scholarly journals Body ownership and agency altered by an electromyographically controlled robotic arm

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (5) ◽  
pp. 172170 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuki Sato ◽  
Toshihiro Kawase ◽  
Kouji Takano ◽  
Charles Spence ◽  
Kenji Kansaku
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Neuroscience ◽  
The Body ◽  
Sense Of Agency ◽  
Robotic Arm ◽  
Body Ownership ◽  
Fundamental Issue ◽  
Rubber Hand ◽  
Sense Of Ownership ◽  
Robotic Prosthesis ◽  
Wrist Flexors

Understanding how we consciously experience our bodies is a fundamental issue in cognitive neuroscience. Two fundamental components of this are the sense of body ownership (the experience of the body as one's own) and the sense of agency (the feeling of control over one's bodily actions). These constructs have been used to investigate the incorporation of prostheses. To date, however, no evidence has been provided showing whether representations of ownership and agency in amputees are altered when operating a robotic prosthesis. Here we investigated a robotic arm using myoelectric control, for which the user varied the joint position continuously, in a rubber hand illusion task. Fifteen able-bodied participants and three trans-radial amputees were instructed to contract their wrist flexors/extensors alternately, and to watch the robotic arm move. The sense of ownership in both groups was extended to the robotic arm when the wrists of the real and robotic arm were flexed/extended synchronously, with the effect being smaller when they moved in opposite directions. Both groups also experienced a sense of agency over the robotic arm. These results suggest that these experimental settings induced successful incorporation of the prosthesis, at least for the amputees who took part in the present study.

The Bodyguard Hypothesis

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frédérique de Vignemont
Keyword(s):  
The Body ◽  
Sense Of Agency ◽  
Special Significance ◽  
Rubber Hand ◽  
Sense Of Ownership ◽  
Body Map ◽  
Self Defence

How are the sense of ownership and the sense of agency related? Does one need to be able to control one’s body to experience it as one’s own? One may suggest that the sense of bodily ownership is grounded in action-orientated representations of the body. However, this agentive hypothesis cannot explain how one can experience as one’s own a rubber hand that is not under control, while not experiencing as one’s own tools that are under control. The chapter then argues that one needs to distinguish between two kinds of hot body maps: the working body map involved in instrumental actions, and the protective body map involved in self-defence. It is proposed that one experiences as one’s own the body represented in the protective body map, which represents the body that has a special significance for the evolutionary needs of the organism.

scholarly journals Experiential ownership and body ownership are different phenomena

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Caleb Liang ◽  
Wen-Hsiang Lin ◽  
Tai-Yuan Chang ◽  
Chi-Hong Chen ◽  
Chen-Wei Wu ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Distinct Type ◽  
Body Part ◽  
The Body ◽  
Body Ownership ◽  
Rubber Hand ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
The One ◽  
First Time ◽  
Full Body

AbstractBody ownership concerns what it is like to feel a body part or a full body as mine, and has become a prominent area of study. We propose that there is a closely related type of bodily self-consciousness largely neglected by researchers—experiential ownership. It refers to the sense that I am the one who is having a conscious experience. Are body ownership and experiential ownership actually the same phenomenon or are they genuinely different? In our experiments, the participant watched a rubber hand or someone else’s body from the first-person perspective and was touched either synchronously or asynchronously. The main findings: (1) The sense of body ownership was hindered in the asynchronous conditions of both the body-part and the full-body experiments. However, a strong sense of experiential ownership was observed in those conditions. (2) We found the opposite when the participants’ responses were measured after tactile stimulations had ceased for 5 s. In the synchronous conditions of another set of body-part and full-body experiments, only experiential ownership was blocked but not body ownership. These results demonstrate for the first time the double dissociation between body ownership and experiential ownership. Experiential ownership is indeed a distinct type of bodily self-consciousness.

scholarly journals Perception of visual-tactile asynchrony, bodily perceptual aberrations, and bodily illusions in schizophrenia

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Regine Zopf
Keyword(s):  
The Body ◽  
Detection Sensitivity ◽  
Body Ownership ◽  
Body Perception ◽  
Rubber Hand ◽  
Bodily Experiences ◽  
Asynchrony Detection ◽  
Body Perceptions ◽  
Proprioceptive Drift ◽  
Insight Into

