Warsaw may be isolated in EU on ‘posted workers’

Subject Poland’s isolation over EU labour reform. Significance "They will not break us," Prime Minister Beata Szydlo said in a recent interview for a right-wing weekly. She was referring to Poland’s opposition to EU migration policy and more generally to a broader set of issues that divide the right-wing government in Warsaw from its EU partners. Szydlo's belligerent rhetoric plays well with domestic audiences but conceals Poland’s inability to build alliances and protect its interests. These weaknesses have become apparent during recent talks on reforming the EU’s Posted Workers Directive. Impacts New regulations may erode the competitive advantage of Polish firms that regularly post workers to western EU member states. The Polish budget would lose posted workers’ social insurance contributions, a loss estimated as worth up to 275 million dollars a month. Poland’s reputation as a regional spokesman for the interests of CEE member states may be undermined.

Significance German Chancellor Angela Merkel has said Germany is "ready to offer support" on four Turkish demands in return for cooperating with the EU in the migrant crisis. At a joint press conference in Istanbul yesterday, Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu repeated Ankara's four conditions for implementing an action plan against the influx of Syrian refugees into Europe. It wants more EU aid for those refugees inside Turkey; three chapters opened in Turkey's EU accession negotiations; visa liberalisation for Turks travelling to the EU; and a seat for Turkey at EU summits. Impacts Erdogan's resentment over EU condemnations of growing authoritarianism is so deep that any EU softening will have little impact. Davutoglu and Erdogan present Turkey as so important globally, that the EU is desperate that it join; they have no interest in accession. Several EU member states have severe reservations about visa liberalisation, funding aid and opening new accession chapters.


Significance One of the front-runners to replace Mattarella is Prime Minister Mario Draghi, who recently gave a strong indication that he intends to run. However, if Draghi is elected president, there does not appear to be an alternative government which could guarantee political stability and make progress on Italy’s crucial reform agenda. Impacts A situation where there is no strong alternative to Draghi’s leadership may boost the electoral appeal of the far-right Brothers of Italy. The return of political instability would diminish Italy’s leverage in the EU regarding important issues such as foreign and fiscal policy. Unless the right-wing parties perform poorly, it is unlikely that Draghi would be elected as prime minister after the next election.


Significance This has put Salvini under pressure, though it has not weakened his support for Prime Minister Mario Draghi’s government of national unity. Support for Draghi suggests the League is becoming a more moderate party, which could help FdI consolidate support on the far right ahead of the next election, currently scheduled for 2023. Impacts The prospects of an amalgamation between the League and Forza Italia are strong, and would boost the former’s centrist credentials. While Five Star Movement support for Draghi is unreliable, its MPs do not want a general election as many of them would lose their seats. An unforeseen crisis, such as an uncontrollable wave of illegal migrants, would play into the hands of the right-wing parties.


Significance The talks will focus on fiscal performance ahead of drafting the 2019 budget, in the light of a major policy speech by Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras in Thessaloniki in which he promised a relaxation of many of the strictures imposed during Greece’s bailouts. With an eye on approaching elections, the Syriza-led government has announced extensive economic handouts, claiming it can finance them without recourse to the pension cuts and tax hikes demanded by creditors in June in exchange for debt relief. Impacts Domestic political uncertainty and Turkey’s financial crisis are keeping spreads on Greek bonds wider than those of other EU member states. The government claims it has a reserve of some 20 billion euros, sufficient to cover borrowing needs for two-and-a-half years. With investment flows sluggish, privatisation will proceed slowly and there is minimal productive investment.


2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (3/4) ◽  
pp. 523-528 ◽  
Author(s):  
Witold Klaus

The so called refugee crisis in 2015 coincided with the Polish parliamentary electoral campaign. The effect of it was – for the first time in Poland – the introduction of migration policy to the political agenda of the right-wing and populist political parties on a massive scale. They presented migration as an issue of security – both national and cultural, direct and symbolic. The new government, acting since the end of 2015, included immigration and asylum issues into their political programme as a key element of national security. Their discourse about refugees is usually based on the differentiation: us and them. And “them” are pictured as evil, dangerous, Muslim terrorists. The new government and its authoritarian style of governing has introduced a number of initiatives designed to deprive individuals of immigrant rights (like in the new so-called Antiterrorist Act from the mid of 2016, based on which every foreign citizen could be put under surveillance without any court control) or to stop refugee influx on the Polish territory in any way – directly from their country of origin (new amendments to asylum law are trying to introduce border and accelerated procedures) or under the UE resettlement and relocation programme (Poland is one of 3 EU Member States – along Hungary and Austria – that hasn’t relocated anyone). In this paper I will present in more detail the legal changes described above, their consequences and the so-called rationalities presented by the government.


