Muslim radicals face crackdown in Azerbaijan

Significance The bill's declared purpose is to prevent the import of foreign ideologies and to give law enforcement wider authority, in particular for 'special' security operations, arrests and searches. Its origins lie not in recent events in Nardaran but the destabilisation of the Middle East after the 'Arab spring', the chair of the parliamentary committee on religious organisations and public associations, Siyavush Novruzov, said. The secular regime sees a rising threat in radical Islam, represented by both Islamic State group (ISG) and a multitude of smaller groups. Impacts The government will strive for socioeconomic stability at all costs, expanding benefits and using the State Oil Fund's substantial reserves. The deteriorating regional security situation may undercut Azerbaijan's strategy of becoming a prime supplier of gas to Turkey and the EU. Baku will become more tempted to use anti-terrorism and anti-extremism as a political weapon against the domestic non-religious opposition. Azerbaijan's Shia form 75% of its Muslims, who form 97% of the population.

Subject Erdogan's vision for Turkey. Significance Since the July attempted coup, the government has purged 81,000 real or imagined opponents. Yet it has not been in turmoil, as is frequently claimed, even though President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's refusal to compromise on any front has locked Turkey into simultaneous expensive military conflicts, including participation in the civil war in Syria, just after 3,000 serving officers have been purged and just under 40% of generals and admirals either sacked or arrested. Impacts Erdogan's supremacy faces no foreseeable internal challengers or pressures to make policy changes. Turkey's international isolation will worsen, especially the US rift; the EU will keep its soft line while Russia will be friendly. The defeat of Islamic State group and recapture of Mosul will exacerbate US-Turkish tensions. Reliance on Russian energy imports may grow and new areas of cooperation be announced. Turkey's ambitious new health system may be an early economic area to run into financing problems.


Significance The process looks in danger. Serious local conflicts in south-eastern Turkey are straining tensions between Kurds and the government, even though guerrilla warfare has not resumed. Kurdish self-confidence is rising because of its fighters' success in expelling Islamic State group (ISG) from Kobani. However, dialogue between the government and imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan continues, and Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu seems more sensitive to Kurdish aspirations than his predecessors. Impacts Ocalan's leadership of the PKK is unshakable, but his ability to persuade his followers to avoid clashes on the streets is weakening. The conflict between the Kurds and Islamists inside Turkey will grow. Public opinion, including conservative religious elements, will block significant concessions to the Kurds, limiting the government's scope. The Kurds are emerging as a key regional opponent of Islamist politics.


Significance The June 26 suicide attack inside the Imam al-Sadiq Mosque killed 27 people and was Kuwait's worst terrorist attack in over three decades. The attack, claimed by Islamic State group (ISG) and carried out by a Saudi citizen, was intended to inflame sectarian tensions that have spiralled in recent years. US officials have long identified Kuwait as an epicentre of funding and other forms of materiel assistance for participants in the Syrian civil war. However, unlike Qatar and Saudi Arabia, where support largely has flowed in one direction toward Sunni rebel groups, Kuwaitis have provided high-profile support to both the opposition and the Assad regime. Impacts The government will use the attack to reinforce its narrative that the bidun constitute a security threat rather than a human rights issue. Initial solidarity among Kuwait Sunni and Shia could dissipate quickly into political wrangling over the government's response. Kuwaiti salafi aid will boost hardline Islamist rebel groups in Syria. Key commercial and business interests, and oil installations are unlikely to be affected seriously by the rising terrorist threat. Reinforced security measures will further restrict political freedoms in the GCC's most open state.


Subject ISG infiltration of refugee flows. Significance Refugee arrivals in Europe in 2016, large if not at 2015 levels, will put yet more pressure on the EU, which is already struggling to address economic crises, political polarisation and inter-state divisions on how to address security crises in Ukraine and the Middle East. Suspicions have grown that among the refugees are operatives of the Islamic State group (ISG). Impacts ISG's foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria will seek to expand their relationships with existing extremist networks in Europe. Speculation over ISG's presence within refugee flows will continue, especially as far-right parties continue to perform well in elections. The EU-Turkey deal may slow refugee flows, but the existing numbers of refugees will continue to attract suspicion from authorities.


