Guerrillas could prompt Turkish state of emergency

Significance They were responding to increasingly serious attacks on Turkish soldiers and police by Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) guerrillas in eastern Turkey. With President Recep Tayyip Erdogan vowing fierce retribution, and conflicts between the authorities and the local population growing in the Kurdish-dominated south-east, the country is braced for full-scale war, just as it prepares for fresh parliamentary elections on November 1. Impacts Business and the economy face a sharp downturn with the lira growing steadily weaker. The conflict with the Kurds will intensify and Kurdish demands for full-scale independence will increase. The government will not seek a compromise with the Kurds and will be prepared to allocate any resources needed for a military solution. A more authoritarian style of government is likely to emerge after November. Turkey looks increasingly vulnerable to serious Islamic State group (ISG) attacks in urban centres, though probably not before the election.

Significance There are no declared candidates and the new man will be in effect the personal appointee of President Recep Tayyib Erdogan, whose dominance over the country seems greater than ever, despite his failure to subdue Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) terrorism or stem the growth of attacks by the Islamic State group (ISG) on Turkey's southern frontier. Most striking of all, the president is taking a hard line in Turkey's dealings with the EU. Impacts The late summer will see pressures grow on the exchange rate because of low earnings from tourism. The threat from ISG will increase. Despite its desire to do so, the government is unlikely to order a major incursion into Syria. The role of the military is rising once again in national life because of the Kurdish and ISG conflicts.


Significance The process looks in danger. Serious local conflicts in south-eastern Turkey are straining tensions between Kurds and the government, even though guerrilla warfare has not resumed. Kurdish self-confidence is rising because of its fighters' success in expelling Islamic State group (ISG) from Kobani. However, dialogue between the government and imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan continues, and Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu seems more sensitive to Kurdish aspirations than his predecessors. Impacts Ocalan's leadership of the PKK is unshakable, but his ability to persuade his followers to avoid clashes on the streets is weakening. The conflict between the Kurds and Islamists inside Turkey will grow. Public opinion, including conservative religious elements, will block significant concessions to the Kurds, limiting the government's scope. The Kurds are emerging as a key regional opponent of Islamist politics.


Significance The June 26 suicide attack inside the Imam al-Sadiq Mosque killed 27 people and was Kuwait's worst terrorist attack in over three decades. The attack, claimed by Islamic State group (ISG) and carried out by a Saudi citizen, was intended to inflame sectarian tensions that have spiralled in recent years. US officials have long identified Kuwait as an epicentre of funding and other forms of materiel assistance for participants in the Syrian civil war. However, unlike Qatar and Saudi Arabia, where support largely has flowed in one direction toward Sunni rebel groups, Kuwaitis have provided high-profile support to both the opposition and the Assad regime. Impacts The government will use the attack to reinforce its narrative that the bidun constitute a security threat rather than a human rights issue. Initial solidarity among Kuwait Sunni and Shia could dissipate quickly into political wrangling over the government's response. Kuwaiti salafi aid will boost hardline Islamist rebel groups in Syria. Key commercial and business interests, and oil installations are unlikely to be affected seriously by the rising terrorist threat. Reinforced security measures will further restrict political freedoms in the GCC's most open state.


Significance The bill's declared purpose is to prevent the import of foreign ideologies and to give law enforcement wider authority, in particular for 'special' security operations, arrests and searches. Its origins lie not in recent events in Nardaran but the destabilisation of the Middle East after the 'Arab spring', the chair of the parliamentary committee on religious organisations and public associations, Siyavush Novruzov, said. The secular regime sees a rising threat in radical Islam, represented by both Islamic State group (ISG) and a multitude of smaller groups. Impacts The government will strive for socioeconomic stability at all costs, expanding benefits and using the State Oil Fund's substantial reserves. The deteriorating regional security situation may undercut Azerbaijan's strategy of becoming a prime supplier of gas to Turkey and the EU. Baku will become more tempted to use anti-terrorism and anti-extremism as a political weapon against the domestic non-religious opposition. Azerbaijan's Shia form 75% of its Muslims, who form 97% of the population.


