Neural Correlates of Mental State Decoding in Dysphoria: An Event‐Related Potential Study

Depression is often associated with profound social and interpersonal functioning impairments. Negative interpersonal experiences may lead depressed individuals to withdraw from social interaction, which may in turn exacerbate the depression state (Rippere, 1980). As a result, it is of theoretical and clinical importance to understand the mechanisms underlying these social deficits. Researchers have applied the theory‐of‐mind framework to better understand the impaired social functioning in depressed individuals. Theory of mind refers to the everyday ability to attribute mental states (i.e., beliefs, desires, emotions) to others to both understand and predict their behaviour (Wellman, 1990). Research has found that individuindividuals with dysphoria (i.e. elevated scores on a measure of depression symptoms, but not necessarily a diagnosis of clinical depression) demonstrate enhanced mental state judgments (Harkness, Sabbagh, Jacobson, Chowdrey, & Chen, 2005). This study will determine neural mechanisms that may underlie this phenomenon by examining whether differences in brain activity exist between dysphoric and nondysphoric groups during mental states decoding. I will record electrophysiological data while participants are judging the mental states from pictures of eyes. Based on previous research (Sabbagh, Moulson, & Harkness, 2004), I anticipate that mental state decoding will be associated with the right inferior frontal and right anterior temporal regions of the brain. Furthermore, I hypothesize that dysphoric individuals will have greater activations in these brain regions and make significantly more accurate judgments than nondysphoric individuals when making mental state judgments.

Neural Correlates of Mental State Decoding in Human Adults: An Event-related Potential Study

10.1162/089892904322926755 ◽

2004 ◽

Vol 16 (3) ◽

pp. 415-426 ◽

Cited By ~ 81

Author(s):

Mark A. Sabbagh ◽

Margaret C. Moulson ◽

Kate L. Harkness

Keyword(s):

Theory Of Mind ◽

Mental State ◽

Right Hemisphere ◽

Mental States ◽

Neural Correlates ◽

Event Related Potential ◽

Neural Systems ◽

Core Theory ◽

Human Adults ◽

Successful negotiation of human social interactions rests on having a theory of mind—an understanding of how others' behaviors can be understood in terms of internal mental states, such as beliefs, desires, intentions, and emotions. A core theory-of-mind skill is the ability to decode others' mental states on the basis of observable information, such as facial expressions. Although several recent studies have focused on the neural correlates of reasoning about mental states, no research has addressed the question of what neural systems underlie mental state decoding. We used dense-array eventrelated potentials (ERP) to show that decoding mental states from pictures of eyes is associated with an N270–400 component over inferior frontal and anterior temporal regions of the right hemisphere. Source estimation procedures suggest that orbitofrontal and medial temporal regions may underlie this ERP effect. These findings suggest that different components of everyday theory-of-mind skills may rely on dissociable neural mechanisms.

An fMRI Investigation of Spontaneous Mental State Inference for Moral Judgment

10.1162/jocn.2009.21137 ◽

2009 ◽

Vol 21 (7) ◽

pp. 1396-1405 ◽

Cited By ~ 117

Author(s):

Liane Young ◽

Rebecca Saxe

Keyword(s):

Theory Of Mind ◽

Moral Judgment ◽

Mental State ◽

Mental States ◽

Brain Regions ◽

Medial Pfc ◽

The Right ◽

State Inference ◽

Moral Facts

Human moral judgment depends critically on “theory of mind,” the capacity to represent the mental states of agents. Recent studies suggest that the right TPJ (RTPJ) and, to lesser extent, the left TPJ (LTPJ), the precuneus (PC), and the medial pFC (MPFC) are robustly recruited when participants read explicit statements of an agent's beliefs and then judge the moral status of the agent's action. Real-world interactions, by contrast, often require social partners to infer each other's mental states. The current study uses fMRI to probe the role of these brain regions in supporting spontaneous mental state inference in the service of moral judgment. Participants read descriptions of a protagonist's action and then either (i) “moral” facts about the action's effect on another person or (ii) “nonmoral” facts about the situation. The RTPJ, PC, and MPFC were recruited selectively for moral over nonmoral facts, suggesting that processing moral stimuli elicits spontaneous mental state inference. In a second experiment, participants read the same scenarios, but explicit statements of belief preceded the facts: Protagonists believed their actions would cause harm or not. The response in the RTPJ, PC, and LTPJ was again higher for moral facts but also distinguished between neutral and negative outcomes. Together, the results illuminate two aspects of theory of mind in moral judgment: (1) spontaneous belief inference and (2) stimulus-driven belief integration.

