Brexit will remove advocate for Balkans enlargement

Subject Prospects for EU enlargement to the Western Balkans after the UK vote to leave. Significance EU officials and diplomats in the region are publicly trying to send messages that, when it comes to the accession prospects of the Western Balkan countries, everything remains 'business as usual', despite the UK vote to leave ('Brexit'). The familiar refrain is that as long as the countries of the region deliver on the reforms demanded by the EU, the process will continue to move forward. Impacts UK-Balkans trade, investment and remittances flows are too low to inflict any appreciable Brexit 'shock'. Serbia will remain on course for the EU despite Brexit, which will have no major financial or economic impact, the Serbian premier has said. However, the National Bank of Serbia cut its key policy rate yesterday, expecting Brexit to affect emerging economies, including Serbia. Pro-Russian elements in the Balkans will welcome UK withdrawal as removing a perceived obstacle to rapprochement between the EU and Russia.

Subject Russia's contacts with Balkans political parties. Significance For Moscow, connections with Balkan parties are an instrument to exert influence in a region falling within the West's sphere. The declaration the ruling United Russia party signed with parties from Serbia, Bosnia-Hercegovina (BiH), Macedonia and Bulgaria on June 27 called for military neutrality in a Balkan zone of neutral sovereign states within a new pan-European continental security architecture that would exclude NATO membership and hark back to the Yugoslav policy of non-alignment. Impacts Russia will balance NATO expansion into the Western Balkans with initiatives to increase its influence in the region's domestic politics. Moscow will tacitly accept the Balkans' integration into the EU. Russia will seek to diversify alliances, cooperating with both mainstream pragmatists and radicals calling for a turn away from the West.


2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-70

This article analyses effects of Brexit on relations between the United Kingdom and the Western Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia). First, the symbolism of the UK departure from the EU for the Western Balkans is explained. In the following step, multiple types of relations (in trade, security, culture) between the post-Brexit UK and this region are analysed using the theoretical concepts of linkage, leverage and soft power. Finally, the consequences of Brexit on further EU enlargement are presented. The research has confirmed the initial hypotheses. First, as expected, the volume and density of UK-Western Balkan relations will be reduced after Brexit. Second, Western Balkans is of a very limited interest for the UK, primarily in security. Third, Brexit has not in a serious way changed the already existing low chances of EU accession for the Western Balkan countries. The reason for this has little to do with the UK’s presence in or absence from the EU and is rather a consequence of the majority view within the Union (that Britain had already shared before Brexit) concerning further enlargement and low level of preparation of Western Balkan countries for EU membership.


Subject Intensifying disputes over several borders in the Western Balkans. Significance Croatia and Slovenia are at odds over their maritime border in the Adriatic. Kosovo rejects Montenegro’s claim to a parcel of land which Kosovo currently controls, while Serbia is mounting a challenge to the very existence of its border with Kosovo. Bosnian Serbs are threatening to create a new international border with the rest of Bosnia-Hercegovina (BiH). Impacts Border disputes will have an adverse impact on economic development and business continuity in the affected areas. Border disputes will frustrate the integration of the Balkans with the EU and NATO. Disputes over borders will provide a flashpoint for potential conflict, especially in Kosovo and BiH.


Subject Outlook for the Swiss economy. Significance Financial market turbulence following the UK vote to leave the EU has caused sharp pound depreciation and demand for 'safe-haven' assets, including the Swiss franc. With official interest rates already negative, Swiss authorities can do little except intervene directly in the foreign-exchange (forex) market. So far, the franc has remained below the high hit in January 2015 following the Swiss National Bank (SNB)'s decision to end the currency's peg to the euro. However, concerns over the economic threat of a strong franc and the high cost of living in Switzerland will be revived. Impacts The SNB is unlikely to reintroduce the euro peg. Further economic weakness and more job losses will emerge if the franc and its cost base strengthen further. With the exception of particular niches, the movement of both commuters and businesses to cheaper EU bases may accelerate. Exceptions include sectors of specialism, such as pharmaceuticals, private banking and headquarter operations for multinationals.


