Cyberoperations and international humanitarian law

2016 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 38-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kosmas Pipyros ◽  
Lilian Mitrou ◽  
Dimitris Gritzalis ◽  
Theodoros Apostolopoulos
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Evolutionary Process ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
Cyber Attacks ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Cyber Warfare ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Cyber Attack ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Fifth Dimension

Purpose – The increasing number of cyber attacks has transformed the “cyberspace” into a “battlefield”, bringing out “cyber warfare” as the “fifth dimension of war” and emphasizing the States’ need to effectively protect themselves against these attacks. The existing legal framework seem inadequate to deal effectively with cyber operations and, from a strictly legal standpoint, it indicates that addressing cyber attacks does not fall within the jurisdiction of just one legal branch. This is mainly because of the fact that the concept of cyber warfare itself is open to many different interpretations, ranging from cyber operations performed by the States within the context of armed conflict, under International Humanitarian Law, to illicit activities of all kinds performed by non-State actors including cybercriminals and terrorist groups. The paper initially presents major cyber-attack incidents and their impact on the States. On this basis, it examines the existing legal framework at the European and international levels. Furthermore, it approaches “cyber warfare” from the perspective of international law and focuses on two major issues relating to cyber operations, i.e. “jurisdiction” and “attribution”. The multi-layered process of attribution in combination with a variety of jurisdictional bases in international law makes the successful tackling of cyber attacks difficult. The paper aims to identify technical, legal and, last but not least, political difficulties and emphasize the complexity in applying international law rules in cyber operations. Design/methodology/approach – The paper focuses on the globalization of the “cyber warfare phenomenon” by observing its evolutionary process from the early stages of its appearance until today. It examines the scope, duration and intensity of major cyber-attacks throughout the years in relation to the reactions of the States that were the victims. Having this as the base of discussion, it expands further by exemplifying “cyber warfare” from the perspective of the existing European and International legal framework. The main aim of this part is to identify and analyze major obstacles that arise, for instance in terms of “jurisdiction” and “attribution” in applying international law rules to “cyber warfare”. Findings – The absence of a widely accepted legal framework to regulate jurisdictional issues of cyber warfare and the technical difficulties in identifying, with absolute certainty, the perpetrators of an attack, make the successful tackling of cyber attacks difficult. Originality/value – The paper fulfills the need to identify difficulties in applying international law rules in cyber warfare and constitutes the basis for the creation of a method that will attempt to categorize and rank cyber operations in terms of their intensity and seriousness.

scholarly journals The Implications of Transnational Cyber Threats in International Humanitarian Law: Analysing the Distinction Between Cybercrime, Cyber Attack, and Cyber Warfare in the 21st Century

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-34 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hemen Philip Faga
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
21St Century ◽  
Information Age ◽  
Cyber Attacks ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
State Responsibility ◽  
Cyber Warfare ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Cyber Attack ◽  
Cyber Threats

AbstractThis paper is an attempt to draw distinctive lines between the concepts of cybercrime, cyber-attack, and cyber warfare in the current information age, in which it has become difficult to separate the activities of transnational criminals from acts of belligerents using cyberspace. The paper considers the implications of transnational cyber threats in international humanitarian law (IHL) with a particular focus on cyber-attacks by non-state actors, the principles of state responsibility, and the implications of targeting non-state perpetrators under IHL. It concludes that current international law constructs are inadequate to address the implications of transnational cyber threats; the author recommends consequential amendments to the laws of war in order to address the challenges posed by transnational cyber threats.

scholarly journals THE BEGINNING OF THE INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICATION TO CYBER ATTACK: THE STATUS OF RULE 30 TALLINN MANUAL 1.0

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 98-113
Author(s):  
Iradhati Zahra ◽  
Diajeng Wulan Christianti
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Ideal Condition ◽  
Cyber Warfare ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Cyber Attack ◽  
Moment Theory ◽  
Customary International Law

