International humanitarian law and cyber operations during armed conflicts

2020 ◽  
Vol 102 (913) ◽  
pp. 481-492

Executive summary•Cyber operations have become a reality in contemporary armed conflict. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is concerned by the potential human cost arising from the increasing use of cyber operations during armed conflicts.•In the ICRC's view, international humanitarian law (IHL) limits cyber operations during armed conflicts just as it limits the use of any other weapon, means or method of warfare in an armed conflict, whether new or old.•Affirming the applicability of IHL does not legitimize cyber warfare, just as it does not legitimize any other form of warfare. Any use of force by States – cyber or kinetic – remains governed by the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant rules of customary international law, in particular the prohibition against the use of force. International disputes must be settled by peaceful means, in cyberspace as in all other domains.•It is now critical for the international community to affirm the applicability of international humanitarian law to the use of cyber operations during armed conflicts. The ICRC also calls for discussions among governmental and other experts on how existing IHL rules apply and whether the existing law is adequate and sufficient. In this respect, the ICRC welcomes the intergovernmental discussions currently taking place in the framework of two United Nations General Assembly mandated processes.•Events of recent years have shown that cyber operations, whether during or outside armed conflict, can disrupt the operation of critical civilian infrastructure and hamper the delivery of essential services to the population. In the context of armed conflicts, civilian infrastructure is protected against cyber attacks by existing IHL principles and rules, in particular the principles of distinction, proportionality and precautions in attack. IHL also affords special protection to hospitals and objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, among others.•During armed conflicts, the employment of cyber tools that spread and cause damage indiscriminately is prohibited. From a technological perspective, some cyber tools can be designed and used to target and harm only specific objects and to not spread or cause harm indiscriminately. However, the interconnectivity that characterizes cyberspace means that whatever has an interface with the Internet can be targeted from anywhere in the world and that a cyber attack on a specific system may have repercussions on various other systems. As a result, there is a real risk that cyber tools are not designed or used – either deliberately or by mistake – in compliance with IHL.•States’ interpretation of existing IHL rules will determine the extent to which IHL protects against the effects of cyber operations. In particular, States should take clear positions about their commitment to interpret IHL so as to preserve civilian infrastructure from significant disruption and to protect civilian data. The availability of such positions will also influence the assessment of whether the existing rules are adequate or whether new rules may be needed. If States see a need to develop new rules, they should build on and strengthen the existing legal framework – including IHL.

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 82-103
Author(s):  
Sergey Garkusha-Bozhko

The development of information technologies in the modern world affects all spheres of human activity, including the sphere of military activities of states. The current level of development of military information technologies allows us to talk about a new fifth possible theatre of military operations, namely, cyberspace. The Tallinn Manual on International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations, developed in 2013 and updated in 2017 by experts from the NATO States, also confirms the likelihood of armed conflict in cyberspace. It is indisputable fact that cyber operations committed in the context of an armed conflict will be subject to the same rules of International Humanitarian Law that apply to such armed conflict. However, many cyber operations that can be classified as military operations may be committed in peacetime and are common cybercrimes. In such circumstances, it is imperative to distinguish between such cybercrimes and situations of armed conflict in cyberspace. Due to the fact, that there are only two types of armed conflict — international and non-international, this problem of differentiation raises the question of the typology of armed conflicts in relation to cyberspace. The main questions within the typology of cyber armed conflicts are: whether an international armed conflict can start solely as a result of a cyber-attack in the absence of the use of traditional armed force; and how to distinguish between ordinary criminal behaviour of individuals in cyberspace and non-international armed conflict in cyberspace? The purpose of this article is to provide answers to these urgent questions. The author analyses the following criteria that play a role in solving the above problems: criteria for assigning a cyber attack to a state and equating such a cyber-attack with an act of using armed force in a cyber armed conflict of an international character; and criteria for the organization of parties and the intensity of military actions in a non-international cyber armed conflict. Based on the results of this analysis, the author gives relevant suggestions for solving the above issues.


