scholarly journals Neural correlates of theory-of-mind are associated with variation in children’s everyday social cognition

2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (6) ◽  
pp. 579-589 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cora E Mukerji ◽  
Sarah Hope Lincoln ◽  
David Dodell-Feder ◽  
Charles A Nelson ◽  
Christine I Hooker
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Mental States ◽  
False Belief ◽  
School Age Children ◽  
Cognitive Behavior ◽  
School Age ◽  
Temporoparietal Junction ◽  
False Belief Reasoning

ABSTRACT Theory of mind (ToM), the capacity to reason about others’ mental states, is central to healthy social development. Neural mechanisms supporting ToM may contribute to individual differences in children’s social cognitive behavior. Employing a false belief functional magnetic resonance imaging paradigm, we identified patterns of neural activity and connectivity elicited by ToM reasoning in school-age children (N = 32, ages 9–13). Next, we tested relations between these neural ToM correlates and children’s everyday social cognition. Several key nodes of the neural ToM network showed greater activity when reasoning about false beliefs (ToM condition) vs non-mentalistic false content (control condition), including the bilateral temporoparietal junction (RTPJ and LTPJ), precuneus (PC) and right superior temporal sulcus. In addition, children demonstrated task-modulated changes in connectivity among these regions to support ToM relative to the control condition. ToM-related activity in the PC was negatively associated with variation in multiple aspects of children’s social cognitive behavior. Together, these findings elucidate how nodes of the ToM network act and interact to support false belief reasoning in school-age children and suggest that neural ToM mechanisms are linked to variation in everyday social cognition.

Theory of Mind

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janet Wilde Astington ◽  
Claire Hughes
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental Representation ◽  
Mental States ◽  
False Belief ◽  
School Age ◽  
Comprehensive Description ◽  
Deontic Reasoning ◽  
Developmental Progression ◽  
New Directions ◽  
Atypical Development

The chapter begins with an explanation of key foundational concepts in theory of mind, such as mental representation and false belief. We then discuss the history and current broad scope of the term, proposing a developmental-componential view that incorporates intuitive and reflective aspects of theory of mind. We continue with a comprehensive description of the developmental progression of theory of mind: from infants’ intuitive understanding of ordinary actions as reflecting others’ attention and intentions, through toddlers’ appreciation of world-inconsistent goals and preschool developments in understanding representational mental states, to school-age children’s mastery of an interpretative and complex theory of mind. We consideren passantindividual differences in development, as well as atypical development, such as in autism. Finally, new directions for research are explored, in the areas of neurology, education, and deontic reasoning.

scholarly journals The Effects Of Adult Ageing And Culture On Theory Of Mind

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
louise phillips ◽  
Louisa Lawrie ◽  
Alexandre Schaefer ◽  
Min Hooi Yong
Keyword(s):  
Socioeconomic Status ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Cultural Differences ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Mental States ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Social Rules ◽  
Mental State Attribution ◽  
Generational Changes ◽  
False Belief Reasoning

Older adults tend to have poorer mental state understanding (Theory of Mind, ToM) than their younger counterparts, including in both Western and Asian cultures. The current study aimed to directly investigate whether there are any cultural differences in the pattern of age effects on ToM tasks. Given evidence of cultural differences in the development of ToM across childhood, we predicted that older Asian adults would find the mental state tasks particularly resource-demanding. We used two ToM tests which made differing demands on updating multiple mental states (the false belief task) and applying social rules to mental state processing (the faux pas task). We also looked at the role of education, socioeconomic status, individualism versus collectivism and working memory (WM). A total of 298 participants from UK and Malaysia completed faux pas, false belief, and WM tasks. Results showed that interacting effects of age and culture were evident in faux pas detection, some aspects of false belief reasoning, and WM tasks, with older Malaysian participants performing poorly compared to the other groups. We also found that WM fully mediated age differences in ToM in the Malaysian sample. High levels of individualism were associated with poorer faux pas detection, but education and socioeconomic status did not explain additional variance in the ToM tasks. This pattern of results may reflect generational changes in the familiarity and cognitive load of explicit mental state attribution, along with cultural differences in the pace and nature of cognitive ageing.

