Beijing's policy shifts raise nuclear weapons risks

Significance China has also announced changes to its nuclear weapons posture, including a rebranding of its nuclear forces. Since becoming a nuclear weapons state in 1964, China has consistently presented its nuclear arsenal as defensive and limited, in both quantity and quality. The recent developments call this into question. Impacts US allies in Asia will seek further reassurance from Washington, including ballistic missile defence cooperation. There will be a quiet 'nuclearisation' of the South China Sea. China is bolder with Obama leaving office; it may be less so once a new US administration is in place. Xi may control the narrative around China's nuclear policy more closely, curtailing Chinese nuclear analysts' freedom of speech.

Subject China's pledge to 'no first use' of nuclear weapons. Significance The recent introduction of more offensive capabilities into China's nuclear forces, such as multiple warheads, together with Chinese military writings that toy with a future launch-on-warning capability, all seem to complicate China's long-standing pledge of 'no first use' (NFU). China is the only nuclear weapons state to maintain an unconditional and continuous NFU pledge ever since it developed nuclear weapons. Impacts China will not become more transparent in its nuclear policy: Beijing sees opacity as tied to survivability. China will focus on conventional military modernisation (including space and cyber), where NFU does not restrict use of force. China's adherence to NFU stabilises the non-proliferation regime only in upholding continuity amid uncertainty in Moscow and Washington. US-China dialogue on strategic relations will not progress while Washington presses Beijing for details on operational conditions of NFU.


Significance Uncertainties surround Trump's willingness to uphold past US foreign policy commitments; nuclear weapons policy is no exception. The next administration will take power with political squabbles deadlocking arms control institutions, fraying international consensus on shared priorities for reducing nuclear dangers, and Washington standing opposite nuclear-armed states in several simmering disputes. Impacts North Korean technological advances will render the US goal of Pyongyang's eventual denuclearisation untenable. Trump will scrutinise Iran for nuclear deal backsliding; Tehran may nevertheless see benefits in strict adherence. Washington questioning its post-1979 'One China' policy towards Taiwan could lead Beijing to adopt a more provocative nuclear posture. US allies in Asia and NATO will view nuclear policy shifts as clues to Washington's relative commitment to their security. Trump's overtures may lead to greater cooperation with Russia on sanctions and counterterrorism, but probably not arms reductions.


Significance At the conclusion of the meeting, a customary statement was issued by the bloc’s chair, which this year is Vietnam. Among other points, the statement confirmed establishment of a COVID-19 ASEAN Response Fund and noted concerns among members about recent developments in the South China Sea. Impacts ASEAN members will remain unable to agree on a united response to the Rohingya crisis. Disagreement on how safe it is to travel amid the ongoing pandemic will delay formation of a proposed ASEAN travel corridor. A Code of Conduct for the South China Sea is unlikely to be agreed before the end of this year.


Significance The announcement came days after an international ruling under the UN Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) dismissing China's maritime claims and island-building in the South China Sea -- a ruling that Beijing has rejected. This will affect an aspect of China-South-east Asia relations that has gone under-noticed amid the maritime controversies: security and defence cooperation. Impacts Despite growing Chinese interest, Thailand will still seek security ties with Washington. As a beneficiary of competing Chinese and US diplomacy, Myanmar will try to balance the two powers' advances. The further China pushes defence interests and ties in ASEAN, the harder ASEAN will find reaching common security positions. South-east Asian countries will stay ready for maritime skirmishes; they will need Western military and technological support.


