Mali insecurity is spreading southwards

Significance On November 1, three Chinese workers who had been kidnapped by unknown gunmen last July were released, but even this positive development underscores some of the main problematic issues confronting the country, such as the southward spread of violence, the criminality accompanying the multi-sided civil war and the security forces’ relative incapacity in face of these cross-cutting drivers of insecurity. Impacts Worsening security in southern Mali will further elevate concerns in coastal West African countries, especially Mauritania and Senegal. The degradation of security does not appear to be elevating coup risks in the short term. Mali’s conflict zones are already food-stressed, and this will spread into parts of the southern Koulikoro and Kayes Regions.

Subject COVID-19 and jihadists. Significance Jihadist attacks are rising across the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin regions, as are conflict fatalities more broadly. However, the increase cannot be solely, or even primarily, attributed to the COVID-19 pandemic. The remote areas where jihadists fight are in the early stages of their respective outbreaks; much of the increased violence reflects pre-existing conflict dynamics. Many of the fatalities, meanwhile, are caused by state security forces, who may be taking advantage of the pandemic, even more than jihadists are, to target civilians with relative impunity. Impacts Sensitive talks between humanitarian aid groups and jihadists may determine the level of famine in parts of the Sahel over the short term. Relationships between governments and human rights groups and journalists will grow even tenser during COVID-19-related restrictions. Accurate information about conflict zones may become harder to obtain amid restrictions and increased government defensiveness.


Significance While the overall number of incidents is fewer than a dozen since the rise of the region's jihadist insurgencies in the early 2010s, the trend lends credence to growing warnings about the jihadist threat to coastal West African countries. Concern has focused on Ivory Coast and Benin, but there is also nervousness about Ghana, Togo and even Senegal. Impacts Western governments will boost security assistance to coastal states. Intelligence sharing and joint operations will not forestall cross-border hit-and-run attacks. Most regional states will resort to security-focused responses whose abuses drive jihadist recruitment.


Significance For over a month, Jammeh rebuffed diplomatic efforts by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to accept Adama Barrow's victory in the December 1 presidential poll. An ECOWAS military intervention into The Gambia -- accompanied by last-minute diplomatic efforts and purported financial and security guarantees -- finally forced Jammeh to accept defeat. Impacts A truth commission offering amnesty for military officials and the outgoing government could prompt discord within the new ruling alliance. Military restructuring will be a priority for Barrow's government. International assistance will likely flow in support of the new president. The Gambia's tourism sector -- which makes up nearly 20% of the country's GDP -- will struggle to recover in the short-term. The ECOWAS intervention could prove unpopular among members' domestic constituencies if a lengthy, costly mission emerges.


Subject Nigeria's restructuring debates. Significance Former Vice-President Atiku Abubakar, a potential presidential candidate for the opposition People's Democratic Party (PDP) in next year's elections, has publicly backed restructuring Nigeria's centralised, federal system. His comments follow shortly after a committee from the ruling All Progressives Congress (APC) produced a report that proposed giving each of Nigeria's 36 states control over mineral resources, decentralising the security forces and reviewing the states' revenue allocation formula. Despite advocating for restructuring during his 2015 presidential campaign, President Muhammadu Buhari has recently dismissed calls for greater devolution. Impacts Significant national restructuring would likely necessitate a census, something there is currently little political appetite for. Police force devolution is one of the APC restructuring proposals most likely to find favour with Buhari's government. Ending a Senate-presidency impasse over central bank nominations will bring short-term investor relief, but divisions will likely linger.


Significance Opposition leader Raila Odinga and supporters of his National Super Alliance (NASA) have long since lost faith in the capacity of the IEBC to deliver a free and fair election and have regularly alleged that the ruling party plans to steal the vote. Opposition supporters claim Msando was killed because he was determined to ensure that the technology designed to prevent electoral fraud worked -- his murder lends credibility to Odinga's narrative that the process is being undermined from within. With only a week until the election, attention is focused not on political platforms but on the potential for voter fraud or a contested result. Impacts Electoral controversies and the delegitimisation of the electoral commission increase the risk of post-election violence. Widespread ethnic clashes on the scale of 2007-08 are unlikely due to heavy deployments of state security forces. Political instability, even if limited, will deter tourism and investment, hurting short-term economic growth.