scholarly journals Growing Up Thinking of God’s Beliefs: Theory of Mind and Ontological Knowledge

SAGE Open ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 215824401880987 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cinzia Di Dio ◽  
Sara Isernia ◽  
Chiara Ceolaro ◽  
Antonella Marchetti ◽  
Davide Massaro
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Religious Beliefs ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Mental States ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Growing Up ◽  
False Beliefs ◽  
Belief Attribution ◽  
Knowledge Bias

The study of social cognition involves the attribution of states of mind to humans, as well as, quite recently, to nonhuman creatures, like God. Some studies support the role of social cognition in religious beliefs, whereas others ascribe religious beliefs to an ontological knowledge bias. The present study compares these distinct approaches in 37 catholic children aged 4 to 10 years, who were administered an adapted version of the unexpected content task assessing false beliefs of different agents: a human, a dog, a robot, and God. The children were also administered an intentionality understanding task, a component of mentalization abilities, and an interview on ontological knowledge assessing emotions, intentions, imagination, and epistemic knowledge. In line with previous research, the results showed that children did not attribute false beliefs to God as they did to the human and to other nonhuman agents. Importantly, while false-belief attribution to the human was associated with the children’s ability to attribute mental states (intentionality understanding), false-belief attribution to God was related to children’s ontological knowledge. We conclude that, contrary to false-belief attribution to the human and to other nonhuman agents, children’s understanding of God’s mind is largely a function of ontological knowledge about God, rather than of children’s social cognitive functions.

Activation of the Default Network During a Theory of Mind Task Predicts Individual Differences in Agreeableness and Social Cognitive Ability

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aisha Linnea Udochi ◽  
Scott D. Blain ◽  
Philip Burton ◽  
Leroy Medrano ◽  
Colin G. DeYoung
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Cognitive Ability ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Self Report ◽  
Network Activity ◽  
Equation Modeling ◽  
Default Network ◽  
Network Activation

Background: Social cognitive processes such as emotion perception and empathy allow humans to navigate complex social landscapes and are associated with specific neural systems. In particular, theory of mind (ToM), which refers to our ability to decipher the mental states of others, is related to the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex and temporoparietal junction, which include portions of the default network. Both social cognition and the default network have been linked to the personality trait Agreeableness. We hypothesized that default network activity during a ToM task would positively predict social cognitive abilities and Agreeableness.Method: In a 3T fMRI scanner, participants (N = 1050) completed a ToM task in which they observed triangles displaying random or social (i.e., human-like) movement. Participants also completed self-report measures of Agreeableness and tests of intelligence and social cognitive ability. Average blood oxygen level dependent responses were calculated for default network regions associated with social cognition, and structural equation modeling was used to test associations of personality and task performance with activation in those brain regions. Results: Default network activation in the dorsal medial subsystem was greater for social vs. random animations. Default network activation in response to social animations predicted better performance across social cognitive tasks and higher levels of Agreeableness.Conclusions: Strength of neural response to social stimuli in the default network, and particularly its dorsal medial subsystem, may facilitate effective social processing and have downstream effects on social interactions. We discuss theoretical and methodological implications of this work for social and personality neuroscience.

scholarly journals Amygdala lesions do not compromise the cortical network for false-belief reasoning

2015 ◽  
Vol 112 (15) ◽  
pp. 4827-4832 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert P. Spunt ◽  
Jed T. Elison ◽  
Nicholas Dufour ◽  
René Hurlemann ◽  
Rebecca Saxe ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Cortical Activity ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Cortical Network ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Central Feature ◽  
False Belief Reasoning ◽  
Patient Responses ◽  
Amygdala Lesions ◽  
Belief Reasoning

