On linear wine score aggregators and the preservation of group preferences

2018 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 265-276
Author(s):  
Lester M.K. Kwong ◽  
Ling Sun

Purpose This paper aims to identify the potential conflicts that arise between the actual and the revealed preference of a panel of wine judges when the panel’s evaluation is derived by a linear aggregation of individual scores. Design/methodology/approach A standard axiomatic social choice theoretical model is used to derive and examine the findings. Findings The findings show that even with the application of a simple majority rule over the pairwise ranking of wines, preferences may be misrepresented by the ordinal ranking of the wine score aggregation. Originality/value A number of wine competitions and reviews, to date, use some form of linear aggregation to represent group preferences. Furthermore, tests surrounding wine judge performance are largely dependent on some underlying true measures usually derived from a linear aggregation. The results imply that care should be taken in these regards.

Author(s):  
Kenneth A. Shepsle

Simple majority rule is badly behaved. This is one of the earliest lessons learned by political scientists in the positive political theory tradition. Discovered and rediscovered by theorists over the centuries (including, famously, the Majorcan Franciscan monk Raymon Llull in the thirteenth century, the Marquis de Condorcet in the eighteenth, the Reverend Charles Dodgson (Lewis Carroll) in the eighteenth, and Duncan Black in the twentieth), the method of majority rule cannot be counted on to produce a rational collective choice. In many circumstances (made precise in the technical literature), it is very likely (a claim also made precise) that whatever choice is produced will suffer the property of not being “best” in the preferences of all majorities: for any candidate alternative, there will always exist another alternative that some majority prefers to it. This chapter suggests that while a collection of preferences often cannot provide a collectively “best” choice, institutional arrangements, which restrict comparisons of alternatives, may allow majority rule to function more smoothly. That is, where equilibrium induced by preferences alone may fail to exist, institutional structure may induce stability.


Author(s):  
Robert P. Inman ◽  
Daniel L. Rubinfeld

This chapter details the likely economic, democratic, and rights performance of a decentralized national legislature with representatives elected from geographically specified local districts. The national legislature is assigned responsibility for national public goods and services and national regulations. Decisions in the legislature are made by simple majority rule. Independent local governments continue to be responsible for important local services, perhaps provided concurrently with the national government. On the dimensions of democratic participation and the protection of rights and liberties, Democratic Federalism is likely to do well, provided all citizens are represented in the legislature. It is on the dimension of economic efficiency that legislature-only Democratic Federalism is most likely to fall short.


2015 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 139-151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Battaglini ◽  
Lydia Mechtenberg

AbstractWe conduct a laboratory experiment to study the incentives of a privileged group (the “yellows”) to share political power with another group (the “blues”). The yellows collectively choose the voting rule for a general election: a simple-majority rule that favors them, or a proportional rule. In two treatments, the blues can use a costly punishment option. We find that the yellows share power voluntarily only to a small extent, but they are more inclined to do so under the threat of punishment, despite the fact that punishments are not sub-game perfect. The blue group conditions punishments both on the voting rule and the electoral outcome.


Kybernetes ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 45 (5) ◽  
pp. 772-787 ◽  
Author(s):  
Can Zhong Yao ◽  
Xiao Feng Liu ◽  
Ji Nan Lin

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to provide the possible and better selection for pedestrian flow evacuation. Design/methodology/approach – Simulation. Findings – First, according to the model with self-decision agents, the paper figures out that the effect of evacuation guided by the random-walk mechanism exceeds that guided by the inertial mechanism, and specifically, the effect of evacuation could significantly improve if random-walk agents restraint the probability of random walk under 0.4. Besides, on neighborhood reference mechanism, individuals who take neighbors’ average direction as reference tend to achieve better effect of evacuation than that of following majority rule. Furthermore, this paper proposes that an optimal ratio of the proportion of clever individuals and system density exists for evacuation effect improvement. Finally, the evacuating effect with barrier locating in different space is also studied in our research. Originality/value – The effect of evacuation could significantly improve if random-walk agents restraint the probability of random walk under 0.4. On neighborhood reference mechanism, individuals who take neighbors’ average direction as reference tend to achieve better effect of evacuation than that of following majority rule.


2003 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 941-960 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Berend ◽  
Luba Sapir

Sapir (1998) calculated the probabilities of the expert rule and of the simple majority rule being optimal under the assumption of exponentially distributed logarithmic expertise levels. Here we find the analogous probabilities for the family of restricted majority rules, including the above two extreme rules as special cases, and the family of balanced expert rules. We compare the two families, the rules within each family, and all rules of the two families with the extreme rules.


1983 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 181-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hannu Nurmi

Roughly two centuries ago the Marquis de Condorcet and Chevalier Jean-Charles de Borda originated a research tradition – by no means a continuous one – that over the decades has produced results casting doubt on many widely used collective decision-making procedures. The phenomenon known as the Condorcet effect or the Condorcet paradox is the well-known problem of the simple majority rule. The paradox bearing the name of Borda is less commonly known, but it also relates to a procedure that is widely used, namely the plurality principle. Either one of these paradoxes is serious enough to make these procedures suspect unless one is convinced that the situations giving rise to these paradoxical features are extremely rare. In this article we review some voting procedures that have been introduced in the literature. We aim at giving a synthesis of the assessments of procedures with respect to various criteria.


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