Significance Part of the preparations for the summit was the ‘reflection forum’ in Trieste on June 26-27, which gathered representatives of international organisations, media and NGOs from Europe and the Balkans. They underlined the risks of further destabilisation in the Balkans, with Bosnia-Hercegovina (BiH) in particular entering deeper into a political crisis characterised by personal animosities and mistrust among all key politicians. Impacts Whether the Balkans destabilises further or stabilises depends on EU and US ability and desire to engage more concretely and resolutely. The gradual fading of EU enlargement has fuelled regional tensions and enabled other influences to grow. Russia could play spoiler by using its influence among Serbs in BiH, Serbia and Montenegro to destabilise the Balkans. Turkey's worsening relations with the EU, United States and NATO and its rapprochement with Russia could create regional tensions.


Significance Disturbances in the newest NATO member state stems from religious and political affiliation rather than any doctrinal split, pitting pro-Western Montenegrin nationalists and minorities against self-identified Serbs loyal to Belgrade and Moscow. It is part of a broader Balkan split between pro-Western and pro-Russia orientations. Impacts The Western Balkans could become another contentious issue dividing Russia and Turkey, alongside Idlib and Libya. Unlike the EU, NATO is still interested in expanding in the Balkans. The West will push back against Beijing’s Balkan influence although its political profile is much lower than Moscow’s.


Subject Prospects for the Balkans in 2020. Significance Political malaise in South-eastern Europe will continue next year as EU enlargement (the West’s plan for stabilising the troubled Western Balkans) becomes an ever more remote prospect and the United States and Russia continue their ‘new Cold War’ in the region. These overarching developments will coincide with, and contribute to, a deepening domestic instability in much of the region.


ECONOMICS ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 49-58
Author(s):  
Tahir Mahmutefendic

Abstract Apart from the former EFTA members (Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway and Switzerland) and a few former republics of the Soviet Union (Bjelorussia, Moldova and Ukraina) the countries of the Western Balkans are the only European states outside of the European Union. They are very keen to join the Union. The Balkans have always been the poorest part of Europe. The appeal of the wealthy European Union is apparent. Access to the largest market in the world, investment, modern technologies and generous regional funds give a hope that by joining the EU the Western Balkans countries will join the rich club. At the moment performance of the Western Balkan countries does not guarantee that they will become rich by joining the European Union. Their current production and trade structure makes it likely that the Western Balkan countries will be locked in inter-industry trade in which they will export products of low and medium technological and developmental level and import products of high technological and developmental level. This might lead to divergence rather than convergence between them and the European Union. In other to overcome this problem the Western Balkan countries need to conduct radical reforms in the public sector, fiscal policy, industrial trade and investment policy. They also need to tackle corruption, simplify administrative procedure, strenghten property rights and the lawful state. All this with the aim to change economic structure and shift from achievements of the second and third to fourth technological revolution. Only if these reforms are successfuly implemented the Western Balkan countries can hope to avoid the Greek scenario and possibly experience the Irish scenario.


Napredak ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-18
Author(s):  
Dimitrios Teofilaktu

The foundations of the strong historical ties between Serbia and Cyprus lie on common struggles, dating back to the 19th and 20th centuries, particularly during the two great wars. Their long struggles against various aggressors, like the Ottoman Turks, Nazi Germany and British colonialism, have left long-lasting wounds on their societies, but also a legacy of bravery, resilience, perseverance and national pride. The deep friendship is also premised on common cultural and Orthodox roots, which helped the two peoples overcome major challenges and preserve their national identity and cultural values. This analysis explores the challenges ahead and assesses the new strategic partnership, including the trilateral cooperation between Serbia-Greece-Cyprus, particularly in light of EU enlargement in the Western Balkans and the volatile situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. The article also attempts to evaluate how the policy of neutrality, that both Yugoslavia and Cyprus have pursued as founding members of the Non-Aligned Movement, would serve today the national interests of Serbia and Cyprus and, by extension, stability and security in their respective regions and the European continent at large, given their elevated geostrategic position.


2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-68
Author(s):  
Aleksandra Čavoški

Although the implementation of the acquis is a crucial element of the EU integration process, it is recognised as its ‘weakest link’. The implementation deficit is especially apparent with the EU environmental acquis, both in the existing member states and the accession countries. Most recently, following the accession of Croatia, the EU faces prospective enlargement to other Western Balkans countries. The author argues that there are specific problems in implementing the environmental acquis in accession countries and that the case of Serbia, or other countries of the Western Balkans, is not particularly unique. The case study used to support this argument is the implementation of the waste acquis in Serbia as it represents a highly demanding and costly policy area for national authorities and the country faces extensive legal, institutional, economic and financial challenges in implementing the environmental acquis.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document