Significance Iran's armed forces have suffered a number of high-profile casualties in Syria and Iraq in recent weeks. General Mohammad Ali Allah-Dadi was killed in an Israeli airstrike inside Syria in January, while General Hamid Taqavi was killed by the Islamic State group (ISG) in Iraq in late December. Taqavi was the highest-ranking officer to be killed since the Iran-Iraq war ended in 1988. Both men were members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), Iran's elite military force that conducts all of Tehran's military operations outside the country's borders. As rising instability threatens Iran's interests, the IRGC has stepped up its deployment across the region, raising the risk of military overstretch. Meanwhile, on the domestic front, the IRGC is at loggerheads with the government of President Hassan Rouhani as nuclear negotiations approach their next deadline. Impacts IRGC dominance in Tehran policy-making will prevent any wider rapprochement with Washington. Resolution to the Syrian civil war will require regional political agreement involving Iran. Tensions with Saudi Arabia are at risk of further escalation. Demands on the defence budget will increase, raising fiscal strain on government.


Significance These operations follow the recapture of Tikrit, Sinjar, Ramadi and Fallujah from Islamic State group (ISG) in the past 18 months. Western countries backing the government and supporting its military campaign have pledged to increase their support for initiatives to stabilise recaptured areas. However, these initiatives have significant drawbacks that limit their prospects of success. Impacts Western criticism of Baghdad's military campaigns and anti-ISG strategy will remain muted. International aid organisations will be at risk of attack. Absent meaningful reconciliation, ISG will drive new terrorist attacks in Iraq, other Middle East conflict zones and the West.


Subject Islamist terrorism in Bangladesh. Significance An Italian aid worker was killed on September 27 in Dhaka, and a Japanese development worker was killed on October 2 in northern Bangladesh. The Islamic State group (ISG) claimed responsibility for both killings, although the government is sceptical of ISG involvement. These are the first attacks on foreign targets in Bangladesh since 2004, but follow a succession of strikes against secular bloggers. Impacts The greatest risk of violence lies in tensions within and between parliamentary parties. India-Bangladesh counterterrorism cooperation will intensify. UK and US security is more at risk from home-grown jihadis than immigrants.


Significance They were responding to increasingly serious attacks on Turkish soldiers and police by Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) guerrillas in eastern Turkey. With President Recep Tayyip Erdogan vowing fierce retribution, and conflicts between the authorities and the local population growing in the Kurdish-dominated south-east, the country is braced for full-scale war, just as it prepares for fresh parliamentary elections on November 1. Impacts Business and the economy face a sharp downturn with the lira growing steadily weaker. The conflict with the Kurds will intensify and Kurdish demands for full-scale independence will increase. The government will not seek a compromise with the Kurds and will be prepared to allocate any resources needed for a military solution. A more authoritarian style of government is likely to emerge after November. Turkey looks increasingly vulnerable to serious Islamic State group (ISG) attacks in urban centres, though probably not before the election.


Subject Prospects for the peace process with ethnic groups under the incoming National League for Democracy government. Significance Peace negotiations between the government, ethnic armed groups (EAGs) and the military (Tatmadaw) were discussed when National League for Democracy (NLD) leader Aung San Suu Kyi met Tatmadaw chief Min Aung Hlaing on January 25. This followed the Union Peace Conference (UPC) round held oon January 12-16, which also involved outgoing President Thein Sein, and which marked Suu Kyi's official debut in the peace process. Impacts Progressing peace in Rakhine State could help Myanmar reduce Islamic State group threats. To protect its interests, the military could stymie peace talks by restarting conflict in ethnic areas. The NLD may soften its stance on federalism to keep the military aboard, but likely thus alienating ethnic groups.


Subject Islamic State threat. Significance Over the last year, Islamic State group (ISG) has expanded its presence in Indonesia. The government estimates that at least 56 Indonesians joined ISG in Iraq and Syria in mid-2014 -- a figure that may have reached 500 by end-2014. Of these, at least 200 are estimated to have returned, with some believed to be planning attacks in Indonesia. Despite the somewhat equivocal stance of national and local authorities on secularism, the threat posed by ISG to security is taken seriously. Impacts Social media and legitimate religious networks are the top two avenues for ISG recruitment in Indonesia and the broader region. Financial institutions, state buildings and tourist destinations are likely targets for terrorist attacks. Inter-regional intelligence cooperation on tackling ISG networks is likely to intensify. South-east Asian countries will seek greater US counterterrorism support. Civil society calls for a clearer state position on secularism will intensify, but they may go unheeded.


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