2021 ◽  
pp. 194016122110226
Author(s):  
Ayala Panievsky

As populist campaigns against the media become increasingly common around the world, it is ever more urgent to explore how journalists adopt and respond to them. Which strategies have journalists developed to maintain the public's trust, and what may be the implications for democracy? These questions are addressed using a thematic analysis of forty-five semistructured interviews with leading Israeli journalists who have been publicly targeted by Israel's Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu. The article suggests that while most interviewees asserted that adherence to objective reporting was the best response to antimedia populism, many of them have in fact applied a “strategic bias” to their reporting, intentionally leaning to the Right in an attempt to refute the accusations of media bias to the Left. This strategy was shaped by interviewees' perceived helplessness versus Israel's Prime Minister and his extensive use of social media, a phenomenon called here “the influence of presumed media impotence.” Finally, this article points at the potential ramifications of strategic bias for journalism and democracy. Drawing on Hallin's Spheres theory, it claims that the strategic bias might advance Right-wing populism at present, while also narrowing the sphere of legitimate controversy—thus further restricting press freedom—in the future.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dmytro S. Melnyk ◽  
Oleg A. Parfylo ◽  
Oleksii V. Butenko ◽  
Olena V. Tykhonova ◽  
Volodymyr O. Zarosylo

Purpose The experience of most European Union (EU) Member States has demonstrated effective anti-corruption practices, making the EU one of the leaders in this field, which can be used as an example to learn from in the field of anti-corruption. The purpose of this study is to analyze and identify the main features of anti-corruption legislation and strategies to prevent corruption at the national and supranational levels of the EU. Design/methodology/approach The following methods were used in the work: discourse and content analysis, method of system analysis, method of induction and deduction, historical-legal method, formal-legal method, comparative-legal method and others. Using the historical and legal method, the evolution of the formation of anti-corruption regulation at the supranational level was revealed. The comparative law method helped to compare the practices of the Member States of the EU in the field of anti-corruption regulation. The formal-legal method is used for generalization, classification and systematization of research results, as well as for the correct presentation of these results. Findings The main results, prospects for further research and the value of the material. The paper offers a critical review of key EU legal instruments on corruption, from the first initiatives taken in the mid-1990s to recent years. Originality/value In addition, the article analyzes the relevant anti-corruption legislation in the EU member states that are in the top 10 countries with the lowest level of corruption, namely: Denmark, Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands, Germany and Luxembourg.


2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 427-447 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marijke Welisch ◽  
Gustav Resch ◽  
André Ortner

Purpose The purpose of the paper is to provide estimation results for feasibility of renewable energy source (RES) deployment in Turkey, the Western Balkans and North Africa. From these results, the potential for cooperation in renewables production between the countries and the European Union (EU) is assessed and evaluated, in a mid- (2030) and long-term (up to 2040) perspective. Design/methodology/approach The authors focus on the quantitative assessments undertaken on the extent to which RES cooperation can create mutual benefits, identifying costs and benefits for both sides, but in particular with respect to RES target achievement (2020 and 2030) at EU level. The potentials for RES generation in Turkey, North Africa and the Western Balkans are calculated under different policy pathways, taking into account different levels of economic and non-economic barriers that could occur. Findings Overall, the authors found that increasing RES deployment in the three analysed regions and initiating or intensifying cooperation with EU28 Member States leads to mutual benefits. Concretely, these benefits become apparent in terms of the EU Member States importing renewable energy sources for electricity with a good resource quality and adding on to their targets for RES deployment. At the same time, substantial savings occur for the EU, in turn leading to income and investments in the cooperating regions. Originality/value The assessment underlying this paper is the first of its kind to the authors’ knowledge that opens up the geographical spread in comparison to merely assessing cooperation between Europe and the Middle East and North Africa. Furthermore, the multitude of policy parameters analysed provides detailed and robust insights concerning a broad variety of different possible scenarios.


Significance The five-party coalition enters office at a time of intense economic and social uncertainty resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic, rising debt and soaring energy prices. Prime Minister Petr Fiala's greatest challenges involve negotiating between the five coalition partners and restoring respectability to Czech politics. Impacts The new government will be less sceptical about closer EU integration, given the upcoming Czech EU presidency from mid-2022. The government will try to reopen EU Green Deal chapters to renegotiate compensation for highly industrialised member states. Former Prime Minister Andrej Babis may run for president in 2023. Babis will strive to avoid losing parliamentary immunity from prosecution relating to the Stork’s Nest affair and alleged EU subsidy fraud.


Author(s):  
Laurențiu Ștefan

In Romania, a highly segmented and extremely volatile party system has contributed to a predominance of coalition governments. Alternation in power by coalitions led by either left-wing or right-wing parties used to be a major feature of Romanian governments. Thus, until a short-lived grand coalition in 2009, ideologically homogeneous coalitions were the general practice. Since then, parties from the right and left of the political spectrum have learned to work together in government. Given the semi-presidential nature of the political regime and the exclusive power to nominate the prime minister, the Romanian president plays an important role in coalition formation. The president also plays a pivotal role by shadowing the prime minister and therefore influencing the governance of coalitions. She has the power to veto ministerial appointments and therefore she can also shape the cabinet line-up. Pre-election coalitions are a common feature, more than two-thirds of Romanian coalition governments have been predicated on such agreements. Coalition agreements dealt with both policy issues and coalition decision-making bodies and the governance mechanisms that have been in most cases enforced and complied with—until the break-up of the coalition and the downfall of the respective government. One very common decision-making body is the Coalition Committee, which has been backed on the operational level by an inner cabinet made up of the prime minister and the deputy prime ministers, which usually are the heads of the junior coalition parties.


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