scholarly journals Active inference through whiskers

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco Mannella ◽  
Federico Maggiore ◽  
Manuel Baltieri ◽  
Giovanni Pezzulo

Rodents use whisking to probe actively their environment and to locate objects in space, hence providing a paradigmatic biological example of active sensing. Numerous studies show that the control of whisking has anticipatory aspects. For example, rodents target their whisker protraction to the distance at which they expect objects, rather than just reacting fast to contacts with unexpected objects. Here we characterize the anticipatory control of whisking in rodents as an active inference process. In this perspective, the rodent is endowed with a prior belief that it will touch something at the end of the whisker protraction, and it continuously modulates its whisking amplitude to minimize (proprioceptive and somatosensory) prediction errors arising from an unexpected whisker-object contact, or from a lack of an expected contact. We will use the model to qualitatively reproduce key empirical findings about the ways rodents modulate their whisker amplitude during exploration and the scanning of (expected or unexpected) objects. Furthermore, we will discuss how the components of active inference model can in principle map to the neurobiological circuits of rodent whisking.

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. e1006267 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna C. Sales ◽  
Karl J. Friston ◽  
Matthew W. Jones ◽  
Anthony E. Pickering ◽  
Rosalyn J. Moran

Entropy ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 198
Author(s):  
Stephen Fox

Active inference is a physics of life process theory of perception, action and learning that is applicable to natural and artificial agents. In this paper, active inference theory is related to different types of practice in social organization. Here, the term social organization is used to clarify that this paper does not encompass organization in biological systems. Rather, the paper addresses active inference in social organization that utilizes industrial engineering, quality management, and artificial intelligence alongside human intelligence. Social organization referred to in this paper can be in private companies, public institutions, other for-profit or not-for-profit organizations, and any combination of them. The relevance of active inference theory is explained in terms of variational free energy, prediction errors, generative models, and Markov blankets. Active inference theory is most relevant to the social organization of work that is highly repetitive. By contrast, there are more challenges involved in applying active inference theory for social organization of less repetitive endeavors such as one-of-a-kind projects. These challenges need to be addressed in order for active inference to provide a unifying framework for different types of social organization employing human and artificial intelligence.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yeon Soon Shin ◽  
Yael Niv

How do we evaluate a group of people after having positive experiences with some members and negative experiences with others? In particular, how do rare experiences with members who stand out (e.g., negative experiences when most are positive) influence the overall impression we have of the group? Here, we show that such rare events may be overweighted due to normative inference of the hidden, or latent, causes that are believed to generate the observed events. We propose a Bayesian latent-cause inference model that learns environmental statistics by combining highly similar events together and separating rare or highly variable observations. The model predicts that group evaluations that rely on averaging inferred latent causes will overweight variable events. We empirically tested these model-derived predictions in four decision-making experiments, where subjects observed a sequence of social (Exp 1 to 3) or non-social (Exp 4) behaviors and were subsequently asked to estimate the average of observed values. As predicted by our latent-cause model, average estimation was biased toward rare and highly variable events when observing social behaviors. We then showed that tracking of a single summary value, instead of parsing events into distinct latent causes, eliminates the bias. These results suggest that biases in evaluations of social groups, such as negativity bias, may arise from the causal inference process of the group.


2019 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Axel Constant ◽  
Maxwell J. D. Ramstead ◽  
Samuel P. L. Veissière ◽  
Karl Friston

Author(s):  
Giovanni Pezzulo ◽  
Laura Barca ◽  
Karl J. Friston

AbstractAll organisms must integrate cognition, emotion, and motivation to guide action toward valuable (goal) states, as described by active inference. Within this framework, cognition, emotion, and motivation interact through the (Bayesian) fusion of exteroceptive, proprioceptive, and interoceptive signals, the precision-weighting of prediction errors, and the “affective tuning” of neuronal representations. Crucially, misregulation of these processes may have profound psychopathological consequences.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna C Sales ◽  
Karl J. Friston ◽  
Matthew W. Jones ◽  
Anthony E. Pickering ◽  
Rosalyn J. Moran