ABSTRACTTechnological development has given rise to new means and methods of warfare such as cyber-attack and can potentially have devastating humanitarian consequences. In times of armed conflict, International Humanitarian Law (IHL) limits certain use of weapons, however, it is questionable whether an armed conflict exists in the situation where cyber-attack is employed alone. In 2007, Estonia suffered severe damages due to cyber-attacks that were equal to the damages caused by kinetic weapons. Yet, there is a debate whether IHL applies in the Estonia case due to the shortage of a kinetic weapon. The Estonia case has generated NATO and other states to draft a cyber-warfare manual (Tallinn Manual 1.0) that, in its Rule 30, affirms the IHL applicability in the case of only cyber-attack. Due to the importance of this Rule, this article argues that Rule 30 shall be considered as a legally binding provision in the form of customary international law. This Rule has satisfied widely practiced and opinio juris elements although it is not as ideal as other customary norms. Taking into consideration the rapid development of technology, it is not necessary for Rule 30 to meet the ideal condition of customary law since, according to Grotian Moment Theory, the formation of a new customary international law can be accelerated in times of fundamental change as can be seen in the practice of customary air and space law. Keywords: Customary International Law, Cyber-Attack, Grotian Moment Theory, IHL, Tallinn Manual 1.0 ABSTRAKPerkembangan teknologi telah melahirkan cara dan metode berperang yang baru seperti serangan siber dan dapat berpotensi menimbulkan kehancuran umat manusia. Hukum Humaniter Internasional (HHI) membatasi penggunaan senjata tertentu saat perang, sayangnya penerapan hukum ini masih dipertanyakan dalam kasus yang hanya melibatkan serangan siber. Tahun 2007 Estonia menderita kerugian akibat dari serangan siber yang tingkat keparahannya dapat disamakan dengan serangan kinetis. Namun, fakta bahwa serangan tersebut tidak melibatkan senjata kinetis melahirkan perdebatan perihal penerapan HHI. Kasus Estonia telah mendorong NATO dan negara-negara lainya untuk merumuskan Manual tentang Perang Siber (Tallinn Manual 1.0) yang mengkonfirmasi penerapan HHI untuk kasus yang hanya melibatkan serangan siber. Pentingnya pengaturan dalam Pasal 30, artikel ini berpendapat bahwa pasal tersebut harus memiliki kekuatan hukum yang mengikat dalam bentuk aturan hukum kebiasaan internasional. Pasal 30 telah memenuhi unsur hukum kebiasaan internasional yakni praktek negara yang luas serta opinio juris. Sekalipun tidak dipenuhi secara sempurna seperti layaknya aturan hukum kebiasaan internasional yang lain. Dengan mempertimbangkan perkembangan teknologi yang pesat, Pasal 30 tidak perlu secara ideal memenuhi unsur norma hukum kebiasaan internasional, karena menurut Grotian Moment Theory pembentukan norma hukum kebiasaan internasional baru dapat dipercepat karena adanya perubahan yang fundamental. Hal ini dapat terlihat dari praktek hukum kebiasaan ruang angkasa. Kata Kunci: Hukum Kebiasaan Internasional, Hukum Humaniter Internasional, Serangan Siber, Tallinn Manual 1.0, Teori Grotian Moment

scholarly journals ‘Not dead but sleeping’: Expanding international law to better regulate the diverse effects of ceasefire agreements

2020 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 731-743
Author(s):  
Marika Sosnowski
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Development Studies ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Economic Networks ◽  
Citizenship Rights ◽  
Geneva Conventions ◽  
Governance Institutions ◽  
New Research

AbstractCeasefire agreements are legally governed by international humanitarian law because they have generally been considered in relation to how they affect levels of violence. However, new research in the fields of anthropology, security, and development studies suggests that ceasefires can have many more ramifications. These range from their ability to influence governance institutions, property and citizenship rights, economic networks, and security mechanisms. Consequently, this article suggests that a broader legal framework is needed through which to consider ceasefires and their consequences. While canvassing the option of ceasefires being types of contractual documents or as special agreements under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, the article concludes that the best way to regulate ceasefire agreements is through an expanded version of lex pacificatoria. Rather than being governed by hard international law, such a move would allow for the implementation of more flexible programmatic standards to influence the myriad ways ceasefires are negotiated, the conduct of belligerents, and their diverse effects on the ground during wartime.

