Boko Haram strains under a resurgent Nigerian army

Significance One consequence is that insurgents are retreating into neighbouring countries. Several civilians died in Boko Haram attacks in Niger's Diffa region on November 11 and Chad declared a state of emergency on November 9 in its far-north Lake Chad region. Impacts The significance of Boko Haram's pledged allegiance to Islamic State group (ISG) is far less than other ISG affiliates. The recent Abuja bombings, while claimed by ISG-affiliated militants, resemble previous attacks and signal no tactical or resource shifts. Boko Haram's increasingly weak position in Nigeria would hamper efforts to make any such link meaningful.

Significance They were responding to increasingly serious attacks on Turkish soldiers and police by Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) guerrillas in eastern Turkey. With President Recep Tayyip Erdogan vowing fierce retribution, and conflicts between the authorities and the local population growing in the Kurdish-dominated south-east, the country is braced for full-scale war, just as it prepares for fresh parliamentary elections on November 1. Impacts Business and the economy face a sharp downturn with the lira growing steadily weaker. The conflict with the Kurds will intensify and Kurdish demands for full-scale independence will increase. The government will not seek a compromise with the Kurds and will be prepared to allocate any resources needed for a military solution. A more authoritarian style of government is likely to emerge after November. Turkey looks increasingly vulnerable to serious Islamic State group (ISG) attacks in urban centres, though probably not before the election.


Subject Boko Haram outlook. Significance The Nigerian Air Force announced on August 20 that it carried out “massive” bombing attacks earlier this month against Boko Haram forces regrouping around their former stronghold in the Sambisa Forest. This follows soon after the military allegedly killed Momodu Bama, second-in command to Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau. Yet despite these renewed military efforts, the Nigerian army faces two still-capable Boko Haram factions, each of which has staged multiple deadly attacks in recent months. Impacts The Islamic State-linked Boko Haram faction has emerged as the most dangerous security threat in the Lake Chad Basin in the short term. The military will struggle to differentiate between Boko Haram factions, undermining operational efficacy. Leadership turnover within the security forces will not overcome the systemic problem of under-equipped and underprepared troops. Neighbouring countries, such as Niger and Cameroon, will bolster border security amid worsening Boko Haram and other criminal threats.


Significance This follows the death of longtime Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau in May at the hands of his rivals in the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). Cameroonian authorities are also reporting a surge in defections. Though the numbers may be exaggerated, this represents a significant new development in the ongoing struggle against jihadist insurgency. Impacts Shekau’s death will allow ISWAP to consolidate its control in the Lake Chad basin by removing a major rival. ISWAP’s overall fighting strength may not substantially increase as many former Boko Haram fighters may defect rather than join ISWAP. The Nigerian military’s use of indiscriminate airstrikes may deter future defections and fuel recruitment into ISWAP.


Subject Security update Significance In late March, Chadian forces launched a military assault on Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) in the Lake Chad region, renewing Chad’s reputation as a more decisive military power than most of its neighbours. Yet the campaign has also evoked questions about transparency and about Chad’s role within the long-term regional fight against the two jihadist groups. Meanwhile, Chad is bracing for the COVID-19 pandemic, especially its economic impact. Impacts COVID-19 may benefit jihadists by allowing them to regroup while governments are distracted. The virus could also kill jihadist fighters and supporters and undercut their revenue. Chad would be unlikely to pull back troops from foreign commitments that France supports, such as in Mali or G5 Sahel.


Significance The attack comes amid growing insecurity in the Far North region over the past year. Residents in Cameroon's north are increasingly the most vulnerable in the Lake Chad Basin to attacks by Boko Haram’s factions, suggesting that some of these are increasingly dependent on their cross-border activities for resources and recruits. Impacts Washington will pressure Yaounde further over its poor human rights record amid rising bipartisan congressional criticism. The Multinational Joint Task Force remains unwilling or unable to degrade Boko Haram in the Far North, undermining touted regional progress. Cameroon’s land border closures appear to have had little or no effect on the illicit movement of goods and people.


2021 ◽  
pp. 568-586
Author(s):  
Ibrahim Yahaya Ibrahim

Over the last decade, jihadist violence has expanded and intensified throughout the Sahel region. Jihadi groups, including Boko Haram, Islamic State West Africa Province, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), Katiba Macina, and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), have established strongholds in many places in the central Sahel, as well as in and around the Lake Chad Basin. As they strengthen their presence, Sahelian jihadists have introduced new changes in local social relations and practices, experimented with new forms of governance, and attempted to insert themselves into the local political economy. Yet, as they gain ground and conquer new spaces, their governance model has also shown its limits: their presence has increasingly fueled deadly communal violence, and infighting among jihadi groups has become recurrent and deadly. This chapter analyses the factors and dynamics behind this surge of jihadi violence in the Sahel. It attempts to situate the global jihadi discourse within the spectrum of Islamic ideologies and discourses and elaborates on the dynamics, both at the state and local levels, that have favored the emergence of jihadi groups.


Subject The rise of Iraq's Shia militias. Significance Shia militias, known as Popular Mobilisation Units (PMUs), are the most capable offensive forces at the federal government's disposal in its fight against Islamic State group (ISG). Yet Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi's cabinet only exercises limited control over these forces, many of which receive backing from Iran. While Iraq's battle against ISG is progressing steadily, the emergence of these powerful Shia militias could represent a larger medium-term challenge to state stability. Impacts Shia militias will probably be less effective in Sunni-only areas. Iraq boasts insufficient offensive forces to attack Mosul in the first half of 2015. The National Guard initiative will take months to be ratified in parliament. Politics in the oil-rich south will be complicated by a power struggle between Shia politicians and militia leaders.


Significance The strikes were in response to a video released by the Islamic State group (ISG) yesterday showing the beheading of 21 Egyptian Copts who had been kidnapped from Sirte on two separate occasions on December 31 and January 3. Brigadier Saqer al-Joroushi, who commands the air force for the armed group of former General Khalifa Haftar, said the strikes were carried out in coordination between them and Egypt. He added that further strikes were going to take place. Impacts The beheadings are sharpening divisions within the moderate Islamist Libya Dawn camp. This might trigger a confrontation between its more moderate elements and the more radical ones. The killings will reinforce popular Egyptian support for Sisi and his anti-Islamist agenda.


Significance Instability in Libya has exacerbated an already fraught security environment in the Maghreb and the Sahel. Several militant groups co-exist in these parts, usually in competition with each other. The Islamic State group (ISG) has taken centre stage, but despite high profile attacks in Libya, it has failed to establish a foothold in other Maghreb countries. Impacts ISG encroachment in Libya will strengthen calls for international action to address Libya's crisis. Sporadic attacks are expected against security forces and government targets in Tunisia and Algeria. Government pressure and expanded counterterrorism operations could cause more widespread abuses of human rights. Fighters returning from jihad in Syria and Iraq could bolster the capabilities of local jihadist cells.


Significance The process looks in danger. Serious local conflicts in south-eastern Turkey are straining tensions between Kurds and the government, even though guerrilla warfare has not resumed. Kurdish self-confidence is rising because of its fighters' success in expelling Islamic State group (ISG) from Kobani. However, dialogue between the government and imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan continues, and Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu seems more sensitive to Kurdish aspirations than his predecessors. Impacts Ocalan's leadership of the PKK is unshakable, but his ability to persuade his followers to avoid clashes on the streets is weakening. The conflict between the Kurds and Islamists inside Turkey will grow. Public opinion, including conservative religious elements, will block significant concessions to the Kurds, limiting the government's scope. The Kurds are emerging as a key regional opponent of Islamist politics.


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