoparietal Junction ◽  
The Right ◽  
Multivariate Pattern

Although harm primarily elicits thoughts of physical injuries, harm can also take the form of negative psychological impact. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we examined the extent to which moral judgments of physical and psychological harms are processed similarly, focusing on brain regions implicated in mental state reasoning or theory of mind, a key cognitive process for moral judgment. Univariate analyses reveal similar levels of theory of mind processing for psychological and physical harms, though multivariate pattern analyses (MVPA) reveal sensitivity to the psychological/physical distinction in two regions implicated in theory of mind: the right temporoparietal junction and the precuneus. Moreover, while there were no differences in neurotypical adults and adults with autism spectrum disorder with regard to neural activity related to theory of mind, there was a group difference in the recruitment of the anterior cingulate cortex for psychological versus physical harms. Altogether, these results reveal sensitivity within regions implicated in theory of mind to the physical / psychological distinction as well as neural processes that capture clinically relevant differences in evaluations of psychological harms versus physical harms.

scholarly journals Theory of Mind, pragmatics and the brain

2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivan Enrici ◽  
Bruno G. Bara ◽  
Mauro Adenzato
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Brain Regions ◽  
Brain Network ◽  
Written Language ◽  
Human Communication ◽  
Temporoparietal Junction ◽  
Communicative Intention ◽  
Right Temporoparietal Junction

Abstract Theory of Mind (ToM) is a neurocognitive system that allows the perceiver to attribute mental states, such as intentions, beliefs, or feelings, to others’ actions. The aim of the present work is to analyse the engagement of the ToM system in communication, in particular, in communicative intention processing. To this aim, we propose an Intention Processing Network (IPN) with its own principles and mechanisms, that is, a brain network differentially engaged according to the complex intertwining of the context, goal, and action involved. According to our IPN model, a set of brain regions of the ToM system (i.e. left and right temporoparietal junction, precuneus, and medial prefrontal cortex) are differentially involved in comprehending different types of intention, such as private or social intentions. We provide independent and convergent evidence on the role of the IPN model in communicative intention processing and we show that the engagement of the IPN does not depend upon the communicative means used, that is, written language, auditory language, or gesture. Evidence deriving from different experimental paradigms, including neuroimaging, lesion, neurodegenerative, and brain stimulation studies are discussed. In our view, this evidence establishes a link between ToM and pragmatics studies and suggests the role of intention processing as a core feature of human communication.

scholarly journals Moral judgement by the disconnected left and right cerebral hemispheres: a split-brain investigation

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (7) ◽  
pp. 170172 ◽  
Author(s):  
Conor M. Steckler ◽  
J. Kiley Hamlin ◽  
Michael B. Miller ◽  
Danielle King ◽  
Alan Kingstone
Keyword(s):  
Brain Research ◽  
Right Hemisphere ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Brain Regions ◽  
Moral Judgement ◽  
Temporoparietal Junction ◽  
Split Brain ◽  
Moral Judgements ◽  
The Right ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient

Owing to the hemispheric isolation resulting from a severed corpus callosum, research on split-brain patients can help elucidate the brain regions necessary and sufficient for moral judgement. Notably, typically developing adults heavily weight the intentions underlying others' moral actions, placing greater importance on valenced intentions versus outcomes when assigning praise and blame. Prioritization of intent in moral judgements may depend on neural activity in the right hemisphere's temporoparietal junction, an area implicated in reasoning about mental states. To date, split-brain research has found that the right hemisphere is necessary for intent-based moral judgement. When testing the left hemisphere using linguistically based moral vignettes, split-brain patients evaluate actions based on outcomes, not intentions. Because the right hemisphere has limited language ability relative to the left, and morality paradigms to date have involved significant linguistic demands, it is currently unknown whether the right hemisphere alone generates intent-based judgements. Here we use nonlinguistic morality plays with split-brain patient J.W. to examine the moral judgements of the disconnected right hemisphere, demonstrating a clear focus on intent. This finding indicates that the right hemisphere is not only necessary but also sufficient for intent-based moral judgement, advancing research into the neural systems supporting the moral sense.

scholarly journals Increasing the role of belief information in moral judgments by stimulating the right temporoparietal junction