Asking ‘why?’ enhances theory of mind when evaluating harm but not purity violations

Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience ◽

10.1093/scan/nsz048 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 14 (7) ◽

pp. 699-708 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

James A Dungan ◽

Liane Young

Keyword(s):

Theory Of Mind ◽

Mental States ◽

Brain Regions ◽

Judgment Task ◽

Moral Judgments ◽

Moral Norms ◽

Temporoparietal Junction ◽

Task Instructions ◽

Right Temporoparietal Junction ◽

Abstract Recent work in psychology and neuroscience has revealed important differences in the cognitive processes underlying judgments of harm and purity violations. In particular, research has demonstrated that whether a violation was committed intentionally vs accidentally has a larger impact on moral judgments of harm violations (e.g. assault) than purity violations (e.g. incest). Here, we manipulate the instructions provided to participants for a moral judgment task to further probe the boundary conditions of this intent effect. Specifically, we instructed participants undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging to attend to either a violator’s mental states (why they acted that way) or their low-level behavior (how they acted) before delivering moral judgments. Results revealed that task instructions enhanced rather than diminished differences between how harm and purity violations are processed in brain regions for mental state reasoning or theory of mind. In particular, activity in the right temporoparietal junction increased when participants were instructed to attend to why vs how a violator acted to a greater extent for harm than for purity violations. This result constrains the potential accounts of why intentions matter less for purity violations compared to harm violations and provide further insight into the differences between distinct moral norms.

6. Mental State Decoding in Dysphoric Individuals: The Role of Motivation

Inquiry@Queen's Undergraduate Research Conference Proceedings ◽

10.24908/iqurcp.7545 ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

Brooke Sinclair

Keyword(s):

Theory Of Mind ◽

Mental State ◽

Social Activity ◽

Social Motivation ◽

Underlying Mechanism ◽

Mental States ◽

Depression Symptoms ◽

Clinical Conditions ◽

Decoding Ability

Depression is associated with pervasive impairments in social and interpersonal functioning. Research demonstrates that individuals with depression have difficulty interacting with peers and show lower levels of social activity than do nondepressed individuals (Levendosky, Okun, & Parker, 1995). In addition, depressed individuals report that their social interactions are less supportive and less rewarding than those of non‐depressed individuals (Nezlek, Hamptom, & Shean, 2000). This reduced social competence may cause depressed individuals to disengage from social interaction, which may in turn exacerbate their state of depression (Rippere, 1980). It is thus important to understand and identify the mechanisms beneath these deficits. Researchers commonly use the theory of mind framework to understand impaired social functioning in clinical conditions. Theory of mind refers to the ability to make judgments about others’ mental states to understand and predict their social behaviour. Research has found a relationship between theory of mind and dysphoria (i.e., elevated scores on a measure of depression symptoms, but not necessarily a diagnosis of clinical depression). Specifically, dysphoric individuals demonstrate enhanced mental state judgments (Harkness, Sabbagh, Jacobson, Chowdrey, & Chen, 2005). My research investigates social motivation as an underlying mechanism for dysphoric individuals’ enhanced decoding ability. A sample of undergraduates will participate in a theory of mind decoding task following social, monetary or no motivation. I hypothesize that dysphoric individuals will make significantly more accurate judgments than non‐dysphoric individuals. Further, I predict that social motivation will enhance non‐dysphoric individuals’ sensitivity to others’ mental states.

Development of Predictive Responses in Theory of Mind Brain Regions

10.31234/osf.io/gj8up ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Hilary Richardson ◽

Rebecca Saxe

Keyword(s):

Theory Of Mind ◽

Peer Review ◽

Recent Work ◽

Mental State ◽

Mental States ◽

Brain Regions ◽

Control Network ◽

Functional Responses ◽

Pain Matrix ◽

Anticipation Effect

When we watch movies, we consider the characters’ mental states in order to understand and predict the narrative. Recent work in fMRI uses movie-viewing paradigms to measure functional responses in brain regions recruited for such mental state reasoning (the Theory of Mind (“ToM”) network). Here, two groups of young children (n=30 3-4yo, n=26 6-7yo) viewed a short animated movie twice while undergoing fMRI. As children get older, ToM brain regions were recruited earlier in time during the second presentation of the movie. This “narrative anticipation” effect is specific: there was no such effect in a control network of brain regions that responds just as robustly to the movie (the “Pain Matrix”). These results complement prior studies in adults that suggest that ToM brain regions play a role not just in inferring, but in actively predicting, other people's thoughts and feelings, and provide novel evidence that as children get older, their ToM brain regions increasingly make such predictions. This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Developmental Science. The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1111/desc.12863 .