Body perception can be dramatically altered in individuals with schizophrenia resulting in experiences of undefined bodily boundaries, loss of body ownership, and size changes for parts of the body. These individuals may also be more susceptible to the rubber hand illusion (RHI: an illusion of body perception that can also be induced in neurotypical populations), but the findings are mixed. Furthermore, the perception of timing information about multisensory stimuli, which is thought to be fundamental for body perception, has been reported to be altered in schizophrenia. We tested here whether altered perception of the temporal relationship between visual and tactile signals in schizophrenia can predict self-reported perceptual aberrations and RHI susceptibility (indexed by both illusion self-ratings and a more objective proprioceptive-drift measure). We found that the sensitivity to detect temporal asynchronies is reduced in schizophrenia and this predicts bodily perceptual symptoms. In contrast, we found no evidence for a direct relationship between asynchrony detection sensitivity and RHI susceptibility. Instead, our findings suggest that experiencing more bodily perceptual symptoms increases the likelihood of endorsing unusual bodily experiences, resulting in higher RHI self-ratings but not higher proprioceptive-drift scores. Overall, our findings provide evidence for both direct and indirect links between temporal and body perception and thus new insight into the mechanisms that may underlie unusual body perceptions in schizophrenia.

The Rubber Hand Illusion in Healthy Younger and Older Adults

2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (6) ◽  
pp. 537-555 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer L. Campos ◽  
Graziella El-Khechen Richandi ◽  
Babak Taati ◽  
Behrang Keshavarz
Keyword(s):  
Skin Temperature ◽  
Subjective Experience ◽  
Age Groups ◽  
Objective Measure ◽  
The Body ◽  
Rubber Hand Illusion ◽  
Body Ownership ◽  
Rubber Hand ◽  
Age Related ◽  
Body Change

Percepts about our body’s position in space and about body ownership are informed by multisensory feedback from visual, proprioceptive, and tactile inputs. The Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI) is a multisensory illusion that is induced when an observer sees a rubber hand being stroked while they feel their own, spatially displaced, and obstructed hand being stroked. When temporally synchronous, the visual–tactile interactions can create the illusion that the rubber hand belongs to the observer and that the observer’s real hand is shifted in position towards the rubber hand. Importantly, little is understood about whether these multisensory perceptions of the body change with older age. Thus, in this study we implemented a classic RHI protocol (synchronous versus asynchronous stroking) with healthy younger (18–35) and older (65+) adults and measured the magnitude of proprioceptive drift and the subjective experience of body ownership. As an adjunctive objective measure, skin temperature was recorded to evaluate whether decreases in skin temperature were associated with illusory percepts, as has been shown previously. The RHI was observed for both age groups with respect to increased drift and higher ratings of ownership following synchronous compared to asynchronous stroking. Importantly, no effects of age and no interactions between age and condition were observed for either of these outcome measures. No effects were observed for skin temperature. Overall, these results contribute to an emerging field of research investigating the conditions under which age-related differences in multisensory integration are observed by providing insights into the role of visual, proprioceptive, and tactile inputs on bodily percepts.

scholarly journals Challenging the boundaries of the physical self: purely distal cues in the environment impact body ownership

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Klaudia Grechuta ◽  
Javier De La Torre ◽  
Belén Rubio Ballester ◽  
Paul F.M.J. Verschure
Keyword(s):  
The Body ◽  
Body Ownership ◽  
Environment Impact ◽  
Rubber Hand ◽  
Sensory Stimuli ◽  
Sensory Signals ◽  
Surrounding Environment ◽  
Tactile Stimuli ◽  
Multisensory Cues ◽  
Multisensory Information

AbstractThe unique ability to identify one’s own body and experience it as one’s own is fundamental in goal-oriented behavior and survival. However, the mechanisms underlying the so-called body ownership are yet not fully understood. The plasticity of body ownership has been studied using two experimental methods or their variations. Specifically, the Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI), where the tactile stimuli are externally generated, or the moving RHI which implies self-initiated movements. Grounded in these paradigms, evidence has demonstrated that body ownership is a product of bottom-up reception of self- and externally-generated multisensory information and top-down comparison between the predicted and the actual sensory stimuli. Crucially, provided the design of the current paradigms, where one of the manipulated cues always involves the processing of a proximal modality sensing the body or its surface (e.g., touch), the contribution of sensory signals which pertain to the environment remain elusive. Here we propose that, as any robust percept, body ownership depends on the integration and prediction of all the sensory stimuli, and therefore it will depend on the consistency of purely distal sensory signals pertaining to the environment. To test our hypothesis, we create an embodied goal-oriented task and manipulate the predictability of the surrounding environment by changing the congruency of purely distal multisensory cues while preserving bodily and action-driven signals entirely predictable. Our results empirically reveal that the way we represent our body is contingent upon all the sensory stimuli including purely distal and action-independent signals which pertain to the environment.