Author(s):  
Fleck Dieter

This chapter provides an overview of the law of non-international armed conflicts and its progressive development. The law of armed conflict, as it has developed in the last part of the nineteenth and the first part of the twentieth century, deals predominantly with wars between states. Its basic principles and rules are, however, likewise relevant for non-international armed conflicts: in all armed conflicts, elementary considerations of humanity must be respected under all circumstances, in order to protect victims, to reduce human sufferings, and to minimize damages to objects vital for survival. Therefore, the parties to the conflict do not have an unlimited choice of the means and methods of conducting hostilities, nor of selecting the targets to be attacked, and they must protect the victims from the effects and consequences of war. This concept is reflected in the principles and rules of international humanitarian law, to be respected by all and, while taking military necessity into account, limiting the use of force for humanitarian reasons. Parties to the conflict respecting these principles and rules are considered as respecting the international order, while those seriously violating them will commit internationally wrongful acts and perpetrators are liable to punishment.


2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 111-114
Author(s):  
Siobhán Wills

In this Article, I argue that there is inconsistency and confusion at the heart of UN policy on use of deadly force by peacekeepers and that this lack of clarity has resulted in deaths and injuries to people that pose no threat to UN forces or anybody else and have not engaged in any violent activities or indeed in any type of crime. Such deaths and injuries are likely to recur if the United Nations continues to use the same rules of engagement for law enforcement operations as it does for operations aimed at curtailing violence by parties to an armed conflict. The problem would be greatly mitigated if the United Nations were to formally commit to applying customary international human rights law standards on use of force in all circumstances except those to which international humanitarian law applies.


Author(s):  
Laurent Gisel ◽  
Tilman Rodenhäuser ◽  
Knut Dörmann

Abstract The use of cyber operations during armed conflicts and the question of how international humanitarian law (IHL) applies to such operations have developed significantly over the past two decades. In their different roles in the Legal Division of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the authors of this article have followed these developments closely and have engaged in governmental and non-governmental expert discussions on the subject. In this article, we analyze pertinent humanitarian, legal and policy questions. We first show that the use of cyber operations during armed conflict has become a reality of armed conflicts and is likely to be more prominent in the future. This development raises a number of concerns in today's increasingly cyber-reliant societies, in which malicious cyber operations risk causing significant disruption and harm to humans. Secondly, we present a brief overview of multilateral discussions on the legal and normative framework regulating cyber operations during armed conflicts, looking in particular at various arguments around the applicability of IHL to cyber operations during armed conflict and the relationship between IHL and the UN Charter. We emphasize that in our view, there is no question that cyber operations during armed conflicts, or cyber warfare, are regulated by IHL – just as is any weapon, means or methods of warfare used by a belligerent in a conflict, whether new or old. Thirdly, we focus the main part of this article on how IHL applies to cyber operations. Analyzing the most recent legal positions of States and experts, we revisit some of the most salient debates of the past decade, such as which cyber operations amount to an “attack” as defined in IHL and whether civilian data enjoys similar protection to “civilian objects”. We also explore the IHL rules applicable to cyber operations other than attacks and the special protection regimes for certain actors and infrastructure, such as medical facilities and humanitarian organizations.


1996 ◽  
Vol 36 (310) ◽  
pp. 36-42

Commission I, which was chaired by H.E. Ambassador Hisashi Owada, Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations in New York, had two main items on its agenda: discussion of the follow-up to the 1993 International Conference for the Protection of War Victims held in Geneva and action to be taken in that regard by the 26th International Conference, and examination of a number of humanitarian issues relating to the protection of the civilian population in times of armed conflict. The Commission also took note of the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea.


2006 ◽  
Vol 88 (864) ◽  
pp. 881-904 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louise Doswald-Beck

AbstractThis article describes the relevant interpretation of the right to life by human rights treaty bodies and analyses how this might influence the law relating to the use of force in armed conflicts and occupations where international humanitarian law is unclear. The concurrent applicability of international humanitarian law and human rights law to hostilities in armed conflict does not mean that the right to life must, in all situations, be interpreted in accordance with the provisions of international humanitarian law. The author submits that the human rights law relating to the right to life is suitable to supplement the rules of international humanitarian law relating to the use of force for non-international conflicts and occupation, as well as the law relating to civilians taking a “direct part in hostilities”. Finally, by making reference to the traditional prohibition of assassination, the author concludes that the application of human rights law in these situations would not undermine the spirit of international humanitarian law.


