Corporate governance: institutional arrangement or market choice?

2014 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 717-744 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mian Du ◽  
Siyan Chen ◽  
Huan Shao

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between corporate governance mechanism and firm value of the listed companies in China. Does the better corporate governance lead to the higher firm value? Or does the higher firm value make it easy to choose a better governance mechanism? Or they affect each other? In other words, this paper tries to answer whether the corporate governance mechanism is only decided by institutional arrangement, or by market choice according to firm value or performance or by the interaction of institutional arrangement and market choice? It tries to answer whether institutional arrangement maximizes the firm value, or an invisible hand pushes them to arrive at its maximum. Design/methodology/approach – This paper establishes an analytic framework of simultaneous equations based on causality, which includes five endogenous variables: ownership of larger shareholders, managerial ownership, director compensation, debt financing and firm value. It adopts 1,644 data samples from 274 Chinese listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange during 2007- 2012 after the non-tradable shares reform. Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of single equation, 2SLS and 3SLS estimation of simultaneous equations are respectively done to show the differences of these three kinds of estimations. Findings – The empirical results show that differences exist among OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS estimation. Finally, 3SLS estimation should be adopted because the OLS and 2SLS estimation are biased. There are endogenous relationships between corporate governance mechanism and firm value. Through the 3SLS estimation, it is found that first, ownership concentration and firm value affect each other positively. Second, managerial ownership and firm value affect each other positively; third, director compensation and firm value affect each other negatively, while director compensation and firm performance affect each other positively. Finally, debt financing level and firm value are negatively related to each other. Practical implications – It means that ownership of large shareholders, managerial ownership, director compensation and debt financing in the Chinese listed companies are found to have a root in the interaction between institutional arrangement and market choice. It is also found that adverse selection occurs when creditors loan to the listed companies. Managerial compensation is positively related to accounting profit, but it is negatively related to firm value because managers increase profit due by earning management. This could only increase the accounting profits and obtain huge cash compensation, but not increase firm value and even harm the interests of shareholders. Originality/value – This paper not only shows the difference between OLS and 2SLS estimation but also compares the estimation of 2SLS and 3SLS in terms of empirical methods. It gives answers to the following questions: whether the relationship is one-way causality or bilateral causality between ownership concentration, managerial ownership, director compensation and firm value; whether governance mechanism affects firm value by institutional arrangement, or market drives both of them to strike a balance by an invisible hand. In other words, does it make them arrive at equilibrium through the competitive selection process when shareholders, directors, managers and creditors attempt to maximize themselves of their interests?

2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 83-97
Author(s):  
Nia Yuniarsih

The objective of this study is to examine the influence of corporate governance mechanism, namely managerial ownership, institutional ownership, to firm value. This study takes sample from 32 companies in the manufacturing sector at the  Indonesia Stock Exchange, which were published in financial report from 2012-2013. The method of analysis of this research used multi regression and single regression. The results of this study show that (1) managerial ownership had positive significant influence to firm value, (2) institutional ownership had not significant influence to firm value, (3) simultaneously of managerial ownership, institutional ownership, had significant influence to firm value.


2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 83
Author(s):  
Rina Hartanti ◽  
Fahri Yulandani ◽  
M Rizky Riandi

The purpose of this study is to explain the effect of Profitability, Capital Structure, and the application of Good Corporate Governance to Firm Value. The population of the study includes companies registered in the LQ-45 which are listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for the period 2015-2017. The technique of determining the sample used is purposive sampling. This study uses a multiple linear regression approach. Based on the results of testing, this study proves that profitability, capital structure, and the application of the GCG mechanism together affect firm value. This study also proves that partially profitability proxied by ROA and Managerial Ownership has a positive effect on Firm Value. The results showed that capital, which is proxied by DER and GCG, which is proxied by Institutional Ownership, does not have a positive effect on Corporate Value


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jyoti Dixit ◽  
Poonam Singh ◽  
Arunima Haldar

