Bank earnings management and income smoothing using commission and fee income

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 419-439 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peterson K. Ozili
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Management Strategy ◽  
Income Smoothing ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Too Big To Fail ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Interest Income ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
European Banks ◽  
Reported Earnings

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether European banks use commission and fee income (CF) to smooth reported earnings or to persistently increase reported earnings as an income-increasing earnings management strategy. Design/methodology/approach The author tests the income-smoothing hypothesis following the approach of Stubben (2010) and Ahmed et al. (1999). Findings The author finds that European banks use CF to smooth reported earnings and this behaviour is pronounced among non-too-big-to-fail (NTBTF) European banks compared to too-big-to-fail (TBTF) European banks. The author also finds a positive and significant correlation between interest income and non-interest income (CF) indicating increased systematic risk due to reduced diversification benefits. The author also finds that the CF of NTBTF banks is procyclical with fluctuating economic conditions but not for TBTF banks. Also, the author finds evidence for income-increasing earnings management in the post-crisis period, for larger European banks and when banks have higher ex post interest income, implying that the propensity to engage in income-increasing earnings management significantly depends on bank size and ex post interest margin considerations. The findings have policy implications. Originality/value The author examines alternative financial numbers that banks use to manage earnings. The author focusses on income smoothing via CF among European banks, a context that has not been explored in the literature.

Bank earnings management using commission and fee income

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 172-189 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peterson K. Ozili ◽  
Erick Outa
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Investor Protection ◽  
Income Smoothing ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Accounting Standard ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Financial Firms ◽  
Reported Earnings ◽  
Accounting Standard Setting

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether banks use commission and fee (CF) income to manage reported earnings as an income-increasing or income smoothing strategy. Design/methodology/approach The authors employ the regression methodology to detect real earnings management. Findings The authors find that banks use CF income for income smoothing purposes and this behaviour persists during recessionary periods and in environments with stronger investor protection. The implication of the findings is that bank non-interest income which achieves diversification gains to banks is also used to manipulate reported earnings. Research limitations/implications The findings show that real earnings management is prevalent among banks in Africa. Further research into earnings management should examine real earnings management among non-financial firms in developing regions. Practical implications From an accounting standard setting perspective, the evidence suggests the need for national/international standard setters to adopt strict revenue recognition rules that ensure that banks or firms report the actual fees they make, and to discourage banks from delaying (or deferring) the collection of fee income to manage or smooth reported earnings opportunistically. Originality/value This study contributes to the positive accounting theory (PAT) literature which examines the accounting and non-accounting decisions that influence managers’ choice of accounting methods in financial reporting. Extending the PAT, the authors show that certain conditions can incentivize managers to engage in earning management such as during recessions and weak institutional quality or weak investor protection.

scholarly journals Efficient contracting, earnings smoothing and managerial accounting discretion

2014 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 100-123 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohamed Khalil ◽  
Jon Simon
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Legal Protection ◽  
Income Smoothing ◽  
Least Square ◽  
Managerial Accounting ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Accounting Choices ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
Reported Earnings

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the contracting incentives (i.e. bonus plans, debt covenants, political costs hypotheses), and income smoothing can explain accounting choices in an emerging country, Egypt. Design/methodology/approach – The paper uses the ordinary least square regression model to examine the relationship between earnings management and reporting objectives. A sample of 438 non-financial firms listed on the Egyptian Exchange over the period 2005-2007 is used. Findings – The paper finds that the contracting objectives explain little of the variations in accounting choices (i.e. discretionary accruals) in the Egyptian context. However, the paper finds that mangers are likely to smooth the reported earnings by managing the accrual component in an attempt to reduce the fluctuation in reported earnings by increasing (decreasing) earnings when earnings are low (high) in attempt to reduce the variability of the reported earnings. Research limitations/implications – The empirical results rely on the ability of earnings management proxies to adequately capture earnings manipulation activities. Practical implications – The findings of the study should be of substantial interest to regulators and policy makers. The results implicitly contribute to the ongoing argument in relation to the optimal flexibility permitted by standard setting and the argument that tightening the accounting standards and mandating International Financial Reporting Standards are likely to improve reporting quality and reduce opportunistic earnings management. The results reveal that many of the weaknesses related to corporate reporting in emerging countries may result from the inadequate enforcement of the law and the weak legal protection of minority shareholders. The results also highlight the crucial role of understanding the reporting incentives, which is mainly shaped by institutional and market forces and the legal environment, in explaining accounting choices. Originality/value – Unlike previous studies that tested an individual objective, this study examines the trade-offs among various reporting objectives in an emerging economy.