scholarly journals The supernumerary rubber hand illusion revisited: perceived duplication of limbs and visuotactile events

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chenggui Fan ◽  
H. Henrik Ehrsson
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Neuroscience ◽  
Body Representation ◽  
Rubber Hand Illusion ◽  
Body Ownership ◽  
Rubber Hand ◽  
Real Right ◽  
The Real ◽  
Skin Conductance Responses ◽  
Supernumerary Limbs ◽  
Real Hand

A controversial and unresolved issue in cognitive neuroscience is whether humans can experience supernumerary limbs as part of their own body. Some previous experiments have claimed that it is possible to elicit supernumerary hand illusions based on modified versions of the rubber hand illusion. However, other studies have provided conflicting results that suggest that only one rubber hand can be perceived as one’s own. To address this issue, we developed a supernumerary hand illusion paradigm that allowed us to disambiguate ownership of individual rubber hands from simultaneous ownership of two fake hands. In our setup, the participant’s real right hand was hidden under a platform, while two identical right rubber hands were placed in parallel on top of the platform in direct view of the participant. We applied synchronous strokes to both rubber hands and the real hand (SS), synchronous strokes to one rubber hand and the real hand and asynchronous strokes to the other model hand (AS and SA) or asynchronous strokes to both fake hands in relation to the real hand (AA). Our results demonstrate that a genuine illusion of owning two rubber hands can be elicited and that such a supernumerary hand illusion can be isolated from the sense of ownership of a single rubber hand both in terms of questionnaire ratings and threat-evoked skin conductance responses (SCRs). These findings advance our knowledge about the dynamic flexibility and fundamental constraints of body representation and emphasize the importance of correlated afferent signals for causal inference in body ownership.

scholarly journals Rubber Hand Illusion does not arise from comparisons with internal body models: a new multisensory integration account of the sense of ownership

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Piotr Litwin
Keyword(s):  
Multisensory Integration ◽  
Human Body ◽  
The Body ◽  
Rubber Hand Illusion ◽  
Multisensory Perception ◽  
Top Down ◽  
Rubber Hand ◽  
Sense Of Ownership ◽  
Body Model ◽  
Internal Body

Human body sense is surprisingly flexible – precisely administered multisensory stimulation may result in the illusion that an external object is part of one’s body. There seems to be a general consensus that there are certain top-down constraints on which objects may be incorporated: in particular, to-be-embodied objects should be structurally similar to a visual representation stored in an internal body model for a shift in one’s body image to occur. However, empirical evidence contradicts the body model hypothesis: the sense of ownership may be spread over objects strikingly distinct in morphology and structure (e.g., robotic arms or empty space) and direct empirical support for the theory is currently lacking. As an alternative, based on the example of the rubber hand illusion (RHI), I propose a multisensory integration account of how the sense of ownership is induced. In this account, the perception of one’s own body is a regular type of multisensory perception and multisensory integration processes are not only necessary but also sufficient for embodiment. In this paper, I propose how RHI can be modeled with the use of Maximum Likelihood Estimation and natural correlation rules. I also discuss how Bayesian Coupling Priors and idiosyncrasies in sensory processing render prior distributions interindividually variable, accounting for large interindividual differences in susceptibility to RHI. Taken together, the proposed model accounts for exceptional malleability of human body perception, fortifies existing bottom-up multisensory integration theories with top-down models of relatedness of sensory cues, and generates testable and disambiguating predictions.

scholarly journals Bodily ownership of an independent supernumerary limb: An exploratory study

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kohei Umezawa ◽  
Yuta Suzuki ◽  
Gowrishankar Ganesh ◽  
Yoichi Miyawaki
Keyword(s):  
Human Brain ◽  
Sensory Feedback ◽  
Body Representation ◽  
The Body ◽  
Artificial Limbs ◽  
Cognitive Measures ◽  
Rubber Hand ◽  
Artificial Limb ◽  
Sense Of Ownership ◽  
Induced Changes

