scholarly journals Genomic imprinting, sibling solidarity and the logic of collective action

2000 ◽  
Vol 355 (1403) ◽  
pp. 1593-1597 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Haig ◽  
Jon F. Wilkins
Keyword(s):  
Resource Allocation ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Group Size ◽  
Genomic Imprinting ◽  
Specific Expression ◽  
Fitness Consequences ◽  
Effective Group ◽  
Maternal Resources ◽  
Number Of Individuals

Genomic imprinting has been proposed to evolve when a gene's expression has fitness consequences for individuals with different coefficients of matrilineal and patrilineal relatedness, especially in the context of competition between offspring for maternal resources. Previous models have focused on pre–emptive hierarchies, where conflict arises with respect to resource allocation between present and future offspring. Here we present a model in which imprinting arises from scramble competition within litters. The model predicts paternal–specific expression of a gene that increases an offspring's fractional share of resources but reduces the size of the resource pool, and maternal–specific expression of a gene with opposite effects. These predictions parallel the observation in economic models that individuals tend to underprovide public goods, and that the magnitude of this shortfall increases with the number of individuals in the group. Maternally derived alleles are more willing than their paternally derived counterparts to contribute to public goods because they have a smaller effective group size.

scholarly journals Modes of Collective Action in Village Economies: Evidence from Natural and Artefactual Field Experiments in a Developing Country

2013 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yasuyuki Sawada ◽  
Ryuji Kasahara ◽  
Keitaro Aoyagi ◽  
Masahiro Shoji ◽  
Mika Ueyama
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Size Effect ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Group Size ◽  
Field Experiments ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Individual Contribution ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
Group Size Effect

In a canonical model of collective action, individual contribution to collective action is negatively correlated with group size. Yet, empirical evidence on the group size effect has been mixed, partly due to heterogeneities in group activities. In this paper, we first construct a simple model of collective action with the free rider problem, altruism, public goods, and positive externalities of social networks. We then empirically test the theoretical implications of the group size effect on individual contribution to four different types of collective action, i.e., monetary or nonmonetary contribution to directly or indirectly productive activities. To achieve this, we collect and employ artefactual field experimental data such as public goods and dictator games conducted in southern Sri Lanka under a natural experimental situation where the majority of farmers were relocated to randomly selected communities based on the government lottery. This unique situation enables us to identify the causal effects of community size on collective action. We find that the levels of collective action can be explained by the social preferences of farmers. We also show evidence of free riding by self-interested households with no landholdings. The pattern of collective action, however, differs significantly by mode of activity—collective action that is directly rather than indirectly related to production is less likely to suffer from the free rider problem. Also, monetary contribution is less likely to cause free riding than nonmonetary labor contribution. Unlike labor contributions, monetary contributions involve collection of fees which can be easily tracked and verified, possibly leading to better enforcement of collective action.

scholarly journals The Evolution of Genomic Imprinting

Genetics ◽  
1996 ◽  
Vol 144 (3) ◽  
pp. 1283-1295 ◽  
Author(s):  
Atsushi Mochizuki ◽  
Yasuhiko Takeda ◽  
Yoh Iwasa
Keyword(s):  
Growth Factor ◽  
Genomic Imprinting ◽  
Parental Origin ◽  
Coding Region ◽  
Placental Development ◽  
Genetic Conflict ◽  
Multiple Partners ◽  
Zygotic Gene ◽  
Mammalian Genes ◽  
Maternal Resources

Abstract In some mammalian genes, the paternally and maternally derived alleles are expressed differently: this phenomenon is called genomic imprinting. Here we study the evolution of imprinting using multivariate quantitative genetic models to examine the feasibility of the genetic conflict hypothesis. This hypothesis explains the observed imprinting patterns as an evolutionary outcome of the conflict between the paternal and maternal alleles. We consider the expression of a zygotic gene, which codes for an embryonic growth factor affecting the amount of maternal resources obtained through the placenta. We assume that the gene produces the growth factor in two different amounts depending on its parental origin. We show that genomic imprinting evolves easily if females have some probability of multiple partners. This is in conflict with the observation that not all genes controlling placental development are imprinted and that imprinting in some genes is not conserved between mice and humans. We show however that deleterious mutations in the coding region of the gene create selection against imprinting.

Refounding the African state and local self-governance: the neglected foundation

2000 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 487-509 ◽  
Author(s):  
James S. Wunsch
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Local Governance ◽  
African State ◽  
Institutional Development ◽  
Political Relationships ◽  
State And Local ◽  
The 1960S ◽  
Rule Systems ◽  
Local Leaders

The political revolution of contemporary Africa has so far largely been limited to the centre and to re-establishing the same institutional forms and processes which failed Africa in the 1960s. These regimes are already showing signs of erosion. This problem can be understood through the theory of public goods. Key collective or ‘public’ goods problems impede the collective action necessary for institutional development. Top-down strategies cannot surmount these problems because they cannot integrate and unify the population or structure consensual and sustained collective action.As currently constituted, national levels of government in Africa will be poor partners with local communities in development, be it of democracy or of the economy. In many cases, national regimes only exist at all because minimal contributing sets or political monopolists controlled, were given, or mobilised the resources to establish constituting rule systems which they used to sustain their existing relative advantages during the break-up of imperial systems. As this advantage is usually at the expense of the majority which lives outside the capitals, resources and policies to improve these areas are slow in coming. The slow, bottom-up process by which a true public constitution is built, one which reflects and elaborates generally held values, is built on existing political relationships, and protects social diversity, has never been allowed to develop.Refounding the African state must resolve these problems if it is to succeed. Ethnically and religiously diverse peoples will rule themselves better under federal and consociational systems which give local leaders space to lead local institutional development, authority to play a role in national governance, a process to develop consensus on central policy and to check the centre when there is no consensus. This requires a foundation of viable, real, developed structures of local governance if it is to succeed.

scholarly journals Elinor Ostrom: proving the effectiveness of collective action in management (the Noble Prize in Economics in 2009 “for research in the field of economic organization”)

2017 ◽  
pp. 127-139
Author(s):  
Oksana Shymanska
Keyword(s):  
Economic Policy ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Natural Resources ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Scarce Resources ◽  
Empirically Supported ◽  
Use Of Resources ◽  
Human Organization ◽  
The Government

The article substantiates Elinor Ostrom’s contribution to the theory of collective management of property. The author outlines solutions to problems of the most optimal use of scarce natural resources and their economically relevant preservation in a long-term perspective. The research paper affirms the idea that it is not only the government who can solve the problem of efficient use of resources for public purposes. It is proved that collective decisions can be made in the management of resources, under which the latter are maintained in good conditions while being used for general public. The most accepted models (‘the tragedy of the commons’, ‘the prisoner’s dilemma’, ‘the logic of collective action’) are examined. The above- mentioned models are frequently used as tools to study cases of economic policy-making in allocating scarce resources for public purposes, and as a concept for analyzing problems of individuals who seek to achieve collective benefits. It is emphasized that there is a need for a balanced application of the above models as metaphors, which substitute solid foundations of the economic policy, since the limitations suggested for easing the analysis are accepted without reservation as permanent empirical requirements that remain as such until adjustments are made by the government. Special emphasis is placed on the importance of developing the theory of human organization based on realistic assessments of human possibilities and limitations that arise when a number of various situations related to using public goods are to be resolved. It is stressed that the empirically supported theories of human organization as an important component of study on economic policy are able to complement the solutions with estimates of the most likely effect of using many ways of organizing human activities. It is concluded that E. Ostrom’s experimental research in the field of natural resources management can be used to solve large-scale range of issues related to the production of public goods.

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