The amygdala plays an integral role in human social cognition and behavior, with clear links to emotion recognition, trust judgments, anthropomorphization, and psychiatric disorders ranging from social phobia to autism. A central feature of human social cognition is a theory-of-mind (ToM) that enables the representation other people's mental states as distinct from one's own. Numerous neuroimaging studies of the best studied use of ToM—false-belief reasoning—suggest that it relies on a specific cortical network; moreover, the amygdala is structurally and functionally connected with many components of this cortical network. It remains unknown whether the cortical implementation of any form of ToM depends on amygdala function. Here we investigated this question directly by conducting functional MRI on two patients with rare bilateral amygdala lesions while they performed a neuroimaging protocol standardized for measuring cortical activity associated with false-belief reasoning. We compared patient responses with those of two healthy comparison groups that included 480 adults. Based on both univariate and multivariate comparisons, neither patient showed any evidence of atypical cortical activity or any evidence of atypical behavioral performance; moreover, this pattern of typical cortical and behavioral response was replicated for both patients in a follow-up session. These findings argue that the amygdala is not necessary for the cortical implementation of ToM in adulthood and suggest a reevaluation of the role of the amygdala and its cortical interactions in human social cognition.

Percezione sociale e paranoia: una rassegna

2009 ◽  
pp. 123-141
Author(s):  
Dennis R. Combs ◽  
Dustin J: Chapman ◽  
Casey Reneau
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Attributional Style ◽  
Social Perception ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Persecutory Delusions ◽  
Future Studies ◽  
Area Of Interest ◽  
Current State ◽  
Interest In Research

- There has been an increased interest in research on paranoia and persecutory delusions. This is partly based on the idea that paranoia exists on a continuum ranging from sub-clinical to clinical levels. One area of interest is in social cognition as it may provide methods to understand how persons with paranoia perceive, interpret, and understand their social world. Previous research has showed that social cognition directly influences or mediates social functioning. Paranoia can be ideally approached from a social cognitive perspective, which makes understanding these processes even more important. For this review, we will focus on the current state of knowledge for paranoia as it pertains to the three primary domains of social cognition: 1) emotion/social perception, 2) theory of mind, and 3) attributional style. Deficits in emotion/social perception appear to be found across the paranoia continuum. In contrast, deficits in theory of mind and attributional style are typically found in persons with clinical levels of paranoia. Future studies should focus on understanding the processes that might underlie the deficits.

scholarly journals Asking ‘why?’ enhances theory of mind when evaluating harm but not purity violations

2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (7) ◽  
pp. 699-708 ◽  
Author(s):  
James A Dungan ◽  
Liane Young
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Brain Regions ◽  
Judgment Task ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Norms ◽  
Temporoparietal Junction ◽  
Task Instructions ◽  
Right Temporoparietal Junction ◽  
The Right

Abstract Recent work in psychology and neuroscience has revealed important differences in the cognitive processes underlying judgments of harm and purity violations. In particular, research has demonstrated that whether a violation was committed intentionally vs accidentally has a larger impact on moral judgments of harm violations (e.g. assault) than purity violations (e.g. incest). Here, we manipulate the instructions provided to participants for a moral judgment task to further probe the boundary conditions of this intent effect. Specifically, we instructed participants undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging to attend to either a violator’s mental states (why they acted that way) or their low-level behavior (how they acted) before delivering moral judgments. Results revealed that task instructions enhanced rather than diminished differences between how harm and purity violations are processed in brain regions for mental state reasoning or theory of mind. In particular, activity in the right temporoparietal junction increased when participants were instructed to attend to why vs how a violator acted to a greater extent for harm than for purity violations. This result constrains the potential accounts of why intentions matter less for purity violations compared to harm violations and provide further insight into the differences between distinct moral norms.

Dark triad personality traits and theory of mind among school-age children

2013 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kurt K. Stellwagen ◽  
Patricia K. Kerig
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Personality Traits ◽  
Dark Triad ◽  
School Age Children ◽  
School Age
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