Extensive Left Temporal Pole Damage Does Not Impact on Theory of Mind Abilities

10.1162/jocn_a_00488 ◽

2013 ◽

Vol 25 (12) ◽

pp. 2025-2046 ◽

Cited By ~ 8

Author(s):

Caroline Michel ◽

Laurence Dricot ◽

Renaud Lhommel ◽

Cécile Grandin ◽

Adrian Ivanoiu ◽

...

Keyword(s):

Theory Of Mind ◽

Mental States ◽

Brain Regions ◽

Brain Network ◽

Semantic Dementia ◽

Knowledge And Beliefs ◽

The Social ◽

Temporal Pole ◽

The Right ◽

The Brain

The temporal poles (TPs) are among the brain regions that are often considered as the brain network sustaining our ability to understand other people's mental states or “Theory of Mind” (ToM). However, so far the functional role of the left and right TPs in ToM is still debated, and it is even not clear yet whether these regions are necessary for ToM. In this study, we tested whether the left TP is necessary for ToM by assessing the mentalizing abilities of a patient (C.M.) diagnosed with semantic dementia. Converging evidence from detailed MRI and 18F-fluoro-2-deoxy-d-glucose PET examinations showed a massive atrophy of the left TP with the right TP being relatively unaffected. Furthermore, C.M.'s atrophy encompassed most regions of the left TP usually activated in neuroimaging studies investigating ToM. Given C.M.'s language impairments, we used a battery of entirely nonverbal ToM tasks. Across five tasks encompassing 100 trials, which probed the patient's ability to attribute various mental states (intentions, knowledge, and beliefs), C.M. showed a totally spared performance. This finding suggests that, despite its consistently observed activation in neuroimaging studies involving ToM tasks, the left TP is not necessary for ToM reasoning, at least in nonverbal conditions and as long as its right counterpart is preserved. Implications for understanding the social abilities of patients with semantic dementia are discussed.

Common and Unique Neural Correlates of Autobiographical Memory and Theory of Mind

10.1162/jocn.2009.21344 ◽

2010 ◽

Vol 22 (6) ◽

pp. 1095-1111 ◽

Cited By ~ 89

Author(s):

Jennifer S. Rabin ◽

Asaf Gilboa ◽

Donald T. Stuss ◽

Raymond A. Mar ◽

R. Shayna Rosenbaum

Keyword(s):

Theory Of Mind ◽

Autobiographical Memory ◽

Temporal Dynamics ◽

Mental States ◽

Neural Correlates ◽

Brain Regions ◽

Fmri Study ◽

Common Activity ◽

The Right ◽

Past Experiences

There is an inconsistency regarding the relationship between thinking about personal past experiences during autobiographical memory (AM) and thinking about other people's mental states during theory of mind (ToM). Neuroimaging studies of AM and ToM consistently report overlap in the brain regions recruited. Lesion data, however, show that amnesic people with AM impairment can have intact ToM, suggesting that distinct neural mechanisms support these abilities [Rosenbaum, R. S., Stuss, D. T., Levine, B., & Tulving, E. Theory of mind is independent of episodic memory. Science, 318, 1257, 2007]. The current fMRI study examined the functional and neural correlates of remembering one's own experiences in response to personal photos (AM condition) and imagining others' experiences in response to strangers' photos (ToM condition). AM and ToM conditions were matched in terms of content and vividness, and were compared directly and to a common baseline. Analyses revealed common activity within frontal and temporal–parietal regions, yet midline structures exhibited greater activity during AM. More specific analyses of event construction and detail elaboration revealed unique activation of the right hippocampus during AM construction, and of lateral regions, such as the right temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) during ToM elaboration. Moreover, a region of left hippocampus/perirhinal cortex appeared to be driven by event vividness. Thus, differences in AM and ToM emerge when a common baseline is used and temporal dynamics are taken into account. Furthermore, the right TPJ and related lateral regions, and not the hippocampus, may be needed for ToM, given that this ability is intact in amnesic people.