AbstractCan our brain perceive a sense of ownership towards an independent supernumerary limb; one that can be moved independently of any other limb and provides its own independent movement feedback? Following the rubberhand illusion experiment, a plethora of studies has shown that the human representation of ‘self’ is very plastic. But previous studies have almost exclusively investigated ownership towards ‘substitute’ artificial limbs, which are controlled by the movements of a real limb and/or limbs from which non-visual sensory feedback is provided on an existing limb. Here, to investigate whether the human brain can own an independent artificial limb, we first developed a novel independent robotic ‘sixth finger.’ We allowed participants to train using the finger and examined whether it induced changes in the body representation using behavioral as well as cognitive measures. Our results suggest that unlike a substituted artificial limb (like in the rubber hand experiment), it is more difficult for humans to perceive a sense of ownership towards an independent limb. However, ownership does seem possible, as we observed clear tendencies of changes in the body representation that correlated with the cognitive reports of the sense of ownership. Our results provide the first evidence to show that an independent supernumerary limb can be embodied by the human brain.

scholarly journals Embodied Precision: Intranasal Oxytocin Modulates Multisensory Integration

2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 592-606 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Crucianelli ◽  
Yannis Paloyelis ◽  
Lucia Ricciardi ◽  
Paul M. Jenkinson ◽  
Aikaterini Fotopoulou
Keyword(s):  
Multisensory Integration ◽  
Tactile Stimulation ◽  
Estimation Error ◽  
The Body ◽  
Multisensory Perception ◽  
Subjective Feeling ◽  
Body Ownership ◽  
Rubber Hand ◽  
Perceptual Inference ◽  
Multisensory Input

Multisensory integration processes are fundamental to our sense of self as embodied beings. Bodily illusions, such as the rubber hand illusion (RHI) and the size–weight illusion (SWI), allow us to investigate how the brain resolves conflicting multisensory evidence during perceptual inference in relation to different facets of body representation. In the RHI, synchronous tactile stimulation of a participant's hidden hand and a visible rubber hand creates illusory body ownership; in the SWI, the perceived size of the body can modulate the estimated weight of external objects. According to Bayesian models, such illusions arise as an attempt to explain the causes of multisensory perception and may reflect the attenuation of somatosensory precision, which is required to resolve perceptual hypotheses about conflicting multisensory input. Recent hypotheses propose that the precision of sensorimotor representations is determined by modulators of synaptic gain, like dopamine, acetylcholine, and oxytocin. However, these neuromodulatory hypotheses have not been tested in the context of embodied multisensory integration. The present, double-blind, placebo-controlled, crossover study ( n = 41 healthy volunteers) aimed to investigate the effect of intranasal oxytocin (IN-OT) on multisensory integration processes, tested by means of the RHI and the SWI. Results showed that IN-OT enhanced the subjective feeling of ownership in the RHI, only when synchronous tactile stimulation was involved. Furthermore, IN-OT increased an embodied version of the SWI (quantified as estimation error during a weight estimation task). These findings suggest that oxytocin might modulate processes of visuotactile multisensory integration by increasing the precision of top–down signals against bottom–up sensory input.

scholarly journals What do participants expect to experience in the rubber hand illusion?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arran T Reader
Keyword(s):  
Subjective Experience ◽  
The Body ◽  
Rubber Hand Illusion ◽  
Body Ownership ◽  
Rubber Hand ◽  
Demand Characteristics ◽  
Open Questions ◽  
Synchronous Condition ◽  
Subjective Reports

The sense of body ownership (the feeling that the body belongs to the self) is commonly believed to arise through multisensory integration. This is famously shown in the rubber hand illusion (RHI), where touches applied synchronously to a false hand and to the participant’s real hand (which is hidden from view) can induce a sensation of ownership over the fake one. Asynchronous touches weaken the illusion, and are typically used as a control condition. Subjective experience during the illusion is measured using a questionnaire, with some statements designed to capture illusory sensation and others designed as controls. However, recent work by Lush (2020, Collabra: Psychology) claimed that participants may have different levels of expectation for questionnaire items in the synchronous condition compared to the asynchronous condition, and for the illusion-related items compared to the control items. This may mean that the classic RHI questionnaire is poorly controlled for demand characteristics. As such, Lush (2020) suggested that subjective reports in the RHI may reflect compliance or even the generation of experience to meet expectations (‘phenomenological control’), rather than multisensory processes underlying the sense of body ownership. In the current work a conceptual replication of Lush (2020) was performed with an improved experimental design. Participants were presented with a video of the RHI procedure and reported the sensations they would expect to experience, both in open questions and by rating questionnaire items. In keeping with Lush (2020), participants had greater expectations for illusion statements in the synchronous condition compared to the asynchronous condition, and for illusion statements compared to control statements. However, there was also evidence that some expectations may be driven by exposure to the questionnaire items rather than exposure to the illusion procedure. The role of pre-illusion expectations and expectations driven by questionnaire exposure in the RHI require further examination.

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