O1.2. DECREASED ACTIVATION IN TEMPOROPARIETAL JUNCTION IN INDIVIDUALS WITH PSYCHOSIS AND BIOLOGICAL FIRST-DEGREE RELATIVES DURING IMPLICIT THEORY OF MIND

The theory of mind network (ToMN) is a set of brain regions activated by a variety of social tasks. Recent work has proposed that these associations with ToMN activity may relate to a common underlying computation: processing prediction error in social contexts. The present work presents evidence consistent with this hypothesis, using a fine-grained item analysis to examine the relationship between ToMN activity and variance in stimulus features. We used an existing dataset (consisting of statements about morals, facts, and preferences) to explore variability in ToMN activity elicited by moral statements, using metaethical judgments (i.e. judgments of how fact-like/preference-like morals are) as a proxy for their predictability/support by social consensus. Study 1 validated expected patterns of behavioral judgments in our stimuli set, and Study 2 associated by-stimulus estimates of metaethical judgment with ToMN activity, showing that ToMN activity was negatively associated with objective morals and positively associated with subjective morals. Whole brain analyses indicated that these associations were strongest in bilateral temporoparietal junction (TPJ). We also observed additional by-stimulus associations with ToMN, including positive associations with the presence of a person (across morals, facts, and preferences), a negative association with agreement (among morals only), and a positive association with mental inference (in preferences only, across 3 independent measures and behavioral samples). We discuss these findings in the context of recent predictive processing models, and highlight how predictive models may facilitate new perspectives on metaethics, the centrality of morality to personal identity, and distinctions between social domains (e.g. morals vs. preferences).

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Replications of implicit theory of mind tasks with varying representational demands

Cognitive Development ◽

10.1016/j.cogdev.2017.10.004 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 46 ◽

pp. 40-50 ◽

Cited By ~ 28

Author(s):

Lindsey J. Powell ◽

Kathryn Hobbs ◽

Alexandros Bardis ◽

Susan Carey ◽

Rebecca Saxe

Keyword(s):

Theory Of Mind ◽

Implicit Theory

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Implicit Theory of Mind Tests

PsycTESTS Dataset ◽

10.1037/t79311-000 ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

Jaime Banks

Keyword(s):

Theory Of Mind ◽

Implicit Theory

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Systematic Comparison of Brain Imaging Meta-Analyses of ToM with vPT

BioMed Research International ◽

10.1155/2017/6875850 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 2017 ◽

pp. 1-12 ◽

Cited By ~ 6

Author(s):

Aditi Arora ◽

Matthias Schurz ◽

Josef Perner

Keyword(s):

Theory Of Mind ◽

Perspective Taking ◽

Visual Perspective ◽

Common Denominator ◽

Precentral Gyrus ◽

Developmental Studies ◽

Temporoparietal Junction ◽

Visual Perspective Taking ◽

Extrastriate Body Area ◽

Meta Analyses

In visual perspective taking (vPT) one has to concern oneself with what other people see and how they see it. Since seeing is a mental state, developmental studies have discussed vPT within the domain of “theory of mind (ToM)” but imaging studies have not treated it as such. Based on earlier results from several meta-analyses, we tested for the overlap of visual perspective taking studies with 6 different kinds of ToM studies: false belief, trait judgments, strategic games, social animations, mind in the eyes, and rational actions. Joint activation was observed between the vPT task and some kinds of ToM tasks in regions involving the left temporoparietal junction (TPJ), anterior precuneus, left middle occipital gyrus/extrastriate body area (EBA), and the left inferior frontal and precentral gyrus. Importantly, no overlap activation was found for the vPT tasks with the joint core of all six kinds of ToM tasks. This raises the important question of what the common denominator of all tasks that fall under the label of “theory of mind” is supposed to be if visual perspective taking is not one of them.

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Theory-of-mind understanding and theory-of-mind use in unaffected first-degree relatives of schizophrenia and bipolar disorder

Psychiatry Research ◽

10.1016/j.psychres.2015.10.026 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 230 (2) ◽

pp. 735-737 ◽

Cited By ~ 7

Author(s):

Yong-guang Wang ◽

David L. Roberts ◽

Yan Liang ◽

Jian-fei Shi ◽

Kai Wang

Keyword(s):

Bipolar Disorder ◽

Theory Of Mind ◽

First Degree Relatives

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Is implicit Theory of Mind real but hard to detect? Testing adults with different stimulus materials