Purpose Takeovers play a critical role as an external corporate governance mechanism to ensure investor protection. There is a long-standing debate on whether the convergence of corporate governance to global standards can enable emerging economies to ensure investor protection. This paper aims to analyse the evolution of the takeover code, namely, Securities Exchange Board of India’s Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers (2011) in India from the lens of investor protection. It then compares the takeover provisions in India, the USA, the UK, Singapore and Australia to examine the extent of convergence and its implications for investor protection. Design/methodology/approach Using a cross-national comparative analysis of takeover mechanisms in common law countries, the study analyses the extent and relevance of convergence in form. The focus of the comparison is on regulations governing offer size, offer price, creeping acquisition and initial trigger limit for the mandatory open offer. Findings The findings suggest that certain provisions such as the initial trigger threshold for the mandatory offer and the offer prices of the Indian takeover code are converging with the standards in common law countries. However, the offer price determination based on market prices may not reflect true market value in an inefficient market like India. Other provisions such as creeping acquisition and offer size are not only diverging from the international standards but are also inconsistent with the key objective of investor protections of the Indian regulator. Research limitations/implications Indian takeover regulation needs to converge to higher global standards to ensure adherence to improved investor protection. This needs to be done for the initial trigger limit for mandatory bid and offer prices, after accounting for the differences in institutional structure. The Indian regulators need to revisit provisions on the initial trigger, creeping acquisition to converge to the broader principle of investor protection. Originality/value This technical paper provides a comprehensive depiction of takeover mechanisms in an emerging economy context as a means of investor protection. Further using a comparative lens, it analyses the relevance of convergence of takeover laws. Thus, advances the theoretical knowledge of limited extant work on external corporate governance mechanism in an emerging economy context.


2020 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 887-911
Author(s):  
Riccardo Stacchezzini ◽  
Francesca Rossignoli ◽  
Silvano Corbella

PurposeThis article investigates the implementation of a compliance programme (CP) in terms of how practitioners conceive of and execute the responsibilities arising from this corporate governance mechanism.Design/methodology/approachThis study involves a practice lens approach forms the case study analysis and interpretation, involving both interviews and documentary materials collected from an Italian company with prolonged compliance experience. Schatzki's (2002, 2010) practice organisation framework guides the interpretation of CP as a practice organised by rules, practical and general understandings and teleoaffective structures.FindingsCP practice evolves over time. A practical understanding of daily actions required to accomplish the CP and a general understanding of the responsibilities connected with the CP, such as the attitudes with which the CP is performed, are mutually constitutive and jointly favour this evolution. Dedicated artefacts – such as IT platforms, training seminars and compliance performance indicators – help spread both of these types of understanding. These artefacts also align practitioners' general understanding with the CP's teleoaffective structures imposed, including the CP's assigned objectives and the desired reactions to them.Research limitations/implicationsThe findings have theoretical and practical implications by revealing the relevance of practitioners' understanding of corporate governance mechanisms in their implementation processes.Originality/valueThis study reveals the potential benefits of practice lens approaches in corporate governance studies. It responds to the call for qualitative studies that demonstrate corporate governance as implemented in daily activities.


2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 362-384 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tanveer Ahsan ◽  
Man Wang ◽  
Muhammad Azeem Qureshi

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to find out firm, industry, and country level determinants of capital structure of Pakistani listed non-financial firms. Design/methodology/approach The authors use a fixed effects panel data model over a 39 years (1972-2010) unbalanced panel data of Pakistani non-financial listed firms to determine the factors that influence capital structure of these firms. Findings The authors find that Pakistani firms prefer retained earnings to finance their business projects, and debt is easily available for experienced firms. Moreover, socio-economic collusive networks, poor corporate governance mechanism along with weak legal system provide these firms an opportunity to pass on their risk to the creditors (banks). Research limitations/implications The data set does not contain factors characterizing inter-industry heterogeneity, therefore, the authors use mean industry leverage and mean industry profitability to explore if any relationship exists between leverage of firms, and their respective industry leverage/profitability. Practical implications Pakistani non-financial firms are highly leveraged increasing their probability to face financial distress in erratic economic conditions. As such, the policy makers need to develop capital markets of Pakistan to enable a resilient corporate capital structure. Further, erratic economic conditions of Pakistan create uncertain business environment yielding short-term opportunities and to finance them Pakistani firms use short-term debt as a main financing source. The policy makers need to improve corporate governance mechanism and strengthen legal system that will go a long way to develop Pakistani capital market on sound and sustainable footing. Originality/value This is the first study that uses an extended number of variables and discovers financial behavior of firms in a bank-based economy having limited financing options, and facing erratic economic conditions.