The Counterterrorism War Paradigm versus International Humanitarian Law: The Legal Contradictions and Global Consequences of the US “War on Terror”

2019 ◽  
Vol 44 (04) ◽  
pp. 922-956
Author(s):  
Lisa Hajjar
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
War On Terror ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
Customary Law ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Strategic Objectives ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Government

Since 2001, we have witnessed the development of a counterterrorism war paradigm built to advance claims about the post-9/11 scope and discretion of US executive power and to articulate specific interpretations of national security interests and strategic objectives in the “war on terror.” What makes this a paradigm rather than merely a conglomeration of evolving policies is the cohesiveness and mutual reinforcement of its underlying rationales about the rights of the US government to prosecute a territorially unbounded war against an evolving cast of enemies. Drawing on Bourdieu’s concept of a juridical field, the article focuses on how officials who constructed a legal framework for this paradigm, rather than disregarding international law wholesale, have engaged in interpretations and crafted rationales to evade some international humanitarian law (IHL) rules and norms while rejecting the underlying logic or applicability of others. This article traces the counterterrorism war paradigm’s development and explains how it now competes with and threatens to supersede the customary law principles enshrined in IHL.

Compromise or Commitment: Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Obligations for UN Peace Forces

1998 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 229-245
Author(s):  
Marten Zwanenburg
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
International Law ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
The One

Allegations of human rights and humanitarian law violations by UN forces have highlighted the need for more clarity in this area. This requires a focus on human rights and humanitarian norms applicable to UN forces, and the question of responsibility for violations of those norms. To a large extent, these questions concern the relations between the UN, national contingents, and troop contributing states. What are their respective rights and obligations? In this paper it is submitted that the answer given to this question under international law differs from the one given in the specific legal framework and practice of UN forces.

The Notion of ‘Objects’ during Cyber Operations: A Riposte in Defence of Interpretive and Applicative Precision

2015 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael N Schmitt
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Cyber Warfare ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
International Group ◽  
The Law

This article responds to the two articles published in this journal that criticise the approach taken by the International Group of Experts (IGE) who prepared the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare. Their authors took issue with the approach of the majority of the IGE over the question of whether data qualifies as an ‘object’ under international humanitarian law such that, for instance, cyber operations that target civilian data violate the prohibition on attacking civilian objects. The majority of the experts took the position that the law had not advanced that far and that pre-existing law could not be definitively interpreted to encompass data within the meaning of ‘objects’. In this article, the Director of the Tallinn Manual Project responds to the authors' criticism of the majority view by explaining and clarifying its reasoning.

Protecting cultural property in Syria: New opportunities for States to enhance compliance with international law?

2017 ◽  
Vol 99 (906) ◽  
pp. 1037-1074 ◽  
Author(s):  
Polina Levina Mahnad
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
International Community ◽  
Cultural Property ◽  
Third Party ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Loss Of Life ◽  
Near Future ◽  
Political Settlement

AbstractThe war in Syria has lasted for six years and has led to massive destruction and loss of life. Stymieing international peace efforts from the outset, there is increasing doubt that the conflict will reach a resolution or political settlement in the near future. This frustration has triggered an appetite among States, civil society and the international community for finite and concrete measures that can contribute to greater protection and compliance with international law. A recent constellation of events around the protection of cultural property appears to herald a shift in the response of the international community toward prescribing practical and actionable measures for third-party States. Drawing on the responsibility of third States “to respect and ensure respect for” international humanitarian law, this article examines the legal framework protecting cultural property and recent innovative protection responses that contribute to ensuring compliance with international law in Syria, short of military assistance and intervention.