2015 ◽  
Vol 77 ◽  
pp. 400-408 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roberta Sellaro ◽  
Berna Güroǧlu ◽  
Michael A. Nitsche ◽  
Wery P.M. van den Wildenberg ◽  
Valentina Massaro ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Temporoparietal Junction ◽  
Right Temporoparietal Junction ◽  
The Right

scholarly journals Right Temporoparietal Junction Encodes Mental Experience of Others More Than Evaluating False Versus True Belief

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Branden J. Bio ◽  
Arvid Guterstam ◽  
Mark Pinsk ◽  
Andrew I. Wilterson ◽  
Michael S. A. Graziano
Keyword(s):  
True Belief ◽  
Mental States ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Temporoparietal Junction ◽  
Cartoon Character ◽  
Visual Reaction ◽  
Alternative Hypotheses ◽  
Right Temporoparietal Junction ◽  
Cortical Regions ◽  
The Right

When people make inferences about other people's minds, called theory of mind (ToM), a network in the cerebral cortex becomes active. ToM experiments sometimes use the false belief task, in which subjects decide whether a story character believes A or B. The "false" belief occurs if the character believes A when B is true. We devised a version in which subjects judged whether a cartoon head "believed" a ball to be in box 1 or box 2. The task was a visual, reaction time version of a ToM task. We proposed two alternative hypotheses. In hypothesis 1, cortical regions of interest within the ToM network should distinguish between false and true belief trials, reflecting outside information that the subjects have about the cartoon character. In hypothesis 2, the ToM network should distinguish between conditions only if the subjects think that the cartoon character can distinguish between the conditions, thus reflecting a model of the internal contents of the cartoon character's mind. The results supported hypothesis 2. Events that the cartoon could not "see" did not affect activity in the ToM network; the same events, when the cartoon could apparently "see" them, significantly affected activity in the right temporoparietal junction (TPJ). The results support the view that the right TPJ participates in modeling the mental states of others, rather than in evaluating the accuracy of the beliefs of others, and may help explain why previous experiments showed mixed results when directly comparing false belief to true belief conditions.

scholarly journals Insular Cortex Mediates Attentional Capture by Behaviorally Relevant Stimuli after Damage to the Right Temporoparietal Junction

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Radek Ptak ◽  
Elena Pedrazzini
Keyword(s):  
Attentional Capture ◽  
Mechanistic Model ◽  
Insular Cortex ◽  
Brain Regions ◽  
Attentional Focus ◽  
Functional Connection ◽  
Temporoparietal Junction ◽  
Spatial Cuing ◽  
Right Temporoparietal Junction ◽  
The Right

Abstract The right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ) and insula both play a key role for the processing of relevant stimuli. However, while both have been conceived as neural “switches” that detect salient events and redirect the focus of attention, it remains unclear how these brain regions interact to achieve this behavioral goal. Here, we tested human participants with focal left-hemispheric or right-hemispheric lesions in a spatial cuing task that requires participants to react to lateralized stimuli preceded by a distracter that shares or does not share a relevant feature with the target. Using machine learning to identify significant lesion–behavior relationships, we found that rTPJ damage produces distinctive, pathologically increased attentional capture, but only by relevant distracters. Functional connectivity analyses revealed that the degree of capture is positively associated with a functional connection between insula and rTPJ, together with functional isolation of the rTPJ from right dorsal prefrontal cortex (dPFC). These findings suggest a mechanistic model where the insula–rTPJ connection constitutes a crucial functional unit that breaks attentional focus upon detection of behaviorally relevant events, while the dPFC appears to attune this activity.

scholarly journals Early and late neural correlates of mentalizing: ALE meta-analyses in adults, children and adolescents

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lynn V Fehlbaum ◽  
Réka Borbás ◽  
Katharina Paul ◽  
Simon b Eickhoff ◽  
Nora m Raschle
Keyword(s):  
Prefrontal Cortex ◽  
Children And Adolescents ◽  
Medial Prefrontal Cortex ◽  
Temporal Cortex ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Brain Regions ◽  
Inferior Temporal Cortex ◽  
Temporoparietal Junction ◽  
Right Temporoparietal Junction ◽  
Meta Analyses