Earnings management and equity incentives: evidence from the European banking industry

2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 244-261 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohammad Alhadab ◽  
Bassam Al-Own
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Banking Industry ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Loan Loss ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Loan Loss Provisions ◽  
Equity Incentives ◽  
European Banking ◽  
European Banks

Purpose This study aims to examine the effect of equity incentives on earnings management that occurs via the use of loan loss provisions by using a sample of 204 bank-year observations over the period 2006-2011. Design/methodology/approach The authors use the data of 39 European banks to test the main hypothesis. Several valuation models and regressions are used to measure the main proxies for executives’ compensation and the determinant factors of loan loss provisions. Findings The empirical results reveal that earnings management that occurs via discretionary loan loss provisions is associated with equity incentives in the banking industry. In particular, European banks’ executives with high equity incentives are found to manage reported earnings upwards by reducing loan loss provisions. The results therefore show that income-increasing earnings management via discretionary loan loss provisions is widely practised by the executives of European banks and that this is partly motivated by executives’ compensation. Practical implications The findings of this paper present important implications for regulators in the European Union, who should take further steps to reform the regulatory environment to monitor and mitigate the earnings management practices that occur via the manipulation of loan loss provisions. Earnings management practices do not just negatively affect subsequent performance but are also found to lead to firms’ failure. Thus, regulators should take the necessary reforms to protect the wealth of stakeholders (investors, creditors, etc.). Originality/value This study provides the first evidence on the relationship between equity incentives and earnings management in the European banking industry. The study sheds more light on an issue of great interest to a broad audience that does not receive much attention in the prior research, thus opening new avenues for future research.

Earnings management when firms face mandatory contributions

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yiyi Qin ◽  
Jun Cai ◽  
Steven Wei
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Investment Strategy ◽  
Fiscal Year ◽  
Management Behavior ◽  
Indicator Variable ◽  
Stock Market Returns ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Early Results ◽  
Reported Earnings

PurposeIn this paper, we aim to answer two questions. First, whether firms manipulate reported earnings via pension assumptions when facing mandatory contributions. Second, whether firms alter their earnings management behavior when the Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) mandates disclosure of pension asset composition and a description of investment strategy under SFAS 132R.Design/methodology/approachOur basic approach is to run linear regressions of firm-year assumed returns on the log of pension sensitivity measures, controlling for current and lagged actual returns from pension assets, fiscal year dummies and industry dummies. The larger the pension sensitivity ratios, the stronger the effects from inflated ERRs on reported earnings. We confirm the early results that the regression slopes are positive and highly significant. We construct an indicator variable DMC to capture the mandatory contributions firms face and another indicator variable D132R to capture the effect of SFAS 132R. DMC takes the value of one for fiscal years during which an acquisition takes place and zero otherwise. D132R takes the value of one for fiscal years after December 15, 2003 and zero otherwise.FindingsOur sample covers the period from June 1992 to December 2017. Our key results are as follows. The estimated coefficient (t-statistic) on DMC is 0.308 (6.87). Firms facing mandatory contributions tend to set ERRs at an average 0.308% higher. The estimated coefficient (t-statistic) on D132R is −2.190 (−13.70). The new disclosure requirement under SFAS 132R constrains all firms to set ERRs at an average 2.190% lower. The estimate (t-statistic) on the interactive term DMA×D132R is −0.237 (−3.29). When mandatory contributions happen during the post-SFAS 132R period, firms tend to set ERRs at 0.237% lower than they would do otherwise in the pre-SFAS 132R period.Originality/valueWhen firms face mandatory contributions, typically firm experience negative stock market returns. We examine whether managers manage earnings to mitigate such negative impact. We find that firms inflate assumed returns on pension assets to boost their reported earnings when facing mandatory contributions. We also find that managers alter earnings management behavior, in the case of mandatory contributions, following the introduction of new pension disclosure standards under SFAS 132R that become effective on December 15, 2003. Under the new SFAS 132R requirement, firms need to disclose asset allocation and describe investment strategies. This imposes restrictions on managers' discretion in making ERR assumptions, since now the composition of pension assets is a key determinant of the assumed expected rate of return on pension assets. Firms need to justify their ERRs with their asset allocations.