Royal Society Open Science ◽

10.1098/rsos.190068 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 6 (7) ◽

pp. 190068 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Louisa Kulke ◽

Marieke Wübker ◽

Hannes Rakoczy

Keyword(s):

Theory Of Mind ◽

Eye Tracking ◽

Implicit Theory ◽

Implicit Methods ◽

New Methods ◽

Stimulus Materials ◽

Anticipatory Looking

Recently, Theory of Mind (ToM) research has been revolutionized by new methods. Eye-tracking studies measuring subjects' looking times or anticipatory looking have suggested that implicit and automatic forms of ToM develop much earlier in ontogeny than traditionally assumed and continue to operate outside of subjects’ awareness throughout the lifespan. However, the reliability of these implicit methods has recently been put into question by an increasing number of non-replications. What remains unclear from these accumulating non-replication findings, though, is whether they present true negatives (there is no robust phenomenon of automatic ToM) or false ones (automatic ToM is real but difficult to tap). In order to address these questions, the current study implemented conceptual replications of influential anticipatory looking ToM tasks with a new variation in the stimuli. In two separate preregistered studies, we used increasingly realistic stimuli and controlled for potential confounds. Even with these more realistic stimuli, previous results could not be replicated. Rather, the anticipatory looking pattern found here remained largely compatible with more parsimonious explanations. In conclusion, the reality and robustness of automatic ToM remains controversial.

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Asking ‘why?’ enhances theory of mind when evaluating harm but not purity violations

Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience ◽

10.1093/scan/nsz048 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 14 (7) ◽

pp. 699-708 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

James A Dungan ◽

Liane Young

Keyword(s):

Theory Of Mind ◽

Mental States ◽

Brain Regions ◽

Judgment Task ◽

Moral Judgments ◽

Moral Norms ◽

Temporoparietal Junction ◽

Task Instructions ◽

Right Temporoparietal Junction ◽

The Right

Abstract Recent work in psychology and neuroscience has revealed important differences in the cognitive processes underlying judgments of harm and purity violations. In particular, research has demonstrated that whether a violation was committed intentionally vs accidentally has a larger impact on moral judgments of harm violations (e.g. assault) than purity violations (e.g. incest). Here, we manipulate the instructions provided to participants for a moral judgment task to further probe the boundary conditions of this intent effect. Specifically, we instructed participants undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging to attend to either a violator’s mental states (why they acted that way) or their low-level behavior (how they acted) before delivering moral judgments. Results revealed that task instructions enhanced rather than diminished differences between how harm and purity violations are processed in brain regions for mental state reasoning or theory of mind. In particular, activity in the right temporoparietal junction increased when participants were instructed to attend to why vs how a violator acted to a greater extent for harm than for purity violations. This result constrains the potential accounts of why intentions matter less for purity violations compared to harm violations and provide further insight into the differences between distinct moral norms.

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Neural correlates of theory-of-mind are associated with variation in children’s everyday social cognition

Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience ◽

10.1093/scan/nsz040 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 14 (6) ◽

pp. 579-589 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Cora E Mukerji ◽

Sarah Hope Lincoln ◽

David Dodell-Feder ◽

Charles A Nelson ◽

Christine I Hooker

Keyword(s):

Social Cognition ◽

Theory Of Mind ◽

Social Cognitive ◽

Mental States ◽

False Belief ◽

School Age Children ◽

Cognitive Behavior ◽

School Age ◽

Temporoparietal Junction ◽

False Belief Reasoning

ABSTRACT Theory of mind (ToM), the capacity to reason about others’ mental states, is central to healthy social development. Neural mechanisms supporting ToM may contribute to individual differences in children’s social cognitive behavior. Employing a false belief functional magnetic resonance imaging paradigm, we identified patterns of neural activity and connectivity elicited by ToM reasoning in school-age children (N = 32, ages 9–13). Next, we tested relations between these neural ToM correlates and children’s everyday social cognition. Several key nodes of the neural ToM network showed greater activity when reasoning about false beliefs (ToM condition) vs non-mentalistic false content (control condition), including the bilateral temporoparietal junction (RTPJ and LTPJ), precuneus (PC) and right superior temporal sulcus. In addition, children demonstrated task-modulated changes in connectivity among these regions to support ToM relative to the control condition. ToM-related activity in the PC was negatively associated with variation in multiple aspects of children’s social cognitive behavior. Together, these findings elucidate how nodes of the ToM network act and interact to support false belief reasoning in school-age children and suggest that neural ToM mechanisms are linked to variation in everyday social cognition.

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