1983 ◽  
Vol 23 (236) ◽  
pp. 246-254 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sylvie Junod

Human rights, particularly civil and political, have influenced the latest developments in international humanitarian law, especially 1977 Protocol II relating to non-international armed conflicts. At the Teheran Conference in 1968 the United Nations began to reconcile these two branches of international law; it was at this Conference that international humanitarian law was first called “human rights in periods of armed conflict”. This rapprochement was helped further by the adoption in the 1977 Protocols of some basic rules identical to those in the Human Rights Conventions; it helps strengthen the protection of human beings in situations of armed conflict.


2008 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 109-138 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ola Engdahl

AbstractCurrent peace operations often include an element of enforcement. Such operations are based upon Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and are regularly endowed with a right to use ‘all necessary measures’ to fulfil the tasks set down in the particular mandate from the UN Security Council. Such operations, moreover, are often deployed in unstable conditions that border on armed conflict, or in areas of existing conflict. At times, the military forces involved in these operations are also involved in the armed conflict itself.The utilization of military force naturally raises the question of the legal status of personnel in peace operations under international humanitarian law (IHL). They represent the international community and as such are protected personnel. But how should they be treated from the perspective of IHL? Should they, despite their obvious military characteristics, be regarded as civilians? At what point, if any, could they be regarded as combatants? On the issue of change of status under IHL, does the same threshold apply for the operation's military forces as for other military personnel? Does the involvement of peace forces in an armed conflict, made up of contributions from a number of States, automatically cause that conflict to assume an international nature? Are theConvention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personneland IHL, applicable in non-international armed conflicts, mutually exclusive? These dilemmas are well illustrated by the difficulties facing the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.


2018 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 203-237
Author(s):  
Nicholas Tsagourias ◽  
Russell Buchan

Automatic cyber defence describes computer operations to neutralise a cyber attack. Once a system detects that it is under cyber attack, it automatically launches offensive cyber operations that pursue the attacker back to its own network with the objective of rescuing stolen data or disabling or destroying the computer hardware and software that is responsible for hosting and distributing the attacking code. The aim of this article is to examine the legality of automatic cyber defence under the law regulating the use of force in international law (jus ad bellum) and under international humanitarian law (jus in bello). Thus, the first part of this article examines automatic cyber defence in the context of the jus ad bellum by considering the legal requirements of an armed attack, necessity, and proportionality. In the second part, it examines the jus in bello aspects of automatic cyber defence and, in particular, whether it triggers an international or a non-international armed conflict and, if so, whether it can comply with the principles of distinction and proportionality.


2014 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 68-108
Author(s):  
Lance Bartholomeusz

The United Nations, its premises and personnel are increasingly present in the theatre of armed conflict across the globe. During armed conflict, un humanitarian agencies are now more likely to stay or arrive and deliver than to evacuate.1 Parties to an armed conflict may fight in close proximity to un premises. Today, from the Gaza Strip to South Sudan to Syria, during armed conflict thousands of displaced civilians seek shelter in un premises and the protection of the blue un flag, which is perceived to give better protection than fundamental principles of international humanitarian law (ihl).2 What is the legal framework for protection offered by the un flag to un humanitarian premises, including to displaced civilians they may shelter during armed conflict? To use the language of State responsibility, this paper considers the relevant primary obligations of ihl and un law, how a possible conflict between those primary obligations is resolved, and then considers the legal consequences of a breach of the relevant primary obligation in accordance with the secondary rules of the law of State responsibility. Thus, the paper addresses four questions: (1)What protection does international humanitarian law and international criminal law provide to un humanitarian operations, in particular un premises? (2)What protection does United Nations law provide to un humanitarian operations, in particular un premises? (3)What if there is a conflict between United Nations law and ihl? (4)In case of a violation of United Nations law protecting un premises, could there be circumstances precluding wrongfulness under the law of State responsibility?


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