AbstractThe locus coeruleus (LC) in the pons is the major source of noradrenaline (NA) in the brain. Two modes of LC firing have been associated with distinct cognitive states: changes in tonic rates of firing are correlated with global levels of arousal and behavioural flexibility, whilst phasic LC responses are evoked by salient stimuli. Here, we unify these two modes of firing by modelling the response of the LC as a correlate of a prediction error when inferring states for action planning under Active Inference (AI).We simulate a classic Go/No-go reward learning task and a three-arm foraging task and show that, if LC activity is considered to reflect the magnitude of high level ‘state-action’ prediction errors, then both tonic and phasic modes of firing are emergent features of belief updating. We also demonstrate that when contingencies change, AI agents can update their internal models more quickly by feeding back this state-action prediction error – reflected in LC firing and noradrenaline release – to optimise learning rate, enabling large adjustments over short timescales. We propose that such prediction errors are mediated by cortico-LC connections, whilst ascending input from LC to cortex modulates belief updating in anterior cingulate cortex (ACC).In short, we characterise the LC/ NA system within a general theory of brain function. In doing so, we show that contrasting, behaviour-dependent firing patterns are an emergent property of the LC’s crucial role in translating prediction errors into an optimal mediation between plasticity and stability.Author SummaryThe brain uses sensory information to build internal models and make predictions about the world. When errors of prediction occur, models must be updated to ensure desired outcomes are still achieved. Neuromodulator chemicals provide a possible pathway for triggering such changes in brain state. One such neuromodulator, noradrenaline, originates predominantly from a cluster of neurons in the brainstem – the locus coeruleus (LC) – and plays a key role in behaviour, for instance, in determining the balance between exploiting or exploring the environment.Here we use Active Inference (AI), a mathematical model of perception and action, to formally describe LC function. We propose that LC activity is triggered by errors in prediction and that the subsequent release of noradrenaline alters the rate of learning about the environment. Biologically, this describes an LC-cortex feedback loop promoting behavioural flexibility in times of uncertainty. We model LC output as a simulated animal performs two tasks known to elicit archetypal responses. We find that experimentally observed ‘phasic’ and ‘tonic’ patterns of LC activity emerge naturally, and that modulation of learning rates improves task performance. This provides a simple, unified computational account of noradrenergic computational function within a general model of behaviour.


Entropy ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 257 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manuel Baltieri ◽  
Christopher Buckley

In the past few decades, probabilistic interpretations of brain functions have become widespread in cognitive science and neuroscience. In particular, the free energy principle and active inference are increasingly popular theories of cognitive functions that claim to offer a unified understanding of life and cognition within a general mathematical framework derived from information and control theory, and statistical mechanics. However, we argue that if the active inference proposal is to be taken as a general process theory for biological systems, it is necessary to understand how it relates to existing control theoretical approaches routinely used to study and explain biological systems. For example, recently, PID (Proportional-Integral-Derivative) control has been shown to be implemented in simple molecular systems and is becoming a popular mechanistic explanation of behaviours such as chemotaxis in bacteria and amoebae, and robust adaptation in biochemical networks. In this work, we will show how PID controllers can fit a more general theory of life and cognition under the principle of (variational) free energy minimisation when using approximate linear generative models of the world. This more general interpretation also provides a new perspective on traditional problems of PID controllers such as parameter tuning as well as the need to balance performances and robustness conditions of a controller. Specifically, we then show how these problems can be understood in terms of the optimisation of the precisions (inverse variances) modulating different prediction errors in the free energy functional.


2018 ◽  
Vol 30 (9) ◽  
pp. 2530-2567 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Schwöbel ◽  
Stefan Kiebel ◽  
Dimitrije Marković

When modeling goal-directed behavior in the presence of various sources of uncertainty, planning can be described as an inference process. A solution to the problem of planning as inference was previously proposed in the active inference framework in the form of an approximate inference scheme based on variational free energy. However, this approximate scheme was based on the mean-field approximation, which assumes statistical independence of hidden variables and is known to show overconfidence and may converge to local minima of the free energy. To better capture the spatiotemporal properties of an environment, we reformulated the approximate inference process using the so-called Bethe approximation. Importantly, the Bethe approximation allows for representation of pairwise statistical dependencies. Under these assumptions, the minimizer of the variational free energy corresponds to the belief propagation algorithm, commonly used in machine learning. To illustrate the differences between the mean-field approximation and the Bethe approximation, we have simulated agent behavior in a simple goal-reaching task with different types of uncertainties. Overall, the Bethe agent achieves higher success rates in reaching goal states. We relate the better performance of the Bethe agent to more accurate predictions about the consequences of its own actions. Consequently, active inference based on the Bethe approximation extends the application range of active inference to more complex behavioral tasks.


Author(s):  
Philip Gerrans ◽  
Ryan J Murray

Abstract This article provides an interoceptive active inference (IAI) account of social anxiety disorder (SAD). Through a neurocognitive framework, we argue that the cognitive and behavioural profile of SAD is best conceived of as a form of maladaptive IAI produced by a negatively biased self-model that cannot reconcile inconsistent tendencies to approach and avoid social interaction. Anticipated future social interactions produce interoceptive prediction error (bodily states of arousal). These interoceptive states are transcribed and experienced as states of distress due to the influence of inconsistent and unstable self-models across a hierarchy of interrelated systems involved in emotional, interoceptive and affective processing. We highlight the role of the insula cortex, in concert with the striatum, amygdala and dorsal anterior cingulate in the generation and reduction of interoceptive prediction errors as well as the resolution of social approach-avoidance conflict. The novelty of our account is a shift in explanatory priority from the representation of the social world in SAD to the representation of the SAD self. In particular, we show how a high-level conceptual self-model of social vulnerability and inadequacy fails to minimize prediction errors produced by a basic drive for social affiliation combined with strong avoidant tendencies. The result is a cascade of interoceptive prediction errors whose attempted minimization through action (i.e. active inference) yields the symptom profile of SAD. We conclude this article by proposing testable hypotheses to further investigate the neurocognitive traits of the SAD self with respect to IAI.


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