Subject Russian private military companies. Significance Despite casualties and other reverses in Syria, the Wagner private military company (PMC) is increasingly active in Africa. It is operating in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Sudan, and talk of a further expansion intensified in November when Wagner's owner Yevgeny Prigozhin attended a meeting between Russian defence officials and Field-Marshal Khalifa Haftar, military commander and powerbroker in eastern Libya. Impacts In the short term, Wagner and other PMCs offer the Kremlin a quick route to building influence in Africa and beyond. PMCs are likely to proliferate along with Moscow's deeper involvement in conflict zones and countries with serious security challenges. Russian companies now doing private security work will increasingly take on more aggressive tasks.


Subject Brunei's economic diversification. Significance Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah, ruler of Brunei for the past 50 years, is turning to Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) and engineering companies to expand his country’s infrastructure and reduce its dependence on crude oil exports. The first phase of the China-funded Pulau Muara Besar (PMB) oil refinery and petrochemical complex is due to open in early 2019. Impacts A rise in oil prices will drive Brunei’s GDP growth in the short term. Reliance on Chinese companies will increase the number of Chinese workers brought to Brunei, limiting opportunities for local labour. Within ASEAN, Brunei will support Beijing on South China Sea issues.


Significance This was the second major protest banned by the authorities in recent days, amid deepening public dissatisfaction with the government's handling of the economy. As fears grow among the ruling ZANU-PF government of a popular uprising, the security forces are intensifying a clampdown on opposition and civil society figures. Impacts Recent violence will probably delay, but not necessarily scupper plans for a new IMF funding package over the medium-to-long term. A potential increase in public-sector wages has unnerved the IMF amid fears over renewed fiscal slippages. A recent scandal over the looting of pension funds by officials has undermined already fragile confidence in government. The current public services crisis will likely worsen over the short term, as strikes by workers increase. Opposition calls for a transitional government are likely to come to naught over the short term amid entrenched ZANU-PF resistance.


Significance Presidential elections in the other five (Burkina Faso, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast and Niger) are set for the fourth quarter. While ECOWAS touts its regional trade and monetary harmonisation efforts, contentious polls complicate its short-term agenda. Impacts Implementation of ECOWAS's new regional counterterrorism strategy will be hampered by insufficient funding and resources. The proposed July launch of the regional ‘Eco’ common currency will likely prove too ambitious and be subject to delays. Nigeria’s various conflicts and political divisions, as well as its autarkic policies, will limit its traditional regional leadership role. Former Burkinabe Prime Minister Kadre Desire Ouedraogo could present a formidable challenge to President Roch Marc Christian Kabore. Despite its reputation for stability, opposition criticisms of the electoral authorities will increase scrutiny of Ghana's polls.


Subject West African currency plans. Significance The new ‘Eco’ currency backed by the West African and Economic Monetary Union (WAEMU) and France is meant to be put into circulation in July. However, the COVID-19 pandemic and other political issues have compounded existing problems in meeting the deadline. At a recent extraordinary summit of ECOWAS leaders, the Eco issue was notably absent from the agenda. Meanwhile, divisions and confusion persist over proposed regional currency plans, with accusations from several mainly English-speaking states that an earlier ECOWAS-backed ‘Eco’ single currency has been hijacked. Impacts In the event the WAEMU Eco is introduced, France’s guarantee will mitigate the risk of capital flight and abrupt currency depreciation. Nigeria will likely oppose WAMZ members joining the WAEMU Eco until such point as there is no French involvement. ECOWAS’s short-term focus will be on the African Union’s debt cancellation and relief initiatives.


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