Abstract The ability to understand mental states of others is referred to as mentalizing and enabled by our Theory of Mind. This social skill relies on brain regions comprising the mentalizing network as robustly observed in adults but also in a growing number of developmental studies. We summarized and compared neuroimaging evidence in children/adolescents and adults during mentalizing using coordinate-based activation likelihood estimation meta-analyses to inform about brain regions consistently or differentially engaged across age categories. Adults (N = 5286) recruited medial prefrontal and middle/inferior frontal cortices, precuneus, temporoparietal junction and middle temporal gyri during mentalizing, which were functionally connected to bilateral inferior/superior parietal lobule and thalamus/striatum. Conjunction and contrast analyses revealed that children and adolescents (N = 479) recruit similar but fewer regions within core mentalizing regions. Subgroup analyses revealed an early continuous engagement of middle medial prefrontal cortex, precuneus and right temporoparietal junction in younger children (8–11 years) and adolescents (12–18 years). Adolescents additionally recruited the left temporoparietal junction and middle/inferior temporal cortex. Overall, the observed engagement of the medial prefrontal cortex, precuneus and right temporoparietal junction during mentalizing across all ages reflects an early specialization of some key regions of the social brain.

Neural Correlates of Mental State Decoding in Dysphoria: An Event‐Related Potential Study

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Angelita Wong
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Brain Activity ◽  
Clinical Importance ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Brain Regions ◽  
Event Related Potential ◽  
Depression Symptoms ◽  
Social Deficits ◽  
The Right

Depression is often associated with profound social and interpersonal functioning impairments. Negative interpersonal experiences may lead depressed individuals to withdraw from social interaction, which may in turn exacerbate the depression state (Rippere, 1980). As a result, it is of theoretical and clinical importance to understand the mechanisms underlying these social deficits. Researchers have applied the theory‐of‐mind framework to better understand the impaired social functioning in depressed individuals. Theory of mind refers to the everyday ability to attribute mental states (i.e., beliefs, desires, emotions) to others to both understand and predict their behaviour (Wellman, 1990). Research has found that individuindividuals with dysphoria (i.e. elevated scores on a measure of depression symptoms, but not necessarily a diagnosis of clinical depression) demonstrate enhanced mental state judgments (Harkness, Sabbagh, Jacobson, Chowdrey, & Chen, 2005). This study will determine neural mechanisms that may underlie this phenomenon by examining whether differences in brain activity exist between dysphoric and nondysphoric groups during mental states decoding. I will record electrophysiological data while participants are judging the mental states from pictures of eyes. Based on previous research (Sabbagh, Moulson, & Harkness, 2004), I anticipate that mental state decoding will be associated with the right inferior frontal and right anterior temporal regions of the brain. Furthermore, I hypothesize that dysphoric individuals will have greater activations in these brain regions and make significantly more accurate judgments than nondysphoric individuals when making mental state judgments.

Extensive Left Temporal Pole Damage Does Not Impact on Theory of Mind Abilities

2013 ◽  
Vol 25 (12) ◽  
pp. 2025-2046 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caroline Michel ◽  
Laurence Dricot ◽  
Renaud Lhommel ◽  
Cécile Grandin ◽  
Adrian Ivanoiu ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Brain Regions ◽  
Brain Network ◽  
Semantic Dementia ◽  
Knowledge And Beliefs ◽  
The Social ◽  
Temporal Pole ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Brain

The temporal poles (TPs) are among the brain regions that are often considered as the brain network sustaining our ability to understand other people's mental states or “Theory of Mind” (ToM). However, so far the functional role of the left and right TPs in ToM is still debated, and it is even not clear yet whether these regions are necessary for ToM. In this study, we tested whether the left TP is necessary for ToM by assessing the mentalizing abilities of a patient (C.M.) diagnosed with semantic dementia. Converging evidence from detailed MRI and 18F-fluoro-2-deoxy-d-glucose PET examinations showed a massive atrophy of the left TP with the right TP being relatively unaffected. Furthermore, C.M.'s atrophy encompassed most regions of the left TP usually activated in neuroimaging studies investigating ToM. Given C.M.'s language impairments, we used a battery of entirely nonverbal ToM tasks. Across five tasks encompassing 100 trials, which probed the patient's ability to attribute various mental states (intentions, knowledge, and beliefs), C.M. showed a totally spared performance. This finding suggests that, despite its consistently observed activation in neuroimaging studies involving ToM tasks, the left TP is not necessary for ToM reasoning, at least in nonverbal conditions and as long as its right counterpart is preserved. Implications for understanding the social abilities of patients with semantic dementia are discussed.

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