Author(s):  
Filia Puspitasari ◽  
Endang Ernawati

Nowdays, most researches in corporate governance field are conducted by researchers based on rising of many firms to become public corporation. According to this situation, they have to separate their functions on ownership and control of the firm. As result, it will arise agency conflict between owners and managers. The corporation enable solve the problem by apply the corporate governance mechanism optimally. This research is a replication research is conducted by Sanda et al (2005). It’s explained the specific study about the impact of corporate governance mechanism include managerial ownership, board size, outside directors, ownership concentration, and debt toward financial performance that measured by ROA, ROE, PER, and TOBINS’Q. The samples of this research are all corporations which listed at Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI) by all sectors that delivered financial statement on time by regulation. The period of time in this research determined on 2005-2007. The model is extended by quadratic of managerial ownership, quadratic of board size, quadratic of ownership concentration, CEO foreign and firm size as control variables, and sectoral dummy. The result of this research explained that corporate governance mechanism simultaneously influence to ROA and ROE significantly. On partially, ROA is influenced by CEO foreign, debt, and firm size significantly. And ROE is inluenced by CEO foreign, firm size, and sector of basic industry significantly.


2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Muhammad Rivandi ◽  
Maria Magdalena Gea

This study aims to examine the effect of corporate governance mechanism on the timeliness of financial reporting. The sample of this study are four central banking companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) selected based on purposive sampling method. The method of data analysis used in this study is multiple regression models. Based on the hypotheses testing result, that the managerial ownership and audit committee have a positive and significant effect on the timeliness of financial reporting, while independent commissioner has no effect on the timeliness of financial reporting


Author(s):  
Abdulrahman Bala Sani ◽  
Ruth Oluwayemisi Owoade

This study examined the impact of corporate governance mechanism in mitigating creative accounting practice of listed conglomerate companies in Nigeria. The study used Secondary data obtained from the company’s annual reports and accounts for the period 2013 to 2020. The population of the study includes six conglomerate companies listed on the Nigeria Stock Exchange and the entire population was used for the study. The dependent variable creative accounting was measured using discretionary accruals as estimated by modified Jones model. The independent variable corporate governance mechanism was proxied by audit committee, board size, board independence, managerial ownership. Multiple regression technique was employed for the panel data analysis using Stata version 13 statistical tools. Findings of the study revealed that audit committee has negative significant impact on creative accounting practice. Managerial ownership has significant positive impact on creative accounting practice. Board size and board independence has no significant impact on creative accounting practice of listed conglomerate companies in Nigeria. The study concludes that good corporate governance have impact on creative accounting practice. Based on these findings, the study recommends that companies are to effectively apply good corporate governance mechanism. They should have an independent audit committee, so as to minimize creative accounting practice.


— Corporate social obligation has become an vital part of commercial company exercise during the last decade or so. In fact, many businesses dedicate a phase of their annual reports and company internet web sites to CSR activities, illustrating the importance they attach to such sports. On the opposite hand, Good company governance exercise has a number of observable outcomes on economic results of the company. Corporate governance recommendations are strongly associated with income quality or the quantity to which the firm’s disclosed economic basic performance reflects its right performance. This have a look at investigates in the main the mediating effect of Corporate Social Responsibility and Dividend Policy on the impact of corporate governance mechanism on firm value amongst publicly listed organizations inside the Philippines. It examined forty seven publicly indexed businesses inside the Philippines for a four-yr period from 2013 to 2016. A structural equation modeling (SEM) approach changed into used for the evaluation. Results show that Corporate Social Responsibility does not act as a mediating variable with regards to company governance mechanisms to firm rate. It manner that CSR does now not act as a variable so one can give a boost to corporation governance mechanisms that during developing the charge of the commercial enterprise corporation. Also, dividend coverage does no longer act as mediating variable at the effect of enterprise governance mechanisms on company value. Finally, the end result confirmed that there is a terrible but large effect of dividend price on business enterprise value.


2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 67
Author(s):  
Habiba Habiba

Accounting conservatism is a condition where a company acknowledges the debts and costs more quickly, but on the other hand, the company acknowledges the income and assets more slowly. Some factors that can affect the accounting conservatism are stan-dards changes, corporate governance, and so forth. The purpose of this study is to analyze the effect occurring on the variable of accounting conservatism when using comprehensive income and income for the current year in manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange in 2012 and 2013. The variables studied are institutional ownership, managerial ownership, the existence of audit committee, the number of audit committee meetings, and leverage. The statistical method used in this study is multiple regression analysis. The results of this study indicate that institu-tional ownership, managerial ownership, and the number of audit committee meetings do not have significant effect on accounting conservatism when using comprehensive income and income for the current year, but the variables of the existence of audit committee and leverage have significant effect on accounting conservatism when using comprehensive income and income for current the year.


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