Stable neural representations of mental states across target people and stimulus modalities

10.31234/osf.io/7axzj ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

Miriam E. Weaverdyck ◽

Mark Allen Thornton ◽

Diana Tamir

Keyword(s):

Mental State ◽

Mental States ◽

Brain Regions ◽

The Self ◽

Similarity Analysis ◽

Multiple Modalities ◽

Neural Representations ◽

Conceptual Core ◽

Stimulus Modalities ◽

Huge Variety

Each individual experiences mental states in their own idiosyncratic way, yet perceivers are able to accurately understand a huge variety of states across unique individuals. How do they accomplish this feat? Do people think about their own anger in the same ways as another person’s? Is reading about someone’s anxiety the same as seeing it? Here, we test the hypothesis that a common conceptual core unites mental state representations across contexts. Across three studies, participants judged the mental states of multiple targets, including a generic other, the self, a socially close other, and a socially distant other. Participants viewed mental state stimuli in multiple modalities, including written scenarios and images. Using representational similarity analysis, we found that brain regions associated with social cognition expressed stable neural representations of mental states across both targets and modalities. This suggests that people use stable models of mental states across different people and contexts.

The Interaction Between Caudate Nucleus and Regions Within the Theory of Mind Network as a Neural Basis for Social Intelligence

Frontiers in Neural Circuits ◽

10.3389/fncir.2021.727960 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 15 ◽

Author(s):

Mikhail Votinov ◽

Artem Myznikov ◽

Maya Zheltyakova ◽

Ruslan Masharipov ◽

Alexander Korotkov ◽

...

Keyword(s):

Theory Of Mind ◽

Caudate Nucleus ◽

Cognitive Processes ◽

Social Intelligence ◽

Functional Integration ◽

Mental States ◽

Neural Basis ◽

Caudate Nuclei ◽

Structural Peculiarity ◽

The organization of socio-cognitive processes is a multifaceted problem for which many sophisticated concepts have been proposed. One of these concepts is social intelligence (SI), i.e., the set of abilities that allow successful interaction with other people. The theory of mind (ToM) human brain network is a good candidate for the neural substrate underlying SI since it is involved in inferring the mental states of others and ourselves and predicting or explaining others’ actions. However, the relationship of ToM to SI remains poorly explored. Our recent research revealed an association between the gray matter volume of the caudate nucleus and the degree of SI as measured by the Guilford-Sullivan test. It led us to question whether this structural peculiarity is reflected in changes to the integration of the caudate with other areas of the brain associated with socio-cognitive processes, including the ToM system. We conducted seed-based functional connectivity (FC) analysis of resting-state fMRI data for 42 subjects with the caudate as a region of interest. We found that the scores of the Guilford-Sullivan test were positively correlated with the FC between seeds in the right caudate head and two clusters located within the right superior temporal gyrus and bilateral precuneus. Both regions are known to be nodes of the ToM network. Thus, the current study demonstrates that the SI level is associated with the degree of functional integration between the ToM network and the caudate nuclei.

Moral judgement by the disconnected left and right cerebral hemispheres: a split-brain investigation

Royal Society Open Science ◽

10.1098/rsos.170172 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 4 (7) ◽

pp. 170172 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Conor M. Steckler ◽

J. Kiley Hamlin ◽

Michael B. Miller ◽

Danielle King ◽

Alan Kingstone

Keyword(s):

Brain Research ◽

Right Hemisphere ◽

Mental States ◽

Brain Regions ◽

Moral Judgement ◽

Temporoparietal Junction ◽

Split Brain ◽

Moral Judgements ◽

The Right ◽

Necessary And Sufficient

Owing to the hemispheric isolation resulting from a severed corpus callosum, research on split-brain patients can help elucidate the brain regions necessary and sufficient for moral judgement. Notably, typically developing adults heavily weight the intentions underlying others' moral actions, placing greater importance on valenced intentions versus outcomes when assigning praise and blame. Prioritization of intent in moral judgements may depend on neural activity in the right hemisphere's temporoparietal junction, an area implicated in reasoning about mental states. To date, split-brain research has found that the right hemisphere is necessary for intent-based moral judgement. When testing the left hemisphere using linguistically based moral vignettes, split-brain patients evaluate actions based on outcomes, not intentions. Because the right hemisphere has limited language ability relative to the left, and morality paradigms to date have involved significant linguistic demands, it is currently unknown whether the right hemisphere alone generates intent-based judgements. Here we use nonlinguistic morality plays with split-brain patient J.W. to examine the moral judgements of the disconnected right hemisphere, demonstrating a clear focus on intent. This finding indicates that the right hemisphere is not only necessary but also sufficient for intent-based moral judgement, advancing research into the neural systems supporting the moral sense.