Rewired warfare: rethinking the law of cyber attack

2014 ◽  
Vol 96 (893) ◽  
pp. 189-206 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael N. Schmitt
Keyword(s):  
Cyber Attacks ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Cyber Attack ◽  
Civilian Population ◽  
The Law

AbstractThe most significant debate regarding the applicability of international humanitarian law to cyber operations involves interpretation of the rules governing cyber “attacks”, as that term is understood in the law. For over a decade, the debate has been a binary one between advocates of the “permissive approach” developed by the author and a “restrictive approach” championed by those who saw the permissive approach as insufficiently protective of the civilian population and other protected persons and objects. In this article, the author analyses that debate, and explains a third approach developed during the Tallinn Manual project. He concludes by suggesting that the Tallinn Manual approach best approximates the contemporary law given the increasing value which societies are attributing to cyber activities.

Part VII Inter-linkages with Other Regimes, Ch.50 Armed Conflict and the Environment

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruch Carl ◽  
Payne Cymie R ◽  
Sjöstedt Britta
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Environmental Law ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
International Criminal Law ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
International Human Rights Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
International Environmental Law ◽  
Starting Point

This chapter looks at how the concern for the environment in relation to armed conflict can be addressed from several bodies of international law. These diverse bodies of law emerged largely isolated from one another: international humanitarian law, international environmental law, international criminal law, international human rights law, the United Nations (UN) Charter, and so on. Hence, a fragmented and unclear legal framework protects the environment in times of armed conflict. The chapter focuses on the interlinkages between international environmental law and other bodies of international law to protect the environment in relation to armed conflict. The thesis is that international environmental law norms are increasingly shaping protection of the environment in relation to armed conflict, in contrast to the relative rigidity of international humanitarian law norms, which is traditionally the starting point for analysing wartime environmental protection. The chapter begins with a brief consideration of international law applicable during all temporal phases of armed conflict: before conflict (including conflict prevention); during conflict; and after conflict. It then explores the issues and relevant law particular to specific phases.

International humanitarian law and cyber operations during armed conflicts

2020 ◽  
Vol 102 (913) ◽  
pp. 481-492
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
List Type ◽  
Cyber Warfare ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Cyber Attack ◽  
Human Cost

Executive summary•Cyber operations have become a reality in contemporary armed conflict. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is concerned by the potential human cost arising from the increasing use of cyber operations during armed conflicts.•In the ICRC's view, international humanitarian law (IHL) limits cyber operations during armed conflicts just as it limits the use of any other weapon, means or method of warfare in an armed conflict, whether new or old.•Affirming the applicability of IHL does not legitimize cyber warfare, just as it does not legitimize any other form of warfare. Any use of force by States – cyber or kinetic – remains governed by the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant rules of customary international law, in particular the prohibition against the use of force. International disputes must be settled by peaceful means, in cyberspace as in all other domains.•It is now critical for the international community to affirm the applicability of international humanitarian law to the use of cyber operations during armed conflicts. The ICRC also calls for discussions among governmental and other experts on how existing IHL rules apply and whether the existing law is adequate and sufficient. In this respect, the ICRC welcomes the intergovernmental discussions currently taking place in the framework of two United Nations General Assembly mandated processes.•Events of recent years have shown that cyber operations, whether during or outside armed conflict, can disrupt the operation of critical civilian infrastructure and hamper the delivery of essential services to the population. In the context of armed conflicts, civilian infrastructure is protected against cyber attacks by existing IHL principles and rules, in particular the principles of distinction, proportionality and precautions in attack. IHL also affords special protection to hospitals and objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, among others.•During armed conflicts, the employment of cyber tools that spread and cause damage indiscriminately is prohibited. From a technological perspective, some cyber tools can be designed and used to target and harm only specific objects and to not spread or cause harm indiscriminately. However, the interconnectivity that characterizes cyberspace means that whatever has an interface with the Internet can be targeted from anywhere in the world and that a cyber attack on a specific system may have repercussions on various other systems. As a result, there is a real risk that cyber tools are not designed or used – either deliberately or by mistake – in compliance with IHL.•States’ interpretation of existing IHL rules will determine the extent to which IHL protects against the effects of cyber operations. In particular, States should take clear positions about their commitment to interpret IHL so as to preserve civilian infrastructure from significant disruption and to protect civilian data. The availability of such positions will also influence the assessment of whether the existing rules are adequate or whether new rules may be needed. If States see a need to develop new rules, they should build on and strengthen the existing legal framework – including IHL.

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