2019 ◽  
Vol 69 (4) ◽  
pp. 1207-1212 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lei Li ◽  
Qi-hang Xu ◽  
Xiao-tian Wang ◽  
Hou-wen Lin ◽  
Yan-hua Lu

A novel marine actinomycete, designated LHW63021T, was isolated from a marine sponge, genus Craniella, collected in the South China Sea. A polyphasic approach was applied to characterize the taxonomic position of this strain. The strain was found to have scarce aerial mycelia that differentiated into spore chains. The cell-wall hydrolysates contained meso-diaminopimelic acid as the diagnostic diamino acid. Glucose, galactose, mannose and madurose were found in the whole-cell hydrolysates. The dominant polar lipids were phosphatidylinositol and diphosphatidylglycerol. MK-9(H6) and MK-9(H8) were the predominant menaquinones. The major fatty acids were iso-C16 : 0, iso-C18 : 0, 10-methyl C17 : 0 and C18 : 1 ω9c. The DNA G+C content based on the draft genome sequence was 72.0 mol%. 16S rRNA gene sequence analysis indicated that strain LHW63021T was a member of the genus Actinomadura and had the highest similarity to Actinomadura echinospora DSM 43163T (97.3 %). Phylogenetic trees supported their close relationship. The average nucleotide identity and digital DNA–DNA hybridization values between the whole genome sequences of strain LHW63021T and A. echinospora DSM 43163T were 79.13 and 23.20 %, respectively. The evidence from the polyphasic study shows that strain LHW63021T represents a novel species of the genus Actinomadura , for which the name Actinomadura craniellae sp. nov. is proposed. The type strain is LHW63021T (=DSM 106125T=CCTCC AA 2018015T).


Significance Increased anxiety over Chinese land reclamation in the South China Sea, particularly its construction of an airstrip and harbour on Fiery Cross Reef, is drawing considerable attention to US policy in the region where US allies have been pressing for greater involvement. Impacts Regional and US rhetoric on Chinese reclamation may provoke an increased demonstration of US military engagement in the region. However, the size and scale of these activities will be highly dependent on the pace and character of Chinese activities. This issue is likely to be featured conspicuously by Carter at the Shangri-la Dialogue in Singapore. It will almost certainly raise difficulties during Chinese President Xi Jinping's September visit to Washington. Given Hillary Clinton's previous statements, pursuing a 'tough' China policy may become a prominent theme of her presidential bid.


Significance However, China's navy already has an operational sea-based nuclear deterrent based on Hainan Island. The deployment of nuclear-armed submarines, and their need to reach the mid-Pacific to threaten the continental United States, makes the South China Sea an arena not just of maritime disputes but of US-China military rivalry. Impacts The strategic importance of the Philippines, Taiwan and Singapore to the United States will increase. A new defence agreement with the Philippines will, as of last month, support US military activities in the area. Washington will encourage greater Japanese involvement in the South China Sea; as long as Shinzo Abe is prime minister, Japan will oblige.


Subject The outlook for deepening defence links between Japan and Malaysia. Significance Chinese Politburo member Yu Zhengsheng warned visiting Japanese lawmakers on June 29 that the South China Sea maritime disputes have "nothing to do with Japan". This comes amid new developments in South-east Asian governments' efforts to strengthen security cooperation with Japan. Among them is the agreement between Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on May 25 to elevate bilateral ties to the level of 'Strategic Partnership'. This reflects Malaysia's growing concern over China's actions in the South China Sea, which are increasingly expanding southwards, affecting Malaysian-claimed territorial waters. Malaysian officials on June 9 announced a complaint to China over a Chinese coast guard vessel near Luconia Shoals. Impacts The Philippines's armed forces are less powerful than Malaysia's, implying more scope to develop Japan-Philippines defence ties. Vietnam, and perhaps Indonesia, may be the next ASEAN countries to seek deeper defence ties with Japan. Malaysian criticism of China over the South China Sea could see a more assertive ASEAN over disputed maritime claims.


Subject ASEAN-China security cooperation. Significance China-ASEAN security cooperation has moderated the assertiveness Beijing displayed in the South China Sea during the first half of this year. In October, China and the ASEAN states held their first ever joint naval exercise. Impacts The verbal statements on regional maritime security cooperation will increasingly be followed by concrete actions. Negotiations over a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea will advance slowly and contentiously. China-Philippines joint energy explorations in the South China Sea will remain hamstrung by Philippine constitutional conditions.


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