Significance Iran's armed forces have suffered a number of high-profile casualties in Syria and Iraq in recent weeks. General Mohammad Ali Allah-Dadi was killed in an Israeli airstrike inside Syria in January, while General Hamid Taqavi was killed by the Islamic State group (ISG) in Iraq in late December. Taqavi was the highest-ranking officer to be killed since the Iran-Iraq war ended in 1988. Both men were members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), Iran's elite military force that conducts all of Tehran's military operations outside the country's borders. As rising instability threatens Iran's interests, the IRGC has stepped up its deployment across the region, raising the risk of military overstretch. Meanwhile, on the domestic front, the IRGC is at loggerheads with the government of President Hassan Rouhani as nuclear negotiations approach their next deadline. Impacts IRGC dominance in Tehran policy-making will prevent any wider rapprochement with Washington. Resolution to the Syrian civil war will require regional political agreement involving Iran. Tensions with Saudi Arabia are at risk of further escalation. Demands on the defence budget will increase, raising fiscal strain on government.


Significance The meeting follows Turkey's launch of military strikes on July 24 against Islamic State group (ISG) in northern Syria and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in northern Iraq. Although Ankara says it is pursuing a broader strategy against terrorism, it has two asymmetrical goals. Against ISG, its measures remain largely defensive in nature, including driving ISG from the border and reducing the threat of blowback inside Turkey. Against the PKK, they appear more ambitious and appear designed to crush the organisation and use force rather than dialogue to resolve the demands of Turkey's Kurds for greater cultural and political rights. Impacts The US-led coalition may move the main platform for its air campaign in Syria and Iraq to Turkey, reducing flying times to targets. Ankara is likely to stop short of deploying ground troops in Syria. ISG may retaliate inside Turkey, particularly against its tourism sector. AKP may abandon coalition negotiations and go for the nationalist vote to recover its majority in early elections, possibly in November. Crackdown on ISG activities inside Turkey could weaken the group in Syria.


Significance This is one of the few successes the military have had on the ground since President Recep Tayyip Erdogan ended the ceasefire with the PKK on July 24. Impacts The Turkish state will sustain heavy daily casualties inviting ever-stronger retaliation, although what shape this may take is not clear. Despite attacks on it from government politicians, the HDP will retain enough support to get into the next parliament. The struggle with Islamic State group will take second place in government eyes to fighting the PKK. There will be strains between the PKK and HDP, but probably no overt split between them ın the short term.


Significance These operations follow the recapture of Tikrit, Sinjar, Ramadi and Fallujah from Islamic State group (ISG) in the past 18 months. Western countries backing the government and supporting its military campaign have pledged to increase their support for initiatives to stabilise recaptured areas. However, these initiatives have significant drawbacks that limit their prospects of success. Impacts Western criticism of Baghdad's military campaigns and anti-ISG strategy will remain muted. International aid organisations will be at risk of attack. Absent meaningful reconciliation, ISG will drive new terrorist attacks in Iraq, other Middle East conflict zones and the West.


Subject Islamist terrorism in Bangladesh. Significance An Italian aid worker was killed on September 27 in Dhaka, and a Japanese development worker was killed on October 2 in northern Bangladesh. The Islamic State group (ISG) claimed responsibility for both killings, although the government is sceptical of ISG involvement. These are the first attacks on foreign targets in Bangladesh since 2004, but follow a succession of strikes against secular bloggers. Impacts The greatest risk of violence lies in tensions within and between parliamentary parties. India-Bangladesh counterterrorism cooperation will intensify. UK and US security is more at risk from home-grown jihadis than immigrants.


Subject Counterterrorism in Kyrgyzstan. Significance Kyrgyzstan will hold parliamentary elections on October 4. While President Almazbek Atambayev's party is expected to perform well, concern is growing regarding the security situation in the country. A terrorist incident in July that state security officials have claimed as having links with the Islamic State group (ISG) means that Kyrgyzstan's State Committee for National Security (GKNB) has been presented with an opportunity to assert its role. However, the growing risk of instability will also be a serious test for the agency's capabilities. Impacts GKNB influence will grow if instability increases and it will retain its positon as the main security body. The agency's political role means that it has little incentive to reform at present. Eurasian Economic Union membership will draw Bishkek closer to Moscow's economic woes and could increase domestic tensions. A security crisis in Kyrgyzstan would add considerable strain to Russian military commitments in Ukraine, Syria and Tajikistan.


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