Earnings management and goodwill impairment

2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 120-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giuseppe Davide Caruso ◽  
Elisa Rita Ferrari ◽  
Vincenzo Pisano
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Income Smoothing ◽  
Financial Accounting ◽  
Current Debate ◽  
Managerial Behavior ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Goodwill Impairment ◽  
Research Questions

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to understand whether managerial behavior in impairing goodwill arising from M & As has changed after the adoption of IAS/IFRS, searching for evidences of earnings management (EM) practices. Thus, our goal is to provide a response to the following research questions. Are goodwill impairments used by listed firms’ managers to manipulate earnings? If so, what kind of EM practice is mostly used? Design/methodology/approach – In this paper the authors tested the following hypothesis: H1. In the year of the deal’s closure and in the following four years, the management detects impairment of goodwill in difformity with the previous Italian regulations and related accounting practices. Moreover, the authors tried to determine, for each considered firms, potential symptoms of typical DEM practices widely debated in the financial accounting literature (income smoothing, income minimization, income minimization, or big bath accounting). Findings – Our analysis does not prove evidence of certain EM practices, but it highlights very clearly that, after the adoption of IAS/IFRS, managers’ behavior has deeply changed. Moreover, the analysis shows that there is no univocal choice in favor of a specific EM practice and that every firm pursues its own “strategy.” Originality/value – Considering the importance of the topic from both the perspectives of managerial (with regard to M & As valuation processes) and financial accounting (with regard to intangibles valuation fulfilled by applying the impairment test instead of the amortization), this work aims to provide a multi-dimensional contribution to the current debate.

Third-party underwriting and its effects on credit spreads and earnings management

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-94
Author(s):  
Huaili Lyu ◽  
Conghui Yang
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Sample Selection ◽  
Estimation Method ◽  
Ordinary Least Squares ◽  
Bond Market ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Credit Spreads ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Bond Issuers

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the certification and monitoring motivations of third-party underwriting and its effects on credit spreads and earnings management of bank issuers. Design/methodology/approach Ordinary least squares is used to examine the certification and monitoring effects of third-party underwriting. Furthermore, the Heckman two-stage estimation method is used in controlling the endogeneity of sample selection. Findings The authors find that financial bonds underwritten by third-party underwriters bear lower credit spreads due to their credibly ex ante certification and effectively ex post monitoring compared with self-underwriting. Moreover, the certification of third-party underwriters can help to select good quality bond issuers with lower earnings management, and the monitoring function also plays an essential role in constraining the behavior of earnings management after the bond issues. Research limitations/implications The findings in this study suggest that underwriting types (third-party underwriting) will affect financial bond yields and bank issuers’ earnings management. Practical implications On the one hand, the authors should encourage third-party underwriters to actively promote the certification and monitoring functions. For example, given commercial banks the chance to be underwriters when the bond issuers are investment banks, which is not allowed now in China’s financial bond market. On the other hand, the authors should cut off the quid pro quo relations within third-party underwriting because such relations will reduce the certification and monitoring effects of third-party underwriters. Originality/value This is the first study to distinguish the certification and monitoring effects by using unique data from China’s financial bond market. And the authors further investigate the adverse effects of quid pro quo relations (hiring each other as lead underwriters) on the certification and monitoring effects of third-party underwriters.

The impact of the global economic crisis of 2008 on earnings quality in Mexico

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 407-421
Author(s):  
Jose Miranda-Lopez ◽  
Ivan Valdovinos-Hernandez
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Economic Crisis ◽  
Earnings Quality ◽  
Accounting Standards ◽  
Previous Literature ◽  
Income Smoothing ◽  
Accounting Quality ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Global Economic Crisis

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the earnings quality of companies listed on Mexico’s primary stock market, the Bolsa Mexicana de Valores (Bolsa) before and during the global economic crisis of 2008. Previous research has shown that these economic events can have potentially conflicting effects on the quality of earnings of listed companies in capital markets around the world. Design/methodology/approach This paper operationalizes earnings quality based on earnings management. Therefore, four constructs to proxy for earnings quality are developed from previous literature, and multiple regression analysis along with tests of differences across two time periods, 2005–2007 and 2008–2010, are used to determine if there is a significant change in the accounting quality of companies listed on the Bolsa before and after the start of the global economic crisis. Findings Results indicate a statistically significant decrease of earnings quality on three out of the four constructs used to proxy for earnings management. There is only one construct in this category that shows a significant increase of earnings quality. Research limitations/implications There are different number of constructs and methodologies used to test for earnings quality. This study draws on four different constructs on two dimensions of earnings quality from previous literature, but other methodologies and constructs can potentially be used as well, such as discretionary accruals. Furthermore, there is a chance that there can be confounding factors affecting the results of this study besides the effects of the global economic crisis. Finally, the sample used in this study comprises non-financial public companies listed on the Bolsa, which can affect the generalization of the results to countries other than Mexico. Practical implications The results of this study can be of interest to Mexican and foreign investors, standard setters and regulators of the Bolsa, as the results show a strong incentive to manage companies’ earnings using income smoothing in an emerging economy during an economic crisis even after converging to a higher-quality set of accounting standards. Results can also be of interests to investors and regulators in other Latin-American countries with economies similar to that of Mexico. Originality/value This is the first study to test the quality of earnings of Mexican companies before and during the global economic crisis of 2008. Thus, this study contributes to the accounting quality literature by offering evidence showing a significant increase of income smoothing during the global economic crisis for companies listed in a developing economy with a relevant history of economic crises, even when these companies were using recently converged, higher-quality accounting standards.

Board gender diversity, corporate governance, and earnings management

2019 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nurlan Orazalin
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Gender Diversity ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Annual Reports ◽  
Public Companies ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Weak Evidence ◽  
Board Gender Diversity

Purpose The purpose of this study is to examine whether board gender diversity and other board characteristics affect earnings management practices of top public companies in Kazakhstan. Design/methodology/approach The study analyzes data of top public companies for the period 2010-2016. Data on corporate governance were manually collected from annual reports and investment memorandums, and financial data were collected from audited financial statements. Findings The empirical results show that companies with greater board gender diversity are more effective in constraining earnings management. The findings also indicate that companies with larger boards adopt a more restrained approach to earnings management practices, thus supporting the theoretical framework of the study. However, the results provide weak evidence of the association between board independence and earnings quality. Originality/value This study is the first to investigate the relationship between gender diversity and earnings management in emerging markets such as Kazakhstan that offers managerial and policy implications.

The effect of the need for subsequent seasoned equity offerings on earnings management motivation

2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-52
Author(s):  
Guannan Wang ◽  
Moshe Hagigi
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Seasoned Equity Offerings ◽  
Common Stock ◽  
Equity Offerings ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Equity Issues ◽  
Total Magnitude ◽  
Prior Literature ◽  
Reported Earnings

PurposeMost prior literature focuses on how managers’ immediate needs affect their current earnings management. The purpose of this paper is to expand this body of literature by investigating the managerial motivation in a multi-period setting. The authors believe that managers’ incentive to engage in earning management around current equity issues is not only determined by the companies’ immediate need, but that it is also determined by their longer-term financing need.Design/methodology/approachThe authors examine all issuances of common stock, whether they are issued as seasoned equity offerings or whether as a reissuance of previously repurchased stock. They believe that the motivations for earnings management are similar for all these various stock-issuance events, which result in an increase in the number of outstanding common stock items.FindingsThe results of this paper reveal that those firms with less of a need for subsequent equity issuances are more likely to engage in “income- increasing” earnings management before their equity issuances. Conversely, equity issuers with more of a need for subsequent equity issuances would be more concerned about the potential impact of current earnings management on their future reported earnings and, therefore, would be less likely to manage earnings.Originality/valueThis paper contributes to the literature by extending the findings of the prior literature, showing that managerial discretion does not only affect the total magnitude of earnings management, but that it also impacts the timing of the earnings management activities. Insights gained from our research may contribute to the literature and enable a better understanding of firms’ financial reporting strategy from a longer-run view.

scholarly journals The impact of CEOs’ accounting backgrounds on earnings management and conservatism

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 4-24
Author(s):  
Nan Hu ◽  
Rong Huang ◽  
Xu Li ◽  
Ling Liu
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Accounting Conservatism ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Good News ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Accounting Research ◽  
Significant Difference ◽  
The Impact

Purpose Existing literature in experimental accounting research suggests that accounting professionals and people with accounting backgrounds tend to have a lower level of moral reasoning and ethical development. Motivated by these findings, this paper aims to examine whether chief executive officers (CEOs) with accounting backgrounds have an impact on firms’ earnings management behavior and the level of accounting conservatism. Design/methodology/approach The authors classify CEOs into those with and without accounting backgrounds using BoardEx data. Using discretionary accruals from several different models, they do not find that CEOs with accounting backgrounds are more likely to engage in income-increasing accruals. However, the authors find that CEOs with accounting backgrounds exhibit lower levels of conservatism, proxied by C-scores and T-scores (Basu, 1997). This finding suggests that CEOs with accounting backgrounds recognize bad news more quickly than good news, consistent with the accounting principle of “anticipating all losses but anticipating no gains”. Findings The authors show that firms whose CEOs have accounting backgrounds exhibit lower levels of accounting conservatism. However, these firms do not exhibit higher levels of income-increasing discretionary accruals. This study documents the impact of CEOs’ educational backgrounds on firms’ accounting choices and confirms prior findings in experimental accounting research using large sample archival data. Originality/value This paper is the first study that investigates the impact of CEOs’ accounting backgrounds on firms’ financial reporting policy. The findings may have some policy implications. If accounting backgrounds of CEOs can make a significant difference on firms’ behavior, it is reasonable to make CEOs accountable for the quality of financial reporting. This paper is one of the first to empirically test inferences drawn by experimental accounting research. There has been a gap between archival and experimental accounting studies. The authors propose that interesting research questions can be addressed by filling in such a gap.

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