NAFTA and USMCA

Author(s):  
Anne O. Krueger

How are NAFTA and USMCA different? The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came into force at the beginning of 1994. It was an “FTA plus” between Canada, Mexico, and the US. There had been some strenuous opposition to the preferential trading arrangement (PTA)...

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
pp. e57624
Author(s):  
Angelo Raphael Mattos

A partir das competências constitucionais do Congresso dos Estados Unidos em política externa, das plataformas dos partidos Democrata e Republicano de 1992, bem como dos argumentos a favor e contra a implementação do North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), o artigo objetiva compreender e discutir as razões da dificuldade enfrentada por Bill Clinton para aprovar o NAFTA no Congresso dos EUA em 1993. Os resultados das análises dos diferentes grupos domésticos, incluindo os atores Executivo e Legislativo, indicam que posições ideológicas, sobretudo presentes no Partido Democrata, como questões trabalhistas e ambientais, representaram o principal fator de resistência ao NAFTA no Capitólio.Palavras-chave: Congresso; Estados Unidos; NAFTA.ABSTRACTBased on the constitutional powers of the United States Congress in foreign policy, the platforms of the Democratic and Republican parties of 1992, as well as the arguments for and against the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the article aimed to understand and discuss the reasons for Bill Clinton's difficulty in passing NAFTA to the US Congress in 1993. The results of the analyzes of different domestic groups, including the Executive and Legislative actors, indicate that ideological positions, especially present in the Democratic Party, as labor and environmental issues, represented the main factor of resistance to NAFTA in the Capitol. Keywords: Congress; United States; NAFTA. Recebido em: 08 fev. 2021 | Aceito em: 20 set. 2021.


1997 ◽  
Vol 91 (2) ◽  
pp. 324-338 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier ◽  
Laura W. Arnold ◽  
Christopher J. W. Zorn

A critical element of decision making is the timing of choices political actors make; often when a decision is made is as critical as the decision itself. We posit a dynamic model of strategic position announcement based on signaling theories of legislative politics. We suggest that members who receive clear signals from constituents, interest groups, and policy leaders will announce their positions earlier. Those with conflicting signals will seek more information, delaying their announcement. We test several expectations by examining data on when members of the House of Representatives announced their positions on the North American Free Trade Agreement. We also contrast the timing model with a vote model, and find that there are meaningful differences between the factors influencing the timing of position announcements and vote choice. Our research allows analysts to interpret the process leading up to the House action and the end state of that process.


2007 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 121-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dwi Susanto ◽  
C. Parr Rosson ◽  
Flynn J. Adcock

This paper examines the effect of the U.S.-Mexico trade agreement under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The results suggest that U.S. agricultural imports from Mexico have been responsive to tariff rate reductions applied to Mexican products. A one percentage point decrease in tariff rates is associated with an increase in U.S. agricultural imports from Mexico by 5.31% in the first 6 years of NAFTA and by 2.62% in the last 6 years of NAFTA. U.S. imports from Mexico have also been attributable to the pre-NAFTA tariff rates. Overall, the results indicate that the U.S-Mexico trade agreement under NAFTA has been